Opening Armenia-Turkey Border in UK Press
The Times
April 15, 2009
A promise of peace in the shadow of Ararat
At last the Turkey-Armenia border may finally be opened. But the move
will stir up deep and long-held regional feelings
Michael Binyon
Years ago Andrei Gromyko, the veteran Soviet Foreign Minister, was
once buttonholed by his irate Turkish counterpart. `Why do you show
Mount Ararat, which lies in Turkey, on the flag of Soviet Armenia? Do
you lay claim to our territory?' `No,' replied Gromyko. `Why do you
have a crescent on your flag? Do you lay claim to the Moon?'
Armenia is now free of Soviet control. But the Turkish-Armenian
border, sealed during the Cold War years when it marked the tense
boundary between Nato and the Soviet Union, remains closed. And though
Armenians gaze across at Ararat's elusive peak, they still cannot
cross over into the lost provinces of their historic homeland that lie
in northeast Turkey.
Something, however, may at last be moving. Ali Babacan, Turkey's
Foreign Minister, will visit Yerevan today for a meeting of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation Council, an 11-nation regional grouping set
up in 1992. But the real issue for him and for his Armenian hosts is
the border. Can both countries set aside their historic animosities
and suspicions and dismantle the last Cold War barbed-wire barricades?
Barack Obama hopes so. Indeed, in Istanbul last week he challenged his
Turkish hosts to `move forward' and establish, for the first time,
diplomatic ties with their Armenian neighbours. Much more than just
the border is at stake. A reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia
would help to ease more than 90 years of bitterness dating back to the
Ottoman massacres of Armenians between 1915 and 1917, which still cast
a long shadow over the politics of the Caucasus and the West's
attitudes to Turkey.
Background
An open border would not only bring huge economic benefits to both
sides: it could also help to thaw one of the last `frozen conflicts'
in Europe's backyard, the military stand-off between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over control of the ethnically Armenian enclave of
Nagorno-Karabakh.
It could also help Russia to regain its balance within the turbulent
Caucasus and Turkey to extend its reach to its cultural Central Asian
hinterland. And it could remove some of the taboos from today's
Turkish politics, where any mention of the Ottoman killings of up to
1.5 million Armenians produces a venomous nationalist reaction.
The issues are all interlinked, and, bedevilled by emotion, are
exceptionally difficult to resolve. At the heart of the stalemate lie
the fears and political isolation of Armenia, a tiny country of less
than three million people, that has historically been at the mercy of
its powerful neighbours. Armenia, the first nation to adopt
Christianity, lies on the front line of Islam, and has always looked
to Russia for protection from Turkey and its Muslim Azeri neighbours.
It is a role that Moscow has embraced eagerly, and one that has
underpinned Russia's military confrontation with Turkey, which for
centuries has shaped the history of both countries.
But the forcible incorporation of Armenia into the Soviet Union in
1922 changed the relationship. There is lingering resentment in
Yerevan of Moscow, especially after the post-Soviet economic collapse
when Russia put pressure on Armenia by cutting fuel supplies. The
impoverished nation shivered through several winters. Armenia hoped to
open up to the south. But although the border with Turkey was briefly
opened, it was closed swiftly in 1993 after Armenia invaded Azerbaijan
to establish a corridor to the besieged Nagorno-Karabakh, and Turkey
sided with Muslim Azeris.
Turkish support is vital to Azeri hopes of regaining control of its
enclave. Azerbaijan has therefore reacted ferociously to hints of a
Turkish-Armenian rapprochement. It has suggested that it would use its
oil muscle and interrupt supplies through the vital pipeline from Baku
to southern Turkey unless Armenia made concessions.
The threat seems to have rattled Ankara. Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
Turkey's Prime Minister, poured cold water yesterday on suggestions
from Armenia that the border could be opened in time for the World Cup
qualifying tie in October. President Sarksyan said he hoped he would
be able to cross the border into Turkey to watch the football game.
Not until Nagorno-Karabakh is settled, Mr Erdogan retorted.
The Islamist Prime Minister cannot be seen to abandon his Muslim
neighbour. But Turkey has also long harboured hopes that it could
spread its influence far beyond Azerbaijan into former Soviet Central
Asia, which is Turkic-speaking and desperately in need of some Western
knowhow and investment. These hopes came to little in the early 90s.
Now they are being revived. Ankara can ill afford to upset the Azeris.
Reconciliation with Armenia, however, and an end to the Caucasus
stalemate could benefit everyone. It would confirm the status of
Turkey as the superpower within the Black Sea council. Turkey may look
to the EU as a supplicant, but to its neighbours it looks an economic
giant.
Armenia, blocked to the north by the instability in Georgia and
fearful of being too dependent on Russia, would have an alternative
outlet to the world through Turkey. And economic cooperation could
soothe historic hatreds.
For Russia, there would also be gains. Paradoxically, the Russians
have never had better relations with Turkey than now, largely because
of the huge volume of trade, the massive flow of Russian tourists and
the reduced threat from a Nato member on Russia's borders. But these
smooth relations are fragile.
Historic competition for influence and for the region's energy
resources could flare up again. Russian actions in Georgia raised
hackles in Turkey. Moscow needs a settlement to ensure that there is
no new `South Ossetia' in the offing - and that the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute does not turn violent again, leaving Moscow and Ankara on
opposite sides.
Mount Ararat is a peak of startling beauty, especially in the morning
sun. The reputed resting place of the Ark and revered by so many in
the region, it has become a symbol of division. An open border would
allow all to approach its heights.
FT
April 12 2009 18:57
President Barack Obama's visit to Turkey last week - towards the end
of his first big international trip - paid a handsome compliment to
the country's growing influence in international affairs. Under the
administration of George W. Bush, relations between Washington and
Ankara slipped badly, not least because Turkey refused to support
the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. But Mr Obama's state visit may
have marked a turning point. The US president underlined Turkey's
importance as a bridge between the Islamic world and the west. He
made clear that Turkey had a role as a negotiator between Israel and
the Arab world. He voiced, too, the hope that Turkey would one day
join the European Union.
This last aspiration, of course, prompted another display of anguish
from some European leaders. No sooner had Mr Obama spoken than Nicolas
Sarkozy, French president, argued that "the immense majority" of EU
states opposed Turkey's accession. Angela Merkel, German chancellor,
acknowledged there were huge "differences of opinion" inside her
country on Turkey's EU hopes.
Even so, the Turkish government must be aware of one thing. It
does itself no favours when adopting a needlessly brash tone on the
world stage. Turkey may be playing a constructive role in attempts
to stabilise Iraq and Afghani stan. But Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
prime minister, nearly wrecked the recent Nato summit with his lone
opposition to Anders Fogh Rasmussen's nomination as the organisation's
secretary-general. The summit was too important a stage for such
petty grandstanding, which damaged Turkey's international image.
Instead, this is a time for Turkey to display quiet and responsible
diplomacy. The next few months bring two great challenges. The first
is to normalise relations with Armenia and reopen the border closed
by Turkey in 1993 in support of Azerbaijan. The second is to reach
a settlement with Greece over Cyprus, a dispute which poisons
decision-making inside the EU and Nato. If Turkey can display
statesmanship on both these fronts, it will significantly bolster
its claims to EU accession.
LAST REMNANT OF THE IRON CURTAIN SET TO FALL IN VICTORY
by Tony Halpin
The Times
April 14, 2009 Tuesday
London
A potholed road runs through the village of Margara into a barbed-wire
fence that marks Europe's last Cold War frontier. All that separates
Armenia and Turkey is a narrow bridge across the River Araks and
almost a century of enmity that began with the massacres of Armenians
in Ottoman Turkey in 1915 and continued with the Iron Curtain that
divided the Soviet Union from the West.
The Soviet legacy in the Caucasus and the painful burden of history
have conspired to keep the border closed long after the end of the Cold
War. Now more than 70 years of separation may be only weeks from ending
as relations between Turkey and Armenia undergo a remarkable thaw.
The opening of the border is being seen as a pivotal moment in
Turkey's rise as a major force in the Caucasus and beyond to Central
Asia. With Russia also resurgent in the Caucasus after last summer's
war with Georgia the stage is being set for an intensified struggle
for control of the region's energy resources.
Russian and Turkish troops eye each other warily from observation
towers on either side of the bridge. The Russian Army patrols the
border under a security agreement with Armenia and, with Turkey in
Nato, this is the last place where the former Cold War foes still confront
border.
Turkey refused to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia
after it became independent in 1992 because of a dispute over border
recognition. Ankara denies Armenian charges of genocide and is fearful
of a claim for land in eastern Turkey once occupied by Armenians.
Turkey briefly allowed trucks to cross the border in 1992 to
deliver wheat to Armenia, where the population risked starvation
as its Soviet-era economy collapsed. It sealed the border in 1993
in protest at Armenia's war with Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh,
a Soviet enclave populated largely by Armenians.
Repeated negotiations, often secret, failed to end the stand-off but
a bout of "football diplomacy" brought a breakthrough in September
when President Sargsyan of Armenia invited President Gul of Turkey to
watch the two countries play a World Cup qualifying match in Yerevan,
the capital.
Mr Gul accepted and invited Mr Sargsyan to watch the return match in
Turkey in October. Mr Sargsyan has said that he wants to cross the
land border to go to the game.
Ali Babacan, the Turkish Foreign Minister, is expected in Yerevan
on Thursday for a meeting of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation
Organisation, only nine days before Armenia traditionally marks the
anniversary of the genocide.
He is not expected to announce a date for the opening of the bo rder
but all sides believe that it is close.
Richard Giragosian, director of the Armenian Centre for National
and International Studies, said that he expected the opening of the
border to be followed by diplomatic recognition and an agreement to
establish joint commissions dealing with everything from trade and
transport issues to the genocide.
"This is the first time that both sides have been ready and willing
at the same time and this, combined with Russian support, makes me
optimistic," he said.
"It's a Turkish effort but also part of a Russia-Turkish warming that
I think is only temporary because they are inherently rivals in the
long term."
The West views the Caucasus as a key channel for pipelines to link
Central Asia's massive oil and gas reserves with Europe, bypassing
Russia. The opening of the border has special resonance in Margara,
however, an impoverished village 40km (25 miles) from Yerevan, where
refugees crossed the river to safety.
The snow-capped peak of Mount Ararat also stands tantalisingly out
of reach, rising majestically above farmland 40km inside Turkey. The
biblical resting place for Noah's Ark is sacred to Armenians, who
were the world's first state to adopt Christianity.
Kostan Piliposyan, 75, told The Times that he was eager to visit
Ararat and to see his mother's birthplace in nearby Igdir when the
border opened.
Then he dissolved into tears as he recal led how she had left behind
her dead parents as she fled the genocide.
"Of course, Turkey doesn't want to talk about this question," he
said. "But it will be good for Armenia that the border is open. The
Turks are also people and we need to talk and trade with each other,
so let them come."
Thawing relations
1915 Armenia claims that the Young Turks, the dominant party in the
Ottoman Empire, arranged the killing of 1.5 million Armenians
1920 Armenia invaded by Turkey and Russia. An agreement with the
Bolsheviks leads to Armenia proclaiming itself a socialist republic
1993 Turkey shuts its border with Armenia after separatists fight
for independence in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh
2001 Armenia becomes a full member of the Council of Europe.
France ignores Turkish objections and introduces a law stating that
Ottoman Turks committed genocide against Armenians in 1915
2005 Turkey says that it is ready for political relations with Armenia
and proposes joint commission to investigate the 1915 killings
2008 Talks accelerated after Turkish President attends a Turkey-Armenia
football match in Yerevan
Reuters Alert
April 14 2009
UK
Reuters and AlertNet are not responsible for the content of this
article or for any external internet sites. The views expressed are
the author's alone.
Istanbul/Yerevan/Baku/Brussels, 14 April 2009: Turkey and Armenia
should seize their best opportunity yet to normalise relations, work
on a new approach to shared history and open a European border that
for nearly a century has been hostage to conflict.
Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders,* the latest
report from the International Crisis Group, examines how a decade
of academic and civil society outreach laid the foundations for what
is now intense official engagement between the governments. The two
sides are now close to agreement on a package deal that will establish
diplomatic relations, open the border and set up bilateral commissions
to address a range of issues.
These commissions will include one on joint historical dimensions
of the Armenian-Turkish relationship, which will work to broaden
understanding of the Ottoman-era forced relocations and massacres of
Armenians, widely recognised as the Armenian genocide. Turkey contests
the term genocide, disputing its legal applicability and pointing to
mitigating circumstances as the Ottoman Empire fought on three fronts
in the First World War. But many Turks, including officials, now
publicly express regret over the tragic and high loss of Armenian life.
"Turks' and Armenians' once uncompromising views of history are
significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can be
healed", says Hugh Pope, Director of Crisis Group's Turkey/Cyprus
Project. "At this sensitive time, third parties should avoid statements
or resolutions in the politicised debate over genocide recognition
or denial that could inflame opinion on either side".
A separate but related issue, the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, still risks undermining final agreement
on the Turkey and Armenia normalisation package. Azerbaijan opposes any
border opening until Armenia withdraws from its occupied territory. But
Turkey should not sacrifice this chance to move forward, and should
persuade its ally that détente which makes Armenia feel secure will
do more for a settlement than continuing a fifteen-year impasse. For
long-term normalisation with Turkey to be sustainable, Armenia,
together with Azerbaijan, should ultimately adopt the Organisation for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group basic principles
for settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict of the OSCE, and
Armenia should withdraw from Azerbaijani territories that it occupies.
"Turkey and Armenia should finalise their agreement and thus create
new momentum for peace and cooperation in the South Caucasus", says
Sabine Freizer, Crisis Group's Europe Program Director. "They should
not wait until the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is settled. But outside
powers such as the U.S., EU, Russia and others should build on their
rare common interest to move both Turkish-Armenian normalisation and
the Nagorno-Karabakh process forward".
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Kimberly
Abbott (Washington) +1 202 785 1601 To contact Crisis Group media
please click here *Read the full Crisis Group report on our website:
http://www.crisisgroup.org
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long
roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over
Turkey's European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half,
relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including
how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial
disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation
of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official
engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have
transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of
an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and
begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity
to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide
the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the
stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should
not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain
support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about
history at a critical and promising time.
Turks' and Armenians' once uncompromising, bipolar views of history
are significantly converging, showing that the deep traumas can
be healed. Most importantly, the advance in bilateral relations
demonstrates that a desire for reconciliation can overcome old
enmities and closed borders. Given the heritage and culture shared by
Armenians and Turks, there is every reason to hope that normalisation
of relations between the two countries can be achieved and sustained.
Internal divisions persist on both sides. Armenia does not make
normalisation conditional on Turkey's formal recognition as
genocide of the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians
under the Ottoman Empire. But it must take into account the views of
Armenians scattered throughout the global diaspora, which is twice as
large as the population of Armenia itself and has long had hardline
representatives. New trends in that diaspora, however, have softened
and to some degree removed demands that Turkey surrender territory
in its north east, where Armenians were a substantial minority
before 1915.
Over the past decade, Turkey has moved far from its former blanket
denial of any Ottoman wrongdoing. Important parts of the ruling AK
Party, bureaucracy, business communities on the Armenian border
and liberal elite in western cities support normalisation with
Armenia and some expression of contritition. Traditional hardliners,
including Turkic nationalists and part of the security services, oppose
compromise, especially as international genocide recognition continues
and in the absence of Armenian troop withdrawals from substantial
areas they occupy of Turkey's ally, Azerbaijan. These divisions
surfaced in events surrounding the assassination of Turkish-Armenian
journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. That the new tendencies are
gaining ground, however, was shown by the extraordinary outpouring of
solidarity with Armenians during the Dink funeral in Istanbul and a
campaign by Turkish intellectuals to apologise to Armenians for the
"Great Catastrophe" of 1915.
The unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh still
risks undermining full adoption and implementation of the potential
package deal between Turkey and Armenia on recognition, borders and
establishment of bilateral commissions to deal with multiple issues,
including the historical dimension of their relations. Azerbaijan has
strong links to Turkey based on energy cooperation and the Turkic
countries' shared linguistic and cultural origins. Ethnic Armenian
forces' rapid advance into Azerbaijan in 1993 scuttled plans to
open diplomatic ties and caused Turkey to close the railway line
that was then the only transport link between the two countries. For
years, Turkey conditioned any improvement in bilateral relations on
Armenian troop withdrawals. Baku threatens that if this condition
is lifted, it will restrict Turkey's participation in the expansion
of Azerbaijani energy exports. While Azerbaijani attitudes remain
a constraint, significant elements in Turkey agree it is time for a
new approach. Bilateral détente with Armenia ultimately could help
Baku recover territory better than the current stalemate.
Outside powers have important interests and roles. The U.S. has long
fostered Armenia-Turkey reconciliation, seeking thereby to consolidate
the independence of all three former Soviet republics in the south
Caucasus and to support east-west transit corridors and energy
pipelines from the Caspian Sea. Washington was notable in its backing
of efforts that kick-started civil society dialogue between Turkey
and Armenia. The Obama administration is working hard at repairing the
damage done to U.S. relations with Turkey by the war in Iraq. Although
Obama repeatedly promised on the campaign trail to formally recognise
the 1915 forced relocation and massacres of Armenians under the Ottoman
Empire as genocide, he should continue to steer the prudent middle
course he has adopted as president. The U.S. Congress, which has a
draft resolution before it, should do the same. At this sensitive
moment of Turkish-Armenian convergence, statements that focus on the
genocide term, either to deny or recognise it, would either enrage
Armenians or unleash a nationalist Turkish reaction that would damage
U.S.-Turkish ties and set back Turkey-Armenia reconciliation for years.
U.S. support for Turkey-Armenia reconciliation appears to be
mirrored in Moscow. Russian companies have acquired many of Armenia's
railways, pipelines and energy utilities and seek to develop them;
Russian-Turkish relations are good; and Moscow is looking for ways
to mitigate the regional strains produced by its war with Georgia in
August 2008. If sustained, the coincidence of U.S.-Russian interests
would offer a hopeful sign for greater security and prosperity in
the South Caucasus after years of division and conflict. All sides -
chiefly Armenia and Turkey but potentially Azerbaijan as well - will
gain in economic strength and national security if borders are opened
and trade normalised.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of Turkey:
1. Agree, ratify and implement a normalisation package including the
opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral
commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation;
cultivate a pro-settlement constituency among Armenians; and avoid
threatening or penalising Armenia for outside factors like resolutions
or statements in third countries recognising a genocide.
2. Avoid sacrificing implementation of the normalisation package to
demands for immediate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
withdrawal of Armenian troops from occupied territories in Azerbaijan;
and seek opportunities to show Baku that by easing Yerevan's fears
of encirclement, normalised Turkey-Armenia relations may ultimately
speed up such an Armenian withdrawal.
3. Make goodwill towards Armenia clear through gestures such as joint
work on preserving the ancient ruins of Ani, stating explicitly that
Turkey will recognise and protect Armenian historical and religious
heritage throughout the country.
4. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue broader research
on matters pertaining to the events of 1915, preferably with the
engagement of Armenian and third-party scholars; modernise history
books and remove all prejudice from them; and increase funding for
cataloguing and management of the Ottoman-era archives.
To the Government of Armenia:
5. Agree, ratify, and implement a normalisation package including the
opening of borders, establishment of diplomatic relations and bilateral
commissions; continue to prepare public opinion for reconciliation;
and avoid statements or international actions relating to genocide
recognition that could inflame Turkish public opinion against the
current process.
6. Agree together with Azerbaijan to the OSCE Minsk Group basic
principles on a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement; then start withdrawals
from Armenian-occupied territories in Azerbaijan; and pursue peace
with Azerbaijan in full consciousness that only in this way can
normalisation with Turkey be consolidated.
7. Make clear that Armenia has no territorial claim on Turkey by
explicitly recognising its territorial integrity within the borders
laid out in the 1921 Treaty of Kars.
8. Encourage universities and institutes to pursue more research on
matters relating to the events of 1915, preferably with the engagement
of Turkish and third-party scholars; modernise history books and
remove all prejudice from them; and organise the cataloguing of known
Armenian archives pertaining to the events in and around 1915 wherever
they may be located.
To the United States, Russia and the European Union and its Member
States:
9. Avoid legislation, statements and actions that might inflame
public opinion on either side and so could upset the momentum towards
Turkey-Armenia normalisation and reconciliation.
10. Raise the seniority and intensify the engagement of the U.S.,
Russian and French co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group until Armenia
and Azerbaijan reach final agreement on Minsk Group basic principles
for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
11. Back up Turkey-Armenia reconciliation with projects to encourage
region-wide interaction, heritage preservation and confidence building;
and support as requested any new bilateral historical commission or
sub-commission, development of archive management and independent
Turkish- or Armenian-led scholarly endeavours to research into aspects
of the 1915 events.
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