In the past few years, the International Association of Genocide Scholars
(IAGS) has issued several statements against the historical commission
proposal. Most recently, the letter from the organization’s president
William Schabas to Armenian President Serge Sarkisian and Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that “acknowledgment of the Armenian
Genocide must be the starting point of any ‘impartial historical commission,’
not one of its possible conclusions.”
In turn, Roger Smith, the chairman of the Academic Board of Directors of the
Zoryan Institute, sent an open letter to Sarkisian that considered the
commission “offensive to all genocide scholars, but particularly
non-Armenian scholars, who feel their work is now being truly politicized.”
Several academics in Armenia have also expressed their views on the
sub-commission through comments and interviews to local media outlets, with
very few coming out in support of it.
In this document, compiled and edited by Armenian Weekly editor Khatchig
Mouradian, Diasporan Armenian scholars who are among the most prominent in
the field of modern Armenian history and social sciences share their views.
These scholars closely follow developments in Armenian Genocide scholarship,
and some are prominent in producing that scholarship. They, more than any
politician, millionaire businessman, or showbiz personality, would know the
problems associated with the “impartial and scientific examination” of the
already established facts of the Armenian Genocide. This document gives the
microphone to them.
***
Hovannisian: Recognition, then commission
Prof. Richard Hovannisian, the chair of modern Armenian history at UCLA,
wrote:
International commissions have significant value in easing historical
tensions and promoting mutual understanding. Such commissions, presently at
work in Central Europe and elsewhere, have registered noteworthy progress.
But these commissions are based on acknowledgement of particular human
tragedies and injustices. They could not function if one of the parties was
a denialist state, intent on obfuscating the truth and deceiving not only
the world community but also its own people. The record is too long and too
well tested for there to be any doubt about the intent of the denialist
state in advocating such a commission. It is a snare to be avoided and
rejected. The proper order must be recognition of the crime and only then
the formation of commissions to seek the means to gain relief from the
suffocating historical burden.
Balakian: Integrity of scholarship is at stake
Peter Balakian, a professor of the humanities at Colgate University and
author of The Burning Tigris, wrote:
A “historical commission” on the Armenian Genocide must proceed from the
unequivocal truth of the historical record on the Armenian Genocide. The
historical record shows conclusively that genocide was committed by the
Ottoman Turkish government in 1915. This is the consensus of the
International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS) and is the assessment
of the legal scholar, Raphael Lemkin, who invented the concept of genocide
as a crime in international law, and who coined the word genocide in large
part on the basis of what happened to the Armenians in 1915.
Because Turkey has criminalized the study and even mention of the Armenian
Genocide over the past nine decades, it should be impossible for Turkey to
be part of a process that assesses whether or not Turkey committed genocide
against the Armenians in 1915.
If there is a need for an educational commission on the Armenian Genocide in
order to help Turkey understand its history, such a commission should be
made up of a broad range of scholars from different countries, but not
denialist academics or a denialist state.
The international community would not sanction a commission to study the
Holocaust that included denialist scholars, of which there are many, nor
would it invite a head of state like Mr. Ahmadinejad and his government to
be part of such a commission. The integrity of scholarship and the ethics of
historical memory are at stake.
Kevorkian: Chances of successful historical research in Turkey are close to
null
Dr. Raymond H. Kevorkian, the director of Bibliothéque Nubar in Paris who
has authored and co-authored several books including Le Genocide des
Armeniens , The Armenian General Benevolent Union: One Hundred Years of
History, and Les Armeniens, 1917-1939: La Quete d’un Refuge, wrote:
Although the mission entrusted to the “historical” sub-commission in the
protocols does not explicitly raise the genocide issue, it is clear that it
will be discussed within that framework one way or another. In an effort to
delay qualifying the events of 1915 as genocide for a few more years, Ankara
has tried to make it seem like this was an adoption of the previous Turkish
proposal to establish a “committee of historians.” By assigning this issue
back to the undertakings of a sub-commission, which is itself operating
within the context of official bilateral relations, and by avoiding a direct
reference to the genocide, the Armenian “roadmap” negotiators have clearly
attempted to anticipate the bitter criticism of their opposition. They must
have been persuaded that they had to avoid entering the wicked game
previously proposed to Armenia, which put the 1915 genocide in doubt. On the
other hand, it was inconceivable not to discuss the genocide—or rather its
consequences—within the bilateral context.
The question is to determine whether the aforementioned sub-commission will
deal solely with the genocide file—as it is, in essence, not empowered with
the mission to look into the political aspect of the file—or if the latter
will also be on the negotiation table of the bilateral commission, entrusted
with the whole set of issues to be settled.
Insofar as this sub-commission has at least partly lost its initial mission
to throw doubt on the facts of 1915, exchanges can prove to be useful,
provided that the required experts are competent and of an adequate level.
Its formation and working methods should be subject to scrutiny.
A historian’s work should by no means depend on the state. If historical
research has made some progress, it does not owe it to official
“initiatives.” Not surprisingly, the reasons this progress has been achieved
outside of Turkey until now are obvious: If there were a true will to grasp
the genocidal phenomenon developed by the Turkish society in the early 20th
century, Turkish authorities should have promoted a training program for
experts worthy of being called experts. This means amending Turkish
legislation and encouraging young researchers to contribute to this very
particular field of history: the study of mass violence.
The aforementioned elements show that the probability of a successful work
in Turkey is, to this day, close to null, because the prerequisites to
progress are not guaranteed. There has not been a cultural revolution that
would release Turkish society from the nationalism that is poisoning and
forbidding it from seeing its history in a lucid way. Thus, right from the
start, the sub-commission bears an original sin: its dependency on the
authority of the state.
Sanjian: The sub-commission is a victory for Turkey’s Kemalist establishment
Dr. Ara Sanjian, associate professor of Armenian and Middle Eastern History
and director of the Armenian Research Center at the University of
Michigan-Dearborn, wrote:
Agreeing to the formation of a sub-commission on the so-called “historical
dimension” of relations between Armenia and Turkey is a concession, which I
am afraid Armenian diplomacy will come to deeply regret. At present, I have
no reason to share the optimism of President Sarkisian and his entourage
that this sub-commission will indeed increase international awareness of the
Armenian Genocide. Recent statements by Turkish leaders give no indication
that Ankara will alter its denialist posture any time soon. We should expect
the current Turkish government to fill its allotted share in the
sub-commission with proved and experienced deniers. Assisted by an army of
diplomats, as well as American and other public relations firms on Ankara’s
payroll, these Turkish representatives will in all likelihood use the
sub-commission to engage the Armenian side in protracted yet unproductive
exchanges. Their objective—to give to the outside world a false impression
that Turkey is not afraid of investigating the truth and that it is
committed to an ostensibly serious endeavor in this regard—is unlikely to
change. Ankara will use the sub-commission to continue to discourage outside
parties from taking a principled stand on the Armenian Genocide issue and to
delay indefinitely any meaningful discussion with Armenians on the legal,
political, social, economic, and cultural repercussions of the genocide.
Because of these Turkish tactics, professional historians have long been
extremely careful not to get dragged into direct exchanges with deniers, and
thus provide the latter with undeserved academic legitimacy. The protocols
negotiated by the authorities in Yerevan have unfortunately lent Turkish
state-sponsored deniers this long-sought opportunity. We should expect
Ankara to use the sub-commission card effectively in its persistent quest to
keep this unsavory episode from the late Ottoman era solely within the realm
of a supposed academic dispute. Even if the protocols do not eventually go
into force and the Armenia-Turkish border remains closed, Turkish lobbyists
will constantly refer to the concession by Yerevan. Moreover, even in the
unlikely scenario of President Sarkisian being forced to resign under
pressure from the opposition in Armenia, we can expect pro-establishment
Turkish activists to aggrandize Sarkisian as a pacifist supposedly
overwhelmed by extremist Armenian groups, and all this as part of continuous
official Turkish attempts to avoid facing the full consequences of the World
War I genocide.
I do not place any hope on the possible participation of Swiss and other
international experts in the workings of this sub-commission. In this highly
charged politicized atmosphere involving many nations, independent-minded
experts from third countries will either prefer to stay away or Ankara will
try hard to exclude them, perhaps with the tacit support of fellow western
governments, which maintain deep strategic, military, and financial
interests in Turkey. Those who will end up on the sub-commission will always
be under constant pressure from their respective foreign offices to be
extremely careful of the political ramifications of what they say, both
during the meetings of the sub-commission or outside, and not incur Ankara’s
ire.
The formation of the sub-commission is a victory for Turkey’s Kemalist
establishment. It will probably use the sub-commission not only to impose
its denialist posture on the international scene as a supposedly legitimate
“alternative view,” but it may get encouraged further and tighten the
noose—through a more vigorous use of Article 301 of the penal code and other
means—against various Turkey-based challengers of Kemalist myths, including
issues well beyond the confines of the Armenian Genocide. Within this
context, growing exchanges between Armenian scholars and activists and
Turkish opponents of rigid Kemalism should continue, irrespective of the
protocols.
The protocols may eventually be ratified, paving the way for the
sub-commission. While listing the reasons behind my personal opposition to
its formation was not difficult, the issue of how to handle this unpleasant
entity, now that it has been imposed on the historians’ profession, remains
to me more problematic. Should Armenian and non-Armenian experts of the 1915
genocide serve on this sub-commission and provide unwarranted legitimacy to
deniers likely to represent Turkey? However painful such a climb-down may be
to universally acknowledged genocide experts, the alternative may see less
competent figures, either seeking undeserved celebrity status or unable—for
one non-scholarly reason or another—to refuse President Sarkisian a favor,
arguing the genocidal nature of the Armenian atrocities inside the
sub-commission. From this angle, the establishment of the sub-commission and
the opposition it has generated among established genocide scholars seem to
have created a win-win situation for deniers.
Simonian: One signature offers what Turkey couldn’t achieve in decades
Hovann Simonian, the co-author of Troubled Waters: The Geopolitics of the
Caspian Region and editor of The Hemshin: History, Society and Identity in
the Highlands of Northeast Turkey, wrote:
The recently signed protocols between Armenia and Turkey create a
sub-commission “on the historical dimension” that aims at conducting “an
impartial scientific examination of the historical records and archives.”
The creation of this sub-commission can be considered a major success of
Turkish and other deniers of the Armenian Genocide. It brings to fruition
their long-held objective of casting a shadow on the objectivity and quality
of the historical works affirming the veracity of the Armenian Genocide.
Unable to discredit these works with their own studies, despite the large
financial resources at their disposal, deniers will from now on hide behind
the sub-commission and insist on waiting for its conclusions to block any
discussion of the Armenian Genocide in international forums.
Another constituent that will be comforted by the creation of this
sub-commission includes the waverers and bystanders of all sorts who, rather
than bothering to read the authoritative literature published on the topic,
claim to adopt a neutral or objective stance, stating that there are “two
sides to the story”—the Armenian version and the Turkish one.
By agreeing to the establishment of the sub-commission on the historical
dimension, the Armenian government has with one signature offered the
Turkish state what the latter had failed to achieve in decades, in spite of
enormous financial expenditures and political efforts.
Semerdjian: Protocols engage in genocide denial
In an article written for the Armenian Weekly titled “What do Google and the
Protocols have in common?” Dr. Elyse Semerdjian, an associate professor of
Islamic world history at Whitman College, wrote:
The protocols signed by Armenia and Turkey on Oct. 10 engage in denial of
the Armenian Genocide on several levels. Not only are the injustices of the
past ignored, but those injustices, rather than be acknowledged as a
condition of peace, are relegated to an undesignated commission that will
pursue “an impartial scientific examination of the historical records.” This
statement is in effect a call for a commission to bury the issue of the
Armenian Genocide once and for all by reducing it to a “historical
dimension” rather than a genocide, a massacre, or any source of conflict
for that matter.
To begin, the term “impartial” indicates that the protocols are written in
state language, not the language of historians. In the field of history, we
have come a long way towards realizing that impartiality doesn’t exist. Many
of us in the field concede that it is impossible for a historian to put
aside their subjectivity while researching and writing history. Historians
choose their archives and their sources. That selection process, although it
can be based on a balanced scientific method, can on many occasions alter
the results. Most importantly, impartiality is called into question when we
recognize that the historian’s ability to write history is greatly impacted
by the sources in their possession. I often imagine the following scenario:
After World War II, Germany provides only controlled access to its archives
and releases only documents relating to Jewish uprisings, for example the
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. With limited sources, a history much like the
“provocation thesis” popular in Turkey today would have taken shape in
Germany. The thesis goes: Armenians rebelled, Turks defended themselves, and
the result was mutual death, a civil war not a genocide. This kind of
history could easily be written based on scientific and “impartial” methods,
especially if a historian thought they had covered all sources available.
Many of us in the field of history are familiar with the kinds of sources
made public regarding the Armenians that emphasize the moments in which
Armenians rebelled against orders of deportation; these sources are easily
found in Turkish publications that line library bookshelves and are
sometimes placed on exhibition.
What the commission proposal fails to recognize is that although historians
can sometimes agree upon the facts of history, debates often multiply once
historians answer the “how” and “why” questions. Historians may be settled
on facts of history (for example, “the American Revolution happened”), but
how or why it happened is another matter. How would a commission, as part of
a dialogue between nations, manage the multiplicity of historical
interpretations? How would Turkey, a state that currently legally bars any
discussion of atrocities committed against Armenians in World War I
according to Article 301 of its penal code, be a trustworthy partner in any
dialogue? Currently, Turkey threatens intellectuals who dare to speak out
(Nobel laureate Orhan Pamuk currently faces yet another trial); how could
it, at the same time, allow freedom of expression on such a commission?
Freedom of speech issues aside, as a history professor, I struggle against
attempts to homogenize history, especially as many incoming students are
taught with high school textbooks that present history as fixed, while in
the academic world history is much more complex. I point to this tendency
existing in students, but truth be said, most people want a one-dimensional
answer to complex historical issues—and states most certainly do. The
internet, particularly Google, is a place people go to get those easy,
one-dimensional answers. One student came to class having searched the
internet on that day’s subject matter and asked: “So, I was surfing the
internet last night and saw that according to the web the Armenian Genocide
didn’t really happen even though your syllabus frames it as though it did.
What’s up with that?” Although our reading that day covered the issue of
genocide denial, explaining how the Armenian Genocide had devolved from a
historical reality to a “debate” in history, it was the Googleability of the
subject that took precedent that day because it offered the “one fixed
answer.” Of course, Google is based on algorithims, rather than the truth of
claims found on one website versus another. It can’t replace science; it is
no oracle of Delphi. But none of this reasoning can undermine the fact that
a first hit is often interpreted as the most important answer; and in cases
it’s not, it is usually the first link clicked on. On Google, where the
Armenian Genocide is concerned, it is a historical “debate” next to global
warming and Darwin’s theory of evolution.
The protocols, like Google, treat the Armenian Genocide as a debate by
avoiding the admission of guilt and by reducing the complexities of history
into a singular answer in the service of the state. Imbedded in the logic of
the protocols is the notion that if we are scientific and impartial enough,
we can find the one answer to our unnamed problem. If there is to be any
future commission, even if it does result in one uniform statement, it is
not the end of a debate, as there will still be independent historians
writing different histories. However, the commission’s ruling will be
presented as the new golden rule, Google’s first hit—the one singular answer
to the historical question of genocide. This answer will be cited by
journalists and students alike as a definitive study because it was balanced
and mutually agreed upon. Outside historians will be marginalized as the
commission will be “impartial,” whereas historians working independently
will not have the same weight, for they will be biased and partisan.
The idea of a commission is a concession granted to Turkey that indicates
there really will be no scientific process at play. History-by-commission in
itself is a partial process. It will begin with the premise that the
genocide needs to be proven, putting Armenia in the weakest possible
position even as a majority of scholars agree that a genocide occurred. By
signing the agreement as currently worded, Armenia has taken the minority
position of denial over the majority position of acceptance.
The idea of a commission is nothing new. South Africa had its Peace and
Reconciliation Commission, Rwanda has its National Unity and Reconciliation
Commission that is working on intercommunal dialogues, as well as the
writing of a new national history that would cover the Rwandan Genocide.
These projects were initiated because states tend to need uniformity of
historical interpretation, and new national histories need to be agreed upon
to salvage the state after the collective traumas of apartheid and genocide.
There are two differences with these projects: First, they acknowledge that
violence happened, and even with that acknowledgement there is a lack of
satisfaction from victims who in some cases feel they have not been given
due justice. Second, they deal with a national rebuilding project, and part
of that includes a rewriting of the events of history, a sculpting of the
common memory, if you will. None of these elements are present in the
protocols. No recognition. No purging of painful memories of genocide. The
fact that there are two nations at stake begs the question: Can
history-by-commission serve two masters?
Historians who are selected to work on the commission agreed upon by Armenia
and Turkey will be part of a bogus endeavor—stooges in a commission geared
to write history for the victor under the pretense of democratic exchange.
The protocols’ use of “impartial” also gives the underlying denial a
sanitized, scientific feel. A 2004 study by Jules and Maxwell Boykoff found
that the use of balanced language by journalists to discuss global warming
was biased because it gave the impression that there was a debate in the
scholarly community over its existence, while international conferences on
the subject have presented a virtual consensus. Creating the impression of a
debate implies a 50/50 split among the experts. Analogous to the protocols,
a similar balance of denialists and affirmers of the Armenian Genocide on a
future commission would presume that experts in the field were split half
and half, when to the contrary a clear majority of scholars affirm that this
event happened. This is the way in which innocuous terms like “balance” can
produce bias as a way of consolidating a position—in this case genocide
denial—rather than starting with a position of admission of guilt. The
bottom line, as I see it, is that the protocols put Armenia in the weakest
possible position, whereby it will become a collaborator in a bogus
commission geared towards propagating the denial of its own genocide. This
is disconcerting as both an Armenian and a historian.
Historians are always searching the dusty recesses of the past for lessons;
I have chosen Greek epic for some insight into the protocols. Homer chose to
end his epic with a bloodbath: The hero Odysseus slaughters the suitors who
defiled his home. Through Zeus’ divine intervention, the memory of the
slaughter is erased from Ithacan minds in order to protect Odysseus who
would otherwise be endangered under the rules of blood vengeance; after all,
the relatives of the suitors had a right to revenge according to custom. The
gods choose to obliterate the communal memory in order to create a peace
without justice. If we move forward to the present, a very different peace
is created in the protocols. Rather than wipe out the memory of injustice
committed against Armenians, the signatories have chosen to ignore issues of
communal memory and justice altogether. In fact, they have chosen to not
even name the source of conflict between the two parties in an attempt to
assure collective amnesia. We learn from the ancient
Greeks that absolute denial of justice may have only been possible through
divine intervention; for, if left to societal norms and intact memories,
Odysseus would have surely been punished for his actions.
Arkun: Historical record clear, political solution needed
Aram Arkun, a New York based scholar who has conducted archival research and
published material on various aspects of modern Armenian history and the
Armenian Genocide, wrote:
An intergovernmental commission dealing with the consequences of the
Armenian Genocide would indeed be a useful body if set up properly. A
politically appointed historical commission, on the other hand, can end up
as quite problematic, and even disastrous, under present conditions.
First, presumably one of the parties directly involved in the appointment of
the historians would be the Republic of Turkey. This is a state that still
can legally punish reference to the Armenian Genocide by its citizens, whose
high government officials have repeated stated their clear opinion that no
such genocide took place, and whose state-sponsored scholars and scholarly
bodies continue to publish works intended to justify the actions of the
Ottoman Empire during World War I concerning the Armenians. This does not
promise well in terms of the freedom of action and opinion of the Turkish
scholars appointed by the government.
Secondly, as part of a political process, this historical commission would
not be, per se, a scholarly commission, but rather a tool for settling
political issues. The Turkish and Armenian states, as the involved parties,
are not equals in terms of their power and influence. The former is much
more powerful than the latter, and so would have a much greater opportunity
to both exert pressure on the workings of the commission and on the
interpretation of its results. Furthermore, the United States and the other
large states involved do not necessarily have any stake in a historically
“correct” outcome. All they appear interested in is a resolution of any kind
of the Armenian Genocide issue, which causes them periodic political
headaches. Thus, if this commission is considered to be a type of
“reconciliation commission,” it may not be in the position to act in a
pragmatically just fashion.
Thirdly, the very creation of such a historical commission will both divide
Armenian communities in Armenia and throughout the world, as well as give
cover to those in academia and politics who would for non-academic reasons
prefer to see the genocide recede as an issue. Already, Western media
coverage is reverting back to a troubling “neutral” description of the
events of 1915 which, contrary to all the extant archival evidence and
widely accepted scholarly analyses, characterize the genocide as an
unresolved matter. A “split decision” by this commission could indefinitely
prolong such a vacillatory approach.
In sum, there is sufficient scholarly work extant on the Armenian Genocide
to understand its basic nature as genocide without an intergovernmental
commission, and there even exist some nongovernmental structures in which
both Armenian and Turkish scholars can operate. Further academic discussion
is, of course, necessary and commendable if done in a scholarly framework,
but the problematic potential format of this commission would make both its
scholarly and political conclusions suspect. Furthermore, the political
consequences of such a commission will be both durable and enforceable
irrespective of the truth of its conclusions. Armenia and Turkey have to
live together as neighbors, and for this reason (and of course many others),
a political solution has to be reached on the issues connected to the
Armenian Genocide. But it does not seem as if the time is ripe for this yet.
Hopefully, in the meantime, basic issues such as open borders and trade can
be resolved to the benefit of those living on both sides of the border.
Kaligian: Commission’s mere existence will be exploited by the Turkish
government
Dr. Dikran Kaligian, the author of Armenian Organization and Ideology under
Ottoman Rule, 1908-1914 and managing editor of the Armenian Review, wrote:
The proposal to have an “impartial scientific examination of the historical
records and archives” is dangerous on a number of grounds. Firstly, no
matter the composition of the commission or how its mandate is framed, its
mere existence will be exploited by the Turkish government in its genocide
denial campaign. Turkey will ensure that the “examination” drags on for
years, and neither the U.S. Congress nor any other legislature will consider
recognizing the Armenian Genocide while there is an “ongoing examination.”
Likewise, Turkey has ensured that the genocide will not be raised during its
negotiations to join the European Union. This replicates what happened in
2001, when the European Commission—citing the formation of the Turkish
Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC)—excluded all mention of
recognition of the genocide from the resolutions on Turkey’s accession to
the EU.
Secondly, the decades of research and dozens of books already written on the
Armenian Genocide will be immediately discredited as “biased and
unscientific” because the “impartial and scientific” examination will have
begun. The consensus among all genocide scholars, as embodied by the
statement of the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), will
thus be undermined. Those few Turkish scholars who have bravely tried to
educate the people of Turkey about their own history can be tarred as
“agents of the Armenians,” and their lives once again endangered because the
Armenian and Turkish governments have agreed that their work was “biased.”
Thirdly, because all the past genocide research has been discredited, all
past decisions made based on it will be brought into question. There will
not be a a state board of education that includes the genocide in its
curriculum, or a newspaper that changed its policy and began allowing its
reporters to use the words “Armenian Genocide,” or a university that hosts a
panel or a course that includes the genocide, that will not be pressured by
the Turkish government and its lobby to reverse its position because even
Armenia agrees that the issue needs more study.
Panossian: Take commission seriously, but don’t lose sleep over it
Dr. Razmik Panossian, the author of The Armenians: From Kings and Priests to
Merchants and Commissars, wrote:
Many Armenians in the diaspora are dead against a historical commission.
They assume that it will question the very existence of the genocide. This
is a correct assumption insofar as Turkey’s intentions are to use the
commission to deny the Armenian Genocide—or at the very least to use it to
minimize international pressure for recognition.
But this does not have to be the case, and the denial of the genocide is not
an inevitable outcome of the commission. Commissions do not work if there is
no political will on all sides to make them work. Armenians must come to the
commission with the starting point of the reality of the genocide. The
questions they should put on the table must therefore center on the effects
of 1915 (e.g., the legal, political, and cultural ramifications of
genocide). The Turkish side will naturally want to examine a different set
of questions. If there is no common ground for discussion, so be it. A
commission can easily be rendered irrelevant, it could be dragged on and on;
in short, it could fail.
All eggs do not have to be put in one basket. The genocide issue must not be
reduced to the commission. It might be in the interest of the Armenian and
Turkish republics to focus on the commission, but this does not meant that
the diaspora (i.e., certain elements of it) must follow suit. It is quite
legitimate for diasporan organizations to have their own “foreign policy”
that does not necessarily mirror the foreign policy of Armenia. There is
historical precedence for this kind of “duality” in Armenian politics.
Hopefully such a “dual track” approach will be somewhat coordinated and
mutually reinforcing. In concrete terms, this would mean that while Armenia
deals with the commission, the diaspora—as citizens of various host
countries—can and should continue its various recognition efforts
irrespective of the commission. Yes, this will be more difficult, but the
efforts must continue, as must the efforts to engage with progressive
Turkish civil society and academics.
The debates around the protocols and the commission highlight once again the
emptiness of the oft-repeated but fictitious notion of national “unity” as
applied to politics. The diaspora and the republic have certain
commonalities, but also differing interests and needs. Their means of
dealing with the genocide can legitimately be different as well. This is not
a problem, but a healthy reality. In fact, the genius and strength of the
Armenian nation is contingent on its multilocality and its differences—as
long as these are more or less complementary and articulated reasonably and
peacefully.
Let Armenians and Turks not be afraid of the commission—and both sides are
afraid of it—but engage with it based on their multiple (and contradictory)
interests. Let’s take it seriously, but not lose sleep over it. If it
succeeds, fine. If it fails, that’s ok too.
Der Matossian: Involvement of governments defies the basic tenets of writing
history
Dr. Bedross Der Matossian, a lecturer in the faculty of history at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), wrote:
The inclusion of the historical commission as part of the Armenian-Turkish
protocols is one of the most serious blows to the historical research of the
Armenian Genocide. From the perspective of a historian, the establishment of
a joint commission by two governments in order to investigate the events of
1915 as part of their “normalization package” contradicts the craft of
historianship. The involvement of governments in initiating and promoting
this kind of understanding defies the basic tenets of writing history. In
this instance, the victimized group agrees to establish a historical
commission with the “perpetrator” group in order to examine the veracity of
an event that has long been accepted by international scholars as the mass
murder of the indigenous Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. The
Armenian Genocide is a fact; it can neither be subject to a historical
compromise nor be the victim of a Machiavellian diplomatic plan.
In addition, attempting to question the veracity of the research conducted
thus far is itself a travesty of colossal magnitude that mainly aims at
serving the regional interests of international powers. This does not mean
that the motives, processes, and factors that led to the genocide cannot be
the subject of an honest academic discussion by all historians, regardless
of their ethnic background. I say regardless of their ethnic background
because in the past decade the meetings between Turkish and Armenian
historians have resembled a soccer game in which a third party always gets
involved as the mediator. Historians who are interested in debating the
history of the Armenian Genocide should participate in conferences and
workshops by first representing themselves as historians and not as
Armenians or Turks. Ethnicity should not be a criterion for their
historianship in venues where they talk as “Armenians” or “Turks,” thereby
recreating the fixed identities and contributing to the political interests
of the “perpetrator” group. On the other hand, a dialogue that does not
address the power asymmetry between Turks and Armenians, and the
politico-historical reasons for the current powerlessness of the Armenian
position, serves the needs of the more powerful entity in the equation.
The aim of the Turkish government in this initiative is clear: to reach some
kind of a historical compromise about the Armenian Genocide that satisfies
the Turkish side. A sincere discussion of the Armenian Genocide requires the
involvement of honest scholars who treat their material with utmost
professionalism, integrity, and sobriety in their understanding of the
historical, political, legal, and ethical dimensions of several shades of
state-sanctioned denialism—anything from relativization to the outright
distortion of facts and chronology under the cloak of “scholarship” and
“dialogue.”
Theriault: Sarkisian and Nalbandian have rescued the failed Turkish denial
campaign
Dr. Henry Theriault, a professor of philosophy at Worcester State College
and author of several articles on genocide denial, wrote:
The notion of a “historical commission” to bring together the “points of
view” of Armenians and Turks on their “common history” is not new. It is a
variation of the denialist tactic of presenting the opposition of falsified
history (the Armenian Genocide did not occur) to historical fact (the
Armenian Genocide did occur). After the Turkish government’s suppression of
global awareness of the Armenian Genocide began to fail in 1965, and the
truth started coming out in compelling primary documents and powerful
scholarly analyses based on them in the 1970’s and 1980’s, the Turkish
government shifted its approach to denial and presenting “the other side of
the story.” The tactic was simple: All it had to do was get its false
version of history taken seriously as a mere possibility alongside the true
facts of history, to rob those true facts of their rightful certainty. The
deniers turned the actual situation of falsification against fact into the
appearance of one perspective against another. This appealed to those with
embedded commitments to “open-mindedness,” “fair play,” and even freedom of
speech. Indeed, the Turkish government and its denialist functionaries in
the United States and elsewhere intentionally played on those laudable
commitments in presenting a perversion of critical thinking that violates
the very basics of sound evidence evaluation.
“Historical commissions” consisting of those who assert the truth and those
who assert falsehood, in equal balance, became a way of further legitimizing
the false as a valid “perspective” on history. A historical commission has
two functions. First, because there is no way for those who are committed to
truth and those committed to falsity to come to a consensus, this method can
permanently forestall a “decision” on whether the Armenian Genocide
occurred, which is what the Turkish government will happily settle for.
After all, if there is no official, universal fact, then no acknowledgment
need happen and no reparations made. Second, it establishes the
philosophically nonsensical method of determining truth by splitting the
difference between opposing views, rather than looking at the evidence and
coming to the conclusion determined by that evidence. History becomes a
power play between competing interests, not a matter of what really happened
as it has been captured in documents that, in the case of the Armenian
Genocide, are as unambiguous as they are numerous.
The danger here, by the way, is not just limited to the Armenian Genocide.
Denial of this sort quite literally is an assault on truth, as Israel Charny
has written. This crude weapon is something of an intellectual nuclear bomb.
Not only does it effectively deny the Armenian Genocide, but it advances the
notion that all truth is just a matter of splitting the difference between
fact and falsity. Do you hate Jews and want to stop recognition of the
Holocaust? Just say it didn’t happen and people will start to think the
truth is in the middle of “what Jews say” and your denialism. Upset that
African Americans are recognized as oppressed by the legacy of slavery? Tell
everyone that, contrary to “abolitionist propaganda,” U.S. slaves actually
had it better than Africans in their time. Sooner or later, people will
start to think the truth is in the middle. Don’t like the effect recognition
of global warming is having on your oil company’s profits? Just fund some
scientists to say there is no global warming. People will get confused and
start to think the truth is somewhere in the middle. And so on. Even if it
is intended for a “surgical strike” against Armenians, this weapon’s blast
radius ends up taking out the very possibility of truth in history, science,
and ethics. It renders evidence and logical inference based on it
meaningless—or no more meaningful than groundless assertions and wild
accusations. It undoes hundreds of years of philosophical and scientific
progress. Fact becomes impossible. Critical thinking is replaced by what I
have termed “academic relativism,” in which every claim, no matter how
ungrounded on evidence, is considered perpetually legitimate.
The catalysts of that progress were quite clear about what real critical
thought and evidence evaluation are. Descartes certainly doubted everything
he could think—virtually every thought he had—just as deniers want us to do
of the historical facts of the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust, U.S.
slavery, Native American Genocides, and on and on. But deniers want this to
be the endpoint, the stopping point of thought. For Descartes, it was the
beginning: It happens in Meditation 1, not 6. The rest of the Meditations
consist of a carefully building of certainty as Descartes digs himself out
of the morass of absolute skepticism. In the case of the Armenian Genocide,
this building process has already occurred. Deniers forced it in the 1960’s,
70’s, 80’s, and 90’s. And, after decades of intense, evidence-based
research, scholars have constructed an unassailable castle of truth
regarding the Armenian Genocide. By the 2000’s, rational people who studied
the evidence simply had to recognize the veracity of the genocide, as
Samantha Power and so many others new to the issue did not hesitate to. The
process suggested by J. S. Mill actually worked: A true idea was challenged
by a false one in a manner that spurred greater research and reasoning to
establish the true idea on an even firmer foundation than would otherwise
have been produced.
Indeed, because of the aggressive, well-funded, geopolitically supported
Turkish denial campaign that has lasted for decades, those establishing the
facts of the Armenian Genocide have had to meet such almost impossibly high
standards that the result has been the establishment of the truth—not just
beyond a reasonable doubt, but beyond the shadow of a doubt. The evidence of
the Armenian Genocide has been tested against the harshest challenges and
most dishonest tactics, and it has come through with compelling truth
intact. It has been confirmed again and again, against assault after
assault. The “doubts” that still exist are a testament to the great extent
of the financial, political, cultural, media, and academic resources of
Turkish propagandists and the great geopolitical force behind them, not a
weakness in the evidence or scholarly analysis of it. Despite all the
resources and power arrayed against it, the Armenian Genocide is recognized
by objective scholars and others around the world.
This is significant, because another feature of the historical commission
model is that somehow the difference over whether the genocide occurred is
an ethnic tension between Turks and Armenians. This is as false as denial of
the genocide itself is. On the side of truth are Armenians to be sure, but
also countless non-Armenians whose sole motivation is witnessing the truth
and countless Turks who have had enough of their government’s lies. On the
other side is merely a portion of the Turkish population, together with a
few academic and political mercenaries acting out of obvious interests and
motives. The notion of a Turkish-Armenian historical commission suggested by
the protocols, as an inter-ethnic negotiation process, is inconsistent with
true demographics of the manufactured “conflict” over the truth of the
genocide.
The Turkish denial effort has failed. The latest version of the historical
commission ploy is a desperate attempt to undercut the final victory of the
truth. It is not unlike Ataturk’s “revolution” to rescue Turkish genocidal
ultra-nationalism from its defeat in World War I. Let us not forget how
successful this unjust movement was. Nothing betrays more obviously the
resilience of this anti-Armenianism than the refusal by Turkey to include
recognition of the Armenian Genocide in the protocols and its reinsertion of
denial into Armenian-Turkish relations. As Israel Charny has written, denial
is the celebration of the denied genocide and the mocking of the victim
group. It is the threat of renewed genocide and the assertion of the power
of the perpetrator group over the victim group.
As after 1918, the great powers have again lined up against
Armenians—complete with another decisive reversal of U.S. policy toward
Armenians, now in the form of President Obama’s flip-flop on Armenian
Genocide recognition. But even this pressure is not enough. Too many good
souls around the world understand too well what is going on to be
manipulated by recycled denialism. What is necessary to open the door again
to denial and to undermine four decades of decisive progress is a few
Armenians in key positions turning the knob. If Armenians acquiesce in
denial, suddenly all the evidence becomes irrelevant: Armenians themselves
recognize that the issue is not settled and that a new inquiry—balancing
deniers with those who claim genocide—is needed. With the inclusion of the
historical commission in the protocols, a four decade-long process by
historians, political scientists, psychologists, sociologists, literary
scholars, philosophers, and more, which has proven the Armenian Genocide
beyond a shadow of a doubt, is dismissed. Now the real process will
begin—complete with a fully legitimate denialist perspective.
Few stop to question exactly which Armenians are legitimizing denial with
their signatures, whom they represent—and do not represent—and why they have
come to accept a process legitimizing denial. They are Armenian and that is
enough. Even many supporters of Armenian Genocide recognition are confused.
And so the current Armenian government, led by Serge Sarkisian and Edward
Nalbandian, has done what no one else could have—not a legion of Turkish
diplomats or squadrons of deniers. Sarkisian and Nalbandian have rescued the
failed Turkish denial campaign.
Mamigonian: Historical facts are not negotiated, they are studied
Marc Mamigonian, the director of academic affairs at the National
Association for Armenian Studies and Research (NAASR) in Belmont, Mass.,
wrote:
It is understood that states such as Armenia and Turkey must resolve their
differences through political processes of negotiation. In scholarship,
however, historical facts are not negotiated but studied. And while new
research continues to expand and enrich our understanding, the basic
historical facts of the Armenian Genocide are well established.
It is difficult to have confidence in a historical sub-commission
established as part of a political negotiating process—let alone one that
involves two states with as palpable a power discrepancy as the one that
exists between Turkey and Armenia.
Furthermore, a “scientific examination” of the history of the Armenian
Genocide, such as the protocols appear to call for, has been conducted by
researchers for decades; and the large and continually growing body of
scholarship and documentation testifies to this.
Thanks to the documentary and analytical work that has been done by the
first generation of professional scholars of the Armenian Genocide, the
scholarship has moved beyond “proving the genocide” and entered into more
sophisticated considerations, even though aggressive genocide denial
continues unabated.
Whatever relations are negotiated between Armenia and Turkey as states, the
way forward for Armenians and Turks everywhere is through an honest
recognition of historical events, including but not limited to the Armenian
Genocide. Everything else proceeds from that starting point.
Khatchig Mouradian is the editor of the Armenian Weekly. He is working
towards a Ph.D. in genocide studies at Clark University in Worcester, Mass.
The Armenian Weekly thanks Nayiri Arzoumanian for copyediting and Houry
Tontian for the translation from French of Prof. Kevorkian’s comments.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
H. B. C. Lynch (1862-1913) made two journeys to 
