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The New Challenges of the Armenian Diaspora
07 November 2017 02:55 
Taline Papazian
Researcher at the University of Southern California, Institute of Armenian Studies 

The article below is a transcript of a talk given during the colloquium "Which Future for the Armenian-Turkish Dialogue? Balancing memorial issues and international relations”, which took place in Yerevan on 17 February 2017. The colloquium was organized by Yerkir Europe in partnership with the French Embassy in Armenia, the French University in Armenia (UFAR) and the Fonds d'Alembert project of the Institut Français. 

In 2016-17, we were faced with a series of particularly tense events in Turkey and in Armenia. The factors contributing to that tension are mostly political, with an armed dimension as well in both countries, but they are independent from one another. It seems that since the failure to ratify the Armenian-Turkish protocols, the two countries have been moving along parallel tracks, no longer connecting, although there could be many points of junction if only some political will to have a dialogue existed. Since July 2016 and the failed putsch attempt against Turkish President Erdogan, news events from Turkey have been regularly by the international media—and particularly in Europe. The foreign political class as well is paying attention too, after years of turning a blind eye on arbitrary detentions, academic sackings, and the silencing of progressive opinions in Turkey, could no longer afford to ignore the sometimes extremely brutal repressive measures of the AKP government against dissenting or even just differing voices. These events are starting to be recognized and, not being an expert on Turkey, I shall not dwell on them. 

Less known are the creaking noises of a perilous domestic situation, with many things at stake for the future of Armenia. Before saying a few words about it, let’s take a step back to look at the evolution of relations between the Diaspora, Turkey and Armenia over the last 15 years or so. In the lines below, I propose to brush a broad, empirical overview by focusing on the (French) Diaspora-Armenia pole, drawing from my experience of various French communities and my research work in Armenia over the last ten years. 

The three entities–Armenia, Turkey, the Diaspora—so-called to make things simpler, refer in fact to a host of various players at very different levels of action: at state, national, transnational and individual levels, to name but a few. Amidst that apparent disorder, many movements have emerged since the early 2000s which promote new actors, new challenges and new dynamics in an ever-changing triangular configuration. 

Let’s enter it through its diasporic pole, examining the recent evolutions of the most constant political and social issue: the Genocide of Armenians. The first notable change can be noticed in what we might call the “unfolding” of the collective actions in connection with the genocide issue, like the unfolding of an origami figure with paper sides previously hidden from view. Some fifteen years ago, the Genocide issue entirely revolved around the formal recognition of the genocide by sovereign political powers, including the Turkish state, although it was not the primary target anymore, locked as it was in its denial policy. Collective action regarding the Genocide issue thus centered on the political struggle and the memorial aspect of the question. Since the mid-2000s however, the Genocide issue has displayed two other facets of the problem: the fight against negationism and, separately, the question of reparations. Unfolding these three facets (so far) had the effect of placing the Armenian Genocide issue on the public political agendas of several countries where Armenian communities are traditionally present, or not; on the agenda of national and international law, the latter being a long and arduous process; and on the agenda of international relations. And it occurred with interactions and even contradictions between the three entities mentioned above, as was seen for instance during the negotiations of the Armenian-Turkish protocols. 

The second change, which developed alongside the first one, was the appearance of new community actors which allowed different voices from those of established institutions to be heard. In France, the established structures leading the political battles are the CCAF (Conseil de Coordination des Organisations Arméniennes) and the Dachnak Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation). Of course, both still play a major role in relation with public authorities in their respective countries, but they no longer hold a monopoly on the issues connected to the genocide. In the last years, the representational deficit of established institutions—never corrected in spite of the criticism and several reports addressing that problem—plunged them into a crisis of legitimacy in many ways similar to what modern states are going through, in particular such insufficiently democratic states as Armenia and Turkey. This lack of representativeness allowed many new social players from the French Armenian community to get heard, particularly on the issue of genocide hidden in its “folds”. The emergence of a “diasporic civil society” followed—i.e. a constellation of organizations outside large institutions, of people sometimes outside any structures, or individual members of those institutions personally dissatisfied with them and wanting to act independently. This global phenomenon has been facilitated by the internet and social networks and in the case of the Diaspora, it shows a specific paradoxical trait: the extreme fragmentation of opinion over very few topics. These new community actors allow other voices or viewpoints to exist and to be heard on various other facets of the “unfolded” question of the genocide. They use new strategies of action and communication, launch collaborations with partners in Armenia and/or Turkey, and thus contribute to creating transnational relations between civil societies. In terms of structuring, this diasporic civil society is only in its beginnings and, in order to become efficient, it must gain power by weaving grassroots networks between these various players and, in a second stage, push established institutions to revise the terms by which the community is effectively represented. 

The problem of Genocide negationism in France offers an illustration of that point. Negationism disseminated directly and indirectly by the Turkish state into the French society has increased substantially since the mid-2000s. Established institutions chose to react to that problem by implementing a bill condemning these ideas. And for various reasons, since 2012, the successive drafts of that bill have always failed midway to becoming law. In 2016, community officials received several unfavorable signals as to the chances of success of ever passing the bill. But there are other options to fight denial than a law making it a crime—among which the legal possibilities of existing laws against racism. However, while experts and activists of the community, as part of Diaspora civil society, are heard voicing their request to discuss other possiblities, these other options are just ignored by official “diasporic public policies”. 

These positive changes are partly due to the legacy of Hrant Dink: ten years after his assassination in Istanbul, his legacy is noticeable in the balanced position of politically conscious segments of the Diaspora. On the one hand they follow Turkish news events, showing suspicion in front of the revisionist maneuvers, the handling of official speeches by the State—down to the farce of the Gallipoli centenary in 2015 purposely held with lavish pomp on the very date of 24 April—and on the other hand, they are receptive to the changes in the civil society of Turkey—hence their interest in the dissident voices of Armenians in Turkey such as the Nor Zartonk organization or the political stance of Garo Paylan within the HDP Party. The wish to hear Turkish intellectuals, members of its civil society, its human rights organizations, whose concerns now connect with those of the Diaspora, is clearly shown by the presence of an increasing number of Armenian organizations and/or individuals at 24 April commemorations in Istanbul. On the Diaspora side, taking part in these events was first initiated by players coming from the civil society before they were joined by large institutions. 

Let’s briefly zoom now on the second pole: Armenia. In fact, under that word lies at least one great dividing line, between the state and society. From the point of view of the Armenian state, the question of the genocide is above all a foreign policy issue, involving the crucial dimension of Armenia-Turkey relations. It is also an issue used in domestic policy: responding to public opinion, Armenian governments have been using it since the 2000s to bolster the legitimacy of their rule. On the foreign policy front, the Armenian government considers that it should be the main decision-maker. As far as the normalization of relations with the Turkish state is concerned, this assumption is justified. However, when that question comes to include the reconciliation between peoples and/or societies, the citizens of Armenia and of the Diaspora—or rather of the many and diverse Diaspora communities—have a legitimate say in the process. These discrepancies are not so surprising in a country where the ruling class are not legitimate representatives in the eyes of most citizens. The outcry from the Armenian society, as well as the diasporic communities, on the day after the signing of the 2009 Zurich Protocols has shown how poorly prepared the Armenian societies were to the reasons and stakes for these protocols. The Armenian government conducts its political relations with the Diaspora mostly through symbolic, even token gestures: first by trying to channel these relations through the Ministry of the Diaspora created in 2008, then by choosing to speak essentially and almost exclusively with established institutions (CCAF, UGAB). 

Of course, the main question is whether these changing socio-political parameters may lead to lasting transformations in the years to come. It seems that political and geopolitical times do not play in favor of this happening. Since the putsch attempt against AKP in July 2016, M. Erdogan has been able to strengthen his personal power and tighten the Turkish presidential regime. The Armenian government of Serzh Sargsyan, which obtained a relative majority in the parliamentary elections of April 2017, is however very weak in tackling domestic issues, apparently incapable of improving the economic and social situation of the country. 

Nevertheless, the evolution of civil societies in Armenia, Turkey and the Diaspora does seem in motion and quite certainly in large part irreversible. We can only wish that in spite of the negative development of established powers and unwillingness of rulers to support the progress in their civil societies, the latter will manage to build bridges to a brighter future on all three sides of the Armenia-Turkey-Diaspora triangle. 


Armenia-Diaspora: A Period of Deep Crisis in the Armenian World
Thursday, 05 October 2017 04:55
           
Armenian and Turkish identity today
Standpoint of Armenia Hayk Demoyan 
Head of scientific council of the Armenian genocide museum 

Hayk Demoyan examines the status of Armenia-Diaspora relations and observes that the Armenian world is experiencing a deep crisis. His view is that the failure to develop these relations is due to a crisis in the elites themselves, both in Armenia and through the Diaspora. Obsolete models have been perpetuated, which cannot lead to any breakthrough within the Diaspora or in its relations with the Republic of Armenia. Hayk Demoyan sounds the alarm in front of the new threats and challenges ahead, that the Armenian world is facing with complete unpreparedness. 

I was following an interesting scene on board a plane flying from Yerevan to Paris while heading to Boston in the middle of August. A young mother of three was trying to convince her children to read Movses Khorenatsi’s History of Armenia , which remained half read. It was exactly the same edition of 1968 I had read when I was 14 years old. Despite her attempts, the youngsters sitting in front of me rejected the book, preferring their iphones and tablets. 

Surprisingly enough, ten days after that flight, I came across another reference to Khorenatsi. In his speech at the graduation ceremony of military educational institutions, on August 28 President Serzh Sargsyan reaffirmed the well-known aphorism of Khorenatsi, who in the beginning of his History of Armenia stated that we Armenians are “small in number and vulnerable.” At the same time, he added a reservation, declaring, “…Yes, we are small, yet powerful, strong with the unified characteristics of a powerful nation and family…” 

Maybe not all, but many know well that the fifth-century situation of the Armenians is described in somber tones at the end of Khorenatsi’s pious work, a section which was still awaiting the attention of the mother and her children on board of the plane. This section is the lamentation of Khorenatsi concerning Armenian reality shortly after the loss of statehood and the end of the Arshakuni dynasty. The founding father of Armenian historiography gave a condensed description of the situation of the Armenian state and Armenian people, which simply could be described as a definition of the national crisis. 

The remains of the Arshakuni kings, as archeologists claim, were found and displayed quite recently in the Armenian village of Aghtsq unceremoniously in the presence of the former Speaker of the Parliament and other politicians. Here the bones of the Arshakuni kings were buried in the fourth century after they were taken back from the Persian army, shortly after the latter’s invasion of Armenia. Too much symbolism? Maybe. But is it a new sign for a new loss of statehood we must face? The sad reality is that as a nation we are divided now rather than united, and there is much proof and evidence to back this unwanted statement. I am not intending to be a 21 st century Armenian historian who will write another lamentation on 21 st century Armenian realities, but at the same time I cannot keep silent on what we have both in Armenia and Diaspora, different from the non-existent realities artificially created by the President’s speechwriters and those who feel comfortable with the situation we have currently. 

The situation we have in Armenia and Diaspora relations could be labeled as a profound crisis on the elite level, which is an objective consequence of non-mature and dishonest relationships with no clear strategies and long-term action plans. There are many reasons to describe the existing situation as such, and there is no need to be an academician or to have skills in social sciences in order to understand the reasons and causes of that crisis. 

The failure to develop mutually beneficial and trustful relations within the past 25 years is a consequence of an elite-level crisis both in Armenia and Diaspora. The collapse of political life and corruption in Armenia, and an outdated structure with which many Diasporan communities still try to survive are not the only primary factors which caused the existing crisis. The “Armenian world,” propagated in Armenia at the highest levels not so long time ago, brought no substantive results to set a common agenda and strategic road map to follow, since it was more like an intellectual exercise, and not a clear strategy. One can agree on the formula, saying that Armenia is one thing with Diaspora and quite another without it. But the sad reality is that now we have Armenian statehood absolutely marginalized in regional and global politics, rejected even as a sole decision-maker in her external and internal politics. Armenia is pushed into a corner by her allies, or so-called allies, making her vulnerable many more times than before. 

Mutual ignorance and false rhetoric praising narrow interests and self-promotion accompanied most of the mutual relationships which led to further marginalization of the imagined icon of “Armenia strong with her Diaspora,” one we all were striving for in the first years of independence. Today we have enough evidence of distancing rather than bridging the motherland with Armenian communities worldwide. Armenia in its turn failed to turn into a dominant magnet and heartland for Diasporan communities. The latter also preferred to remain in their own worlds, being afraid of dependent and weak Armenian statehood instead of thinking and acting to strengthen REAL Armenia politically, economically and, of course, militarily. Instead an imagined homeland still prevails in most of Diasporan intellectual and political circles. The last 25 years were not enough to transform the mindset of Diasporan elite thinking from a symbolical and imagined homeland to the real one as an important and the ONLY prerequisite for developing further strategies of the Armenian world of global character. Unclear, suspicious and dispersed thinking banned the Diaspora from being the ONLY reliable ally of the Motherland, pushing it into an environment where it is isolated and ignored. 

Within the past 25 years, there were no any attempts to set up a qualitatively new structure which could enable the effective security of Armenia and Diasporan communities as one united strategic entity. Instead, age-old, completely outdated models were kept which cannot provide and secure any breakthrough both within Diasporan communities as well as in their relations with Armenia. Still surviving party-based structures, century-old enmities, divided churches, and the wasting of enormous resources for nothing and for no reason: this is the situation we are facing today. 

While speaking in the name of the Diaspora, most of the leaders in communities by default oppose themselves to Armenia, rather than trying to show their sympathies and support. Inclinations toward such dangerous opposition became evident during the Armenian-Turkish protocol period, which clearly exposed the absolute absence of dialog between Armenia and the various global communities, at least on the elite level. The reasons for such attitude are both subjective and objective. Armenia, now mired in rampant corruption and human rights violations, objectively gave birth to the formula “I am not going to give anything to Armenia.” At the same time that many preferred to hide themselves or feel comfortable with such mantras or expressions rather than to act, others preferred tourism and mentor-like attitude towards post-Soviet compatriots while residing in Armenia and trying to define new identities for themselves. 

The Ministry of Diaspora eight years ago failed to generate any strategic partnership plan or common agenda for Armenia-Diaspora relations. Instead, Soviet period Komsomol-type entertainments coupled with extensive medal awards and accomplishment ceremonies resulted in, or, it would be more correct to say, were aimed at further marginalization of Armenia-Diaspora relations. It is more than clear that one of the main responsibilities of the Diaspora ministry was to keep away any strong and effective involvement of Diasporan Armenians in both external and internal affairs of Armenia. Such effective presence was of vital importance at least to counter to the disastrous developments inside of Armenia and to have a positive impact on foreign policy preferences of the Motherland. 

Should we expect any breakthrough from the sixth meeting of Armenia-Diaspora scheduled for September 18-19? Definitely NO. Logically and objectively the past five forums showed that such gatherings are more like combined touristic package for many Diasporans wanting to enjoy the mild autumn season in Armenia rather than to speak about putting Armenia-Diaspora relations on the rails of short and long-term development strategies and strengthening the security of both Armenia herself and Armenian-Diaspora relations in general. 

The Armenia-Diaspora congress scheduled for September 18-19 without a doubt will not bring any breakthrough in these strategically important but ignored and downplayed relations. As is expected, both sides will refrain from any intellectual, non-paper-based discussion and criticism of the existing sad and dangerous realities in Armenia and Diasporan communities. Such consensus is a long-orchestrated strategy between elites on both sides preferring banal and cheap patriotic rhetoric and slogans rather than open and sober discussion. The document put into circulation a year ago for setting up the Armenian council is outdated and does not reflect the existing realities of the crisis in Armenia-Diaspora relations and how to overcome it. 

It is sad to state that after suffering enormous human losses and suffering, millions of distorted destinies and emigration from Armenia, we are faced now with new dangers and challenges to overcome, though being absolutely unprepared to face them. 

We are in a deep crisis, ladies and gentlemen. This is a political, religious and intellectual elite-level crisis which could result in disastrous consequences in the nearest future if we fail to understand how to overcome this situation and enable new generation of decision makes to show up and set new agendas for strengthening the Armenian world. The new generation of decision makers are not those who are indoctrinated with political hatred to secure narrow minded interests or Soviet-type party boss clones to replace and duplicate old thinking guys. 

It is high time even after 1400 years after Khorenatsi to take real steps to prevent the further collapse of the Armenian world, but not to make statements on our weakness and vulnerability…