ARMENIAN NEWS...TURKISH-ARMENIAN RELATIONS,,,AND MORE!...
One article more open-minded, the second trots to the usual one-sided
arguments.
Al-Arabiya, UAE
2015 - A definitive year for Turkish-Armenian relations
Sunday, 4 January 2015
Sinem Cengiz
The year of 2014 tested both Turkey's foreign and domestic politics.
The security threat originating from the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) at its doorsteps and the domestic political turmoil
challenged Turkish politics throughout the year. The foreign and the
domestic issues that emerged during the year of 2014 are likely to
continue during 2015.
However, among several foreign policy issues, Armenia seems
Weathering the storm
According to Richard Giragosian, the director of the Yerevan-based
Regional Studies Center (RSC), there are both challenges and limits in
2015; however, he believes that the Turkish government would seek to
"weather the storm" of 2015, and only after the commemoration passes,
would consider returning to the process of diplomatic engagement with
Armenia.
Giragosian, in an interview last May in Yerevan, stated that Turkish
side was exaggerating the importance of the year 2015 to be greater
than it actually need be. "This is a psychological burden created by
Turkey in terms of making the year 2015 a big issue. Turkey
overreacting to the anniversary will only make the issue a bigger
one," he said. Agreeing with Giragosian, I believe that rather than
considering 2015 as a panic year, Turkey should consider it as a year
for opportunity to resume efforts at normalizing relations with
Armenia. Turkey can take some significant steps, like it did in 2014,
for the normalization of relations with its neighbor in 2015.
Armenia seems to be the most significant foreign policy issue that
would dominate Turkish politics in the first half of 2015
Last year witnessed unprecedented, significant and historic
developments in Turkish-Armenian relations. However, the most
important step from the Turkish side came by then- Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current president of Turkey, who issued a
historic and a timing message of condolences about killings of
Armenians in 1915. Erdogan's statement came on 23 April, a day before
of 99th anniversary of the tragic events.
For the first time in the history of Turkey, a Turkish leader offered
condolences to the descendants of Ottoman Armenians. Such a message
would have been unthinkable a decade ago. It was a very momentous
indication of how the taboos regarding the Armenian question were
breaking in Turkey although the official stance regarding the issue
remains unchanged. The ruling Justice and Development Party
government, with exception to many other issues, has taken important
steps regarding the lifting of the taboos on freely discussing 1915
when compared to the previous Turkish governments. As Giragosian
In the last days of 2014, Etyen Mahçupyan, the top adviser for
the Turkish prime minister, stated that a priority for the future
should be establishing relations with Armenia as well as the
millions-strong diaspora rather than expecting to resolve a
long-running dispute within this year. Mahçupyan, who considers
To open the border without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem
would be baseless according to both ethical and realistic rationales.
The year of 2014 tested both Turkey's foreign and domestic politics.
The security threat originating from the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) at its doorsteps and the domestic political turmoil
challenged Turkish politics throughout the year. The foreign and the
domestic issues that emerged during the year of 2014 are likely to
continue during 2015.
However, among several foreign policy issues, Armenia seems
to be the most significant issue that would dominate Turkish
politics in the first half of 2015. Given the importance of 2015,
the centennial of the tragic events of 1915 that led to the mass
killings of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I,
Turkish-Armenian relations is expected to go through a hard test.
The tragic events of 1915 are a greatly controversial matter in Turkey
and Armenia as Armenians describe the events as "genocide" while
Turkey says the events do not amount to genocide and that both Turks
and Armenians were killed. April 2015, for this reason, will be very
significant for both Turkey and Armenia. Armenians, who will be
commemorating the centennial of the 1915 events, are engaged into
several efforts for the international recognition of this tragedy as a
"genocide". On Turkish side, in response to the Armenians'
The tragic events of 1915 are a greatly controversial matter in Turkey
and Armenia as Armenians describe the events as "genocide" while
Turkey says the events do not amount to genocide and that both Turks
and Armenians were killed. April 2015, for this reason, will be very
significant for both Turkey and Armenia. Armenians, who will be
commemorating the centennial of the 1915 events, are engaged into
several efforts for the international recognition of this tragedy as a
"genocide". On Turkish side, in response to the Armenians'
efforts for 2015, Turkish government plans to commemorate
the centennial of the Çanakkale (Dardanelles) campaign on
April 24-25 in order to counter the adverse effects of Armenian
efforts.
Weathering the storm
According to Richard Giragosian, the director of the Yerevan-based
Regional Studies Center (RSC), there are both challenges and limits in
2015; however, he believes that the Turkish government would seek to
"weather the storm" of 2015, and only after the commemoration passes,
would consider returning to the process of diplomatic engagement with
Armenia.
Giragosian, in an interview last May in Yerevan, stated that Turkish
side was exaggerating the importance of the year 2015 to be greater
than it actually need be. "This is a psychological burden created by
Turkey in terms of making the year 2015 a big issue. Turkey
overreacting to the anniversary will only make the issue a bigger
one," he said. Agreeing with Giragosian, I believe that rather than
considering 2015 as a panic year, Turkey should consider it as a year
for opportunity to resume efforts at normalizing relations with
Armenia. Turkey can take some significant steps, like it did in 2014,
for the normalization of relations with its neighbor in 2015.
Armenia seems to be the most significant foreign policy issue that
would dominate Turkish politics in the first half of 2015
Last year witnessed unprecedented, significant and historic
developments in Turkish-Armenian relations. However, the most
important step from the Turkish side came by then- Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current president of Turkey, who issued a
historic and a timing message of condolences about killings of
Armenians in 1915. Erdogan's statement came on 23 April, a day before
of 99th anniversary of the tragic events.
For the first time in the history of Turkey, a Turkish leader offered
condolences to the descendants of Ottoman Armenians. Such a message
would have been unthinkable a decade ago. It was a very momentous
indication of how the taboos regarding the Armenian question were
breaking in Turkey although the official stance regarding the issue
remains unchanged. The ruling Justice and Development Party
government, with exception to many other issues, has taken important
steps regarding the lifting of the taboos on freely discussing 1915
when compared to the previous Turkish governments. As Giragosian
puts:
"That statement not only offered a "safer space" within which to
discuss the genocide issue, it also broadened the constituency for
dialogue by sending a message not only to Armenians but also to
Erdogan's own base of supporters. And it established an important
"That statement not only offered a "safer space" within which to
discuss the genocide issue, it also broadened the constituency for
dialogue by sending a message not only to Armenians but also to
Erdogan's own base of supporters. And it established an important
new precedent, whereby every Turkish prime minister will be
expected to make a similar statement timed with each April 24th
commemoration of the Armenian genocide."
Also in 2014, Yerevan positively responded to Turkish invitation to
take part in the Erdogan's presidential inauguration ceremony. Foreign
Minister Eduard Nalbandyan, who attended the ceremony, also invited
Erdogan to visit Armenia on April, 24 2015. It is difficult to make a
prediction whether Erdogan will visit Armenia or not but there are
some steps that Turkish government can take in Armenia-Turkey
rapprochement. Firstly, acknowledging the fact that Turkish-Armenian
relations are multifaceted, Ankara can pursue a multidimensional
policy in relations with Armenia. The Turkish-Armenian border,
Also in 2014, Yerevan positively responded to Turkish invitation to
take part in the Erdogan's presidential inauguration ceremony. Foreign
Minister Eduard Nalbandyan, who attended the ceremony, also invited
Erdogan to visit Armenia on April, 24 2015. It is difficult to make a
prediction whether Erdogan will visit Armenia or not but there are
some steps that Turkish government can take in Armenia-Turkey
rapprochement. Firstly, acknowledging the fact that Turkish-Armenian
relations are multifaceted, Ankara can pursue a multidimensional
policy in relations with Armenia. The Turkish-Armenian border,
which has been closed since 1994, could be open as a gesture
of good will. The long-awaited opening of the border between
two neighbors would serve significantly in opening the mental
borders between two societies. Secondly, the restoration of the
diplomatic relations between two countries and the ratification
of the frozen protocols signed between two countries in 2009 is
a must for the improvement of the bilateral ties.
In the last days of 2014, Etyen Mahçupyan, the top adviser for
the Turkish prime minister, stated that a priority for the future
should be establishing relations with Armenia as well as the
millions-strong diaspora rather than expecting to resolve a
long-running dispute within this year. Mahçupyan, who considers
2015 as a "tough year" because of the anniversary, said "I don't
think we need to hurry 100 years on. What happens later on
should proceed more healthily."
The improvement of the relations between two countries is not easy to
be achieved within a year, as it requires further time for the both
sides to make their societies ready and to take confidence building
measures. The both sides should not consider 2015 as an end,
The improvement of the relations between two countries is not easy to
be achieved within a year, as it requires further time for the both
sides to make their societies ready and to take confidence building
measures. The both sides should not consider 2015 as an end,
rather it should be considered as a start or the efforts to normalize
the ties between two countries in the post-2015.
For both Ankara and Yerevan, there may be hard limitations in moving
toward normalization; however, dragging out the process is not in
interest of neither side. The normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia will be best for the interests of the two sides as
the peace and the stability at their doorsteps and in Caucasia is of
great importance to both Yerevan and Ankara.
Allow me to conclude with a quote from former Turkish Ambassador
For both Ankara and Yerevan, there may be hard limitations in moving
toward normalization; however, dragging out the process is not in
interest of neither side. The normalization of relations between
Turkey and Armenia will be best for the interests of the two sides as
the peace and the stability at their doorsteps and in Caucasia is of
great importance to both Yerevan and Ankara.
Allow me to conclude with a quote from former Turkish Ambassador
to UK, Ünal Çeviköz, who believes that Turkey should bring out a new
initiative to overcome the deadlock in Turkish-Armenian relations.
"When I think of Turkish-Armenian relations, I am inclined to
characterize it as "history of missed opportunities" that has done
injustice not only to the two nations, the two peoples, the two
countries, but also to the whole Caucasus region. Unless there is
normalization in Turkish-Armenian relations we will have serious
difficulty in talking about an environment of sustainable peace
initiative to overcome the deadlock in Turkish-Armenian relations.
"When I think of Turkish-Armenian relations, I am inclined to
characterize it as "history of missed opportunities" that has done
injustice not only to the two nations, the two peoples, the two
countries, but also to the whole Caucasus region. Unless there is
normalization in Turkish-Armenian relations we will have serious
difficulty in talking about an environment of sustainable peace
and stability in the Caucasus."
_______
Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst based in Athens. Born and
lived in Kuwait, Cengiz focuses mainly on issues regarding Middle East
and Turkey's relations with the region. She was also the former
diplomatic correspondent for Today's Zaman newspaper, English daily in
Turkey. She is currently researching on Turkish-Saudi relations to
complete her MA in International Relations. She can be found on
Twitter:
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Jan 4 2015
The Turkish-Armenian border gate
Kamer Kasim
4 January 2015
Although the closed Turkish-Armenian border is just one of the issues
in Turkish-Armenian relations, it has time and time again made its
appearance on the agenda. Despite Turkey's recognition of the
independence of Armenia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
normal diplomatic relations could not be established. Armenia's state
policy regarding genocide allegations and its tentativeness with
respect to the Kars Treaty, which draws the Turkish-Armenian border,
have created a rift in the two countries' relations. The Armenian
Declaration of Independence states that "The Republic of Armenia
stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition
of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia." Here, the
term "Western Armenia" refers to territories within modern Turkey.
Despite this, the Turkish-Armenian border remained open until the
Armenian forces' occupation of Kelbecer, which clearly indicated that
Armenia had no intention of withdrawing from Azerbaijani territories.
On the contrary, the Armenian forces continued to occupy more ground
during the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. As a result, Turkey closed its
border with Armenia in order to demonstrate its support for
Azerbaijan. After a ceasefire to the conflict was arranged, Turkey has
used diplomatic channels to pursue a permanent solution. However, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not been resolved and violations to the
ceasefire have increased the risk of war.
Why is there pressure to open the border coming from the US and the EU?
The US and the EU are not comfortable with Armenia's policy to
maintain and further strategic ties with Russia. Indeed, Armenia has
become a country in which Russia has stationed military installments
without much domestic objection. Even the Armenian diaspora in the US
is not pleased with the state of Armenia's relations with Russia. Some
circles in the US and the EU have maintained that if the
Turkish-Armenian border were to open, then Armenia would integrate
with the West via Turkey and come to depend less on Russia. The main
deficiency of this argument is that it ignores the weakness of the
Armenian economy. The Armenian economy is in such a state that even if
the Turkish-Armenian border were to open, the trade volume between the
two countries would not experience a substantial rise and Russian
domination of the economic sphere in Armenia would persist.
Additionally, Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union
would actually indicate that Russian domination over Armenia would be
extended into the foreseeable future.
There is also the argument that if Turkey opens the border with
Armenia, the pressure coming from third countries for Turkey
_______
Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst based in Athens. Born and
lived in Kuwait, Cengiz focuses mainly on issues regarding Middle East
and Turkey's relations with the region. She was also the former
diplomatic correspondent for Today's Zaman newspaper, English daily in
Turkey. She is currently researching on Turkish-Saudi relations to
complete her MA in International Relations. She can be found on
Twitter:
Journal of Turkish Weekly
Jan 4 2015
The Turkish-Armenian border gate
Kamer Kasim
4 January 2015
Although the closed Turkish-Armenian border is just one of the issues
in Turkish-Armenian relations, it has time and time again made its
appearance on the agenda. Despite Turkey's recognition of the
independence of Armenia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union,
normal diplomatic relations could not be established. Armenia's state
policy regarding genocide allegations and its tentativeness with
respect to the Kars Treaty, which draws the Turkish-Armenian border,
have created a rift in the two countries' relations. The Armenian
Declaration of Independence states that "The Republic of Armenia
stands in support of the task of achieving international recognition
of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia." Here, the
term "Western Armenia" refers to territories within modern Turkey.
Despite this, the Turkish-Armenian border remained open until the
Armenian forces' occupation of Kelbecer, which clearly indicated that
Armenia had no intention of withdrawing from Azerbaijani territories.
On the contrary, the Armenian forces continued to occupy more ground
during the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. As a result, Turkey closed its
border with Armenia in order to demonstrate its support for
Azerbaijan. After a ceasefire to the conflict was arranged, Turkey has
used diplomatic channels to pursue a permanent solution. However, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not been resolved and violations to the
ceasefire have increased the risk of war.
Why is there pressure to open the border coming from the US and the EU?
The US and the EU are not comfortable with Armenia's policy to
maintain and further strategic ties with Russia. Indeed, Armenia has
become a country in which Russia has stationed military installments
without much domestic objection. Even the Armenian diaspora in the US
is not pleased with the state of Armenia's relations with Russia. Some
circles in the US and the EU have maintained that if the
Turkish-Armenian border were to open, then Armenia would integrate
with the West via Turkey and come to depend less on Russia. The main
deficiency of this argument is that it ignores the weakness of the
Armenian economy. The Armenian economy is in such a state that even if
the Turkish-Armenian border were to open, the trade volume between the
two countries would not experience a substantial rise and Russian
domination of the economic sphere in Armenia would persist.
Additionally, Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union
would actually indicate that Russian domination over Armenia would be
extended into the foreseeable future.
There is also the argument that if Turkey opens the border with
Armenia, the pressure coming from third countries for Turkey
to concede to genocide allegations would lessen. The
administrations of some countries which do not want their
relations with Turkey to be upset by the allegations of genocide
are particularly prone to employ this argument. Nonetheless,
this argument lacks substance as the Armenian diaspora would
continue its activities regarding genocide allegations independent
from the state of Turkey-Armenia relations.
Turkey and Armenia have signed protocols with the encouragement of
various third countries who hoped for a resultant normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations. Upon ratification of these protocols the
Turkish-Armenian border would be opened within two months. Regarding
the issue of genocide allegations, which is also one of the obstacles
to the improvement of the two countries' bilateral relations, a
sub-commission would be established in order to provide an impartial
scientific examination of the historical records. While Azerbaijan has
voiced disappointment that the protocols give no mention of the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Armenian diaspora has also criticized
the protocols as well as the Armenian administration due to the
article about the establishment of a historical sub-commission.
When it comes to the ratification of the protocols in Armenia, the
approval of the Armenian Constitutional Court is needed. While the
Armenian Constitutional Court reviewed the compatibility of the
protocols with the Armenian Constitution, it interpreted the protocols
in a way that actually clashed with the spirit of the protocols and
thus created a great debate about the meaning of the protocol's
articles. For example, the Armenian Constitutional Court stated that
the provisions of the protocols could not be interpreted or applied in
the legislative process, and that their implications for the Republic
of Armenia as well as its interstate relations actually contradicted
provisions of the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of
Armenia and the requirements of Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of
Independence of Armenia. Since the Armenian Declaration of
Independence refers to the genocide allegations and mentions "Western
Armenia", general questions have been raised about the protocols'
provisions regarding territorial integrity and the formation of the
historical sub-commission. Turkey expects the protocols to allow
discussion of the genocide allegations on a scientific platform as
well as to facilitate Armenia's open recognition of the borders as
they currently stand. If these expectations are not met, the protocols
would be meaningless for Turkey, as it would be irrational for Turkey
to open the border, which was initially closed due to the Armenian
occupation of Azerbaijani territories, without a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Why Turkey shouldn't open the Border without a Solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Turkey should not open the border without a solution to the issue that
provoked its closure in the first place. Turkey-Azerbaijan relations
would be damaged if Turkey acts otherwise. Besides, Turkey's image
would be negatively affected if it did not show decisive support to
this strategic partner.
Turkey and Armenia have signed protocols with the encouragement of
various third countries who hoped for a resultant normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations. Upon ratification of these protocols the
Turkish-Armenian border would be opened within two months. Regarding
the issue of genocide allegations, which is also one of the obstacles
to the improvement of the two countries' bilateral relations, a
sub-commission would be established in order to provide an impartial
scientific examination of the historical records. While Azerbaijan has
voiced disappointment that the protocols give no mention of the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Armenian diaspora has also criticized
the protocols as well as the Armenian administration due to the
article about the establishment of a historical sub-commission.
When it comes to the ratification of the protocols in Armenia, the
approval of the Armenian Constitutional Court is needed. While the
Armenian Constitutional Court reviewed the compatibility of the
protocols with the Armenian Constitution, it interpreted the protocols
in a way that actually clashed with the spirit of the protocols and
thus created a great debate about the meaning of the protocol's
articles. For example, the Armenian Constitutional Court stated that
the provisions of the protocols could not be interpreted or applied in
the legislative process, and that their implications for the Republic
of Armenia as well as its interstate relations actually contradicted
provisions of the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of
Armenia and the requirements of Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of
Independence of Armenia. Since the Armenian Declaration of
Independence refers to the genocide allegations and mentions "Western
Armenia", general questions have been raised about the protocols'
provisions regarding territorial integrity and the formation of the
historical sub-commission. Turkey expects the protocols to allow
discussion of the genocide allegations on a scientific platform as
well as to facilitate Armenia's open recognition of the borders as
they currently stand. If these expectations are not met, the protocols
would be meaningless for Turkey, as it would be irrational for Turkey
to open the border, which was initially closed due to the Armenian
occupation of Azerbaijani territories, without a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Why Turkey shouldn't open the Border without a Solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Turkey should not open the border without a solution to the issue that
provoked its closure in the first place. Turkey-Azerbaijan relations
would be damaged if Turkey acts otherwise. Besides, Turkey's image
would be negatively affected if it did not show decisive support to
this strategic partner.
To open the border without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem
would be baseless according to both ethical and realistic rationales.
From an ethical point of view, it would be problematic to open the
border seeing that Armenia has continued its occupation of Azerbaijani
territories while showing no intention to withdraw. Moreover, there
are UN resolutions that call for the end of Armenian occupation and
respect for Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders and
territorial integrity. This is not to mention the massacres of
Azerbaijani populations that have taken place during the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
From a realistic point of view, the greater importance of Azerbaijan,
as compared to that of Armenia, with respect to Turkey's regional role
necessitates that it not open the Armenian border without a solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Azerbaijan has a GDP of 103 billion
US Dollars and has even invested more than 5 billion US Dollars in one
single project in Turkey (Star Refinery). There are also crucial
energy lines between the two countries, namely, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural
gas pipeline. Moreover, railway lines between the two countries are
under construction and the contract for TANAP (the Trans-Anatolian
Natural Gas Pipeline), which envisages an annual transportation
capacity of 16 billion cubic meters in 2020 and 31 billion cubic
meters in 2026, has been signed. On the other hand, natural
resource-poor Armenia, which hosts a small GDP of 20 billion US
Dollars and relies heavily on Russia, does not hold much economic
potential for Turkey.
The arguments and data that have been presented by the circles who
actively lobbied for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
and particularly for the opening of the border, did not take into
account Armenia's economic realities. The argument that the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem is independent from Turkish-Armenian
relations neglects the fact that Turkey closed its border with Armenia
due to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the first place. Some Western
countries which offered financial support to Armenia based upon the
expectation that it would grow closer to the West, all the while
ignoring Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories and violation
of its internationally recognized borders, are now disappointed with
Armenia's membership to the Eurasian Economic Union. Taxpayers in
these Western countries should question the financial assistance that
was given to Armenia knowing the fact that it had shown no indication
of changing its foreign policy.
The solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is not only the
border seeing that Armenia has continued its occupation of Azerbaijani
territories while showing no intention to withdraw. Moreover, there
are UN resolutions that call for the end of Armenian occupation and
respect for Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders and
territorial integrity. This is not to mention the massacres of
Azerbaijani populations that have taken place during the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
From a realistic point of view, the greater importance of Azerbaijan,
as compared to that of Armenia, with respect to Turkey's regional role
necessitates that it not open the Armenian border without a solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Azerbaijan has a GDP of 103 billion
US Dollars and has even invested more than 5 billion US Dollars in one
single project in Turkey (Star Refinery). There are also crucial
energy lines between the two countries, namely, the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural
gas pipeline. Moreover, railway lines between the two countries are
under construction and the contract for TANAP (the Trans-Anatolian
Natural Gas Pipeline), which envisages an annual transportation
capacity of 16 billion cubic meters in 2020 and 31 billion cubic
meters in 2026, has been signed. On the other hand, natural
resource-poor Armenia, which hosts a small GDP of 20 billion US
Dollars and relies heavily on Russia, does not hold much economic
potential for Turkey.
The arguments and data that have been presented by the circles who
actively lobbied for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
and particularly for the opening of the border, did not take into
account Armenia's economic realities. The argument that the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem is independent from Turkish-Armenian
relations neglects the fact that Turkey closed its border with Armenia
due to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the first place. Some Western
countries which offered financial support to Armenia based upon the
expectation that it would grow closer to the West, all the while
ignoring Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories and violation
of its internationally recognized borders, are now disappointed with
Armenia's membership to the Eurasian Economic Union. Taxpayers in
these Western countries should question the financial assistance that
was given to Armenia knowing the fact that it had shown no indication
of changing its foreign policy.
The solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is not only the
prime condition for sustainable peace and stability in the Caucasus,
but also for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.
No comments:
Post a Comment