Saturday 10 July 2010

Hillary Clinton in Armenia

Aysor, Armenia
July 4 2010
I am honored to be in Armenia, says Hillary Clinton



`Despite Turks were not ready and are not ready to establish relations
with Armenia without preconditions, it's very important to us to know
the US administration's position over the issue,' said Armenia's
President Serzh Sargsyan during the meeting with Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, who is on a visit to Armenia.

In his remarks, President Sargsyan expressed his gratitude to US
President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton for their efforts and
contributions to process of normalisation of relations between Armenia
and Turkey.

Armenia is interested in strengthening of relations with US, a
spokesperson to President Sargsyan quoted him as saying at the
meeting. Armenian President said: `These relations' high level is one
of the key factors of economical and political development of our
country as well as factor of strengthening of stability and peace in
the region.'

Hillary Clinton, in her part, said she is honored and pleased to be in
Armenia especially on the day that marks the Day of Independence of
the United States. `Tomorrow is the day of your Constitution ` one
more link between Armenia and US,' she said.

Clinton thanked President Sargsyan for kind words addressed to the US
administration and President Obama over the efforts aimed at
settlement to the Karabakh conflict on the basis of the Helsinki
Principles.

`In my own name, I'd like personally thank you for your own efforts
towards normalisation of relations with Turkey; as we have discussed
before, the US is surely interested in settlement of this issue. We
still believe that the settlement to these issues, on the whole, in
terms of development of the region and establishment of new
capabilities, derive from interests of Armenia,' said Hillary Clinton.

She thanked Armenian side for warm welcoming and said is looking
forward to new meetings.

US Secretary of State arrived in Armenia on July 4 within the
framework of her travel to the Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.
Armenia's President hosted Clinton at the Presidential Residence where
parties had a working dinner followed by a joint press conference with
participation of Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian.


Reuters
July 4 2010
Clinton pushes for Nagorno-Karabakh solution
Sun Jul 4, 2010 7:25pm GMT
By Arshad Mohammed

YEREVAN (Reuters) - U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on
Sunday it was a U.S. priority to help Armenia and Azerbaijan settle
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and urged them to refrain from violence
over the separatist region.

Visiting the two countries on the same day, Clinton delivered
identical messages: Washington will do its part to help end the
dispute, violence serves no one and a resolution would bring
prosperity and stability to the Caucasus.

A tiny mountain region mainly populated by Christian Armenians,
Nagorno-Karabakh seceded from Muslim Azerbaijan and proclaimed
independence after an early 1990s war that killed some 30,000. Its
independence is not recognised by any nation.

Azerbaijan wants Nagorno-Karabakh back, if necessary by force. More
than 15 years of mediation have failed to produce a final peace deal
and the threat of war is never far away.

Last month, four ethnic Armenian troops and an Azeri soldier died in
an exchange of fire near Nagorno-Karabakh.

"The United States cannot resolve the conflicts in this region but we
can be a partner and a supporter and an advocate," Clinton said in
Baku after meeting Azeri President Ilham Aliyev. "We stand ready to
help in any way that we can."

Clinton said she believed there had been progress towards ending the
dispute, though she did not provide details, and in both countries she
acknowledged the difficulty of the task.

"We know this will not be easy but we think it is the necessary
foundation for a secure and prosperous future," she told reporters in
Yerevan after talks with Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan.

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian said foreign ministers of
the two countries might meet on July 16 in a follow up to talks
between Aliyev and Sarksyan last month.

MENDING FENCES

Clinton's trip to the region, which has included stops in Ukraine and
Poland and will end with a brief visit to Georgia on Monday, has
multiple purposes.

In Azerbaijan, she pressed the authoritarian government on human
rights while also seeking to mend fences with the strategic country,
uneasy about some U.S. diplomatic moves and by perceived slights such
as the absence of a U.S. ambassador in Baku for more than a year.

A U.S.-backed push for a rapprochement between Armenia and U.S.-ally
Turkey has hurt U.S. relations with Azerbaijan, which worries that its
interests will suffer as a result.

Strategically located between Russia and Iran, Azerbaijan has been a
key supply route for U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The region is also an
important route for oil and gas supplies from the Caspian to Europe.

Clinton pressed Azerbaijan to show greater respect for civil liberties
and said she had raised the case of two jailed opposition bloggers
sentenced last year after a violent incident in a cafe.

The two say they were the victims of an unprovoked attack. The
incident happened soon after video blogger Adnan Hajizade posted his
latest tongue-in-cheek swipe at the authorities in which he held a
fake news conference dressed as a donkey.

In Armenia, she praised the government for its willingness to move
towards normalization with Turkey and she urged Ankara to overcome its
reluctance to reopen the border between the two countries, closed
because of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.

"We urge Turkey to take the steps that it promised to take and that
both sides continue to try to find the opportunity to open the door to
reconciliation and normalization," she said.
She called Armenia's readiness to pursue normal ties with Turkey "very
statesmanlike and very impressive."

"Now, as they say in sports, the ball is in the other court," she added.

(Additional reporting by Margarita Antidze in Tbilisi, Amie
Ferris-Rotman in Moscow and Hasmik Mkrtchyan in Yerevan; Editing by
Janet Lawrence)
Panorama, Armenia
July 4 2010
Clinton: U.S. believes peace is possible between Armenia and Azerbaijan


U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Armenia and Azerbaijan
for resolving the Nagorno Karabakh problem peacefully, Associated
Press reported.

"The final steps toward peace often are the most difficult, but we
believe peace is possible," she said at news conference in Baku with
her Azeri counterpart, Elmar Mammadyarov.

She also spoke about human rights situation in Baku: `Azerbaijan has
made a lot of progress in provide social justice since its
independence from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, "there's a lot
of room for improvement,' AP quoted Clinton as saying.
Panorama, Armenia
July 4 2010
Hillary Clinton: Long-term resolution is in interests of Nagorno
Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan



`Return to violence is inadmissible. Long-term resolution is first of
all in the interests of Nagorno Karabakh population, Armenia and
Azerbaijan,' U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared at a
press conference today.

The Secretary of State mentioned that the United States condemns use
of force and its threat. `We feel sorry for the casualties in the
latest incident. It was violation of the agreement of 1994,' the
Secretary of State said.

`We call on both sides not to use force. We do not want the sides to
suffer casualties,' Hillary Clinton said implying that incidents of
the kind can also cause problems for the negotiations.

Speaking about the current stage of the negotiation process Hillary
Clinton classed OSCE Minsk Group efforts as promising. Quoting the
recent statement of co-chairing countries Presidents the Secretary of
State said: `Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have a single perception that
any solution should be based on Helsinki principles.'

She mentioned that very serious negotiations took place on Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev's initiative and with his participation
lately.'We hope for progress,' Mrs. Clinton stressed saying that the
expected progress implies coordination of basic principles of
settlement. `Everybody understands that it is a complicated process,
but it is the only way of security.'
Panorama, Armenia
July 4 2010
Hillary Clinton: `The ball is in Turkey's field'


Armenia's April decision was impressive and praiseworthy. U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared at a joint press
conference with Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandyan today in
Yerevan, when speaking about Armenian side's decision to suspend the
process of ratification of the Armenia-Turkey Protocols.

Speaking about the Armenian-Turkish normalization process Hillary
Clinton reminded that she personally attended the ceremony of signing
the Protocols. `It was a brave decision by the two Presidents aimed at
complete normalization of relations,' Secretary of State mentioned
meanwhile expressing concern over their non-fulfillment.

`You know that the signed documents have not been fulfilled yet, and
there are some problems. I am happy that irrespective of the
difficulties coming, certainly, from Turkey, Armenia is ready to
continue the process,' Hillary Clinton declared. She mentioned that
under the circumstances Armenia's decision was impressive and
praiseworthy, and they appreciate Armenia's readiness to continue the
process.

Using football terminology Secretary of State concluded: `The ball is
now in Turkey's field.' She also added that the American side also
encourages Turkey to undertake some steps.


Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey
July 4 2010
US-Azerbaijan relations at risk of failing?
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Michael Tkacik



Though sometimes overlooked, Azerbaijan's geopolitical status far
outweighs its size. Located just north of Iran and just south of the
volatile Caucuses, it sits on the Caspian Sea, astride major oil and
gas transshipment routes that avoid Russia. While not a perfect
democracy, Azerbaijan clearly presents an alternative to the theocracy
advocated by Iran and militant Islamists, as well as to the Central
Asian alternative of increasingly brutal authoritarianism. Azerbaijan
is therefore important geopolitically, in terms of energy access, and
as an acceptable if not perfect model of governance.

Yet, Baku has been moving away from the United States. Recently, Baku
cancelled joint maneuvers with the U.S. military. At the same time
Azerbaijan has been increasing its cooperation with Iran and Russia on
energy and other matters. Beyond this, rhetoric from high level Baku
officials has become progressively more anti-American. Though U.S.
policy makers have sought to discount the significance of these
signals, there is little doubt that U.S. - Azerbaijani relations are
undergoing a change for the worse. The questions are why and what can
be done.

Azerbaijan's post-independence quest for a closer relationship with
the U.S. was driven by at least two objectives. First, and most
importantly, Azerbaijan sought to reclaim territory lost to Armenia in
the Nagorno - Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and seven regions adjacent
to it. Second, Baku sought economic growth through integration with
the West. While Azerbaijan has made progress in accomplishing this
second goal, it has been bitterly disappointed on the issue of
Nagorno-Karabakh.

The hopes Azerbaijan pinned on its relationship with the U.S. were
demonstrated in 1994 when the U.S. signed an agreement for cooperation
in the energy sector. Though Baku sought economic benefits from this
deal, it realized the agreement had geopolitical ramifications as
well. Azerbaijan supported U.S. interests by promoting the first
pipelines in the post-Soviet Eurasia that avoided Russian territory.
The Baku - Supsa and Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan oil pipelines and Baku `
Tbilisi - Erzurum gas pipeline are products of that era. As
demonstrated in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and other
former - Soviet republics, displeasing Russia can have severe
ramifications for nearby states. Yet Azerbaijan was willing to take
the risk.

Following the Sept.11 attacks against the U.S., Azerbaijan cooperated
again. Baku opened its airspace for the transfer of coalition troops
to Afghanistan, contributed peacekeeping forces to Afghanistan and
Iraq, and supported U.S. efforts to combat terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Azerbaijan's close engagement with the U.S. in the energy and security
sectors satisfied many of Washington's desires. But from Baku's
perspective there was no quid pro quo - there was no progress toward
the resolution of its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno - Karabakh, a
key objective on which engagement rested.

There have been several disappointments in U.S. policy for Azerbaijan
over the last two decades. First, in 1992 the U.S. Congress adopted
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, making Azerbaijan the only
country in the region following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc
deprived of the U.S. financial assistance. Second, Washington has
never recognized Armenia as an aggressor state in the occupation of an
inalienable part of Azerbaijani territory and even voted against the
March 2008 Baku-sponsored U.N. General Assembly resolution reaffirming
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and `demanding the immediate
withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories
there.' Third, the U.S. Congress has repeatedly offered Armenia far
more aid than Azerbaijan even though Azerbaijan has diligently
supported U.S. interests in the region. Even more disturbing, the U.S.
has been offering separate financial support to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Since President Obama's election, U.S. policy toward the region has
been marked by increasing disinterest, as reflected in no less than
five policy shifts.

First, the replacement of Matthew Bryza by Robert Bradtke as a U.S.
co-chair in the OSCE Minsk Group indicates a more passive approach to
both the Minsk Group and the Nagorno - Karabakh negotiation process.
France and Russia, the other two co-chairs in the Minsk Group, are
both involved in the Nagorno - Karabakh negotiation process at the
presidential level. Conversely, the U.S. seems apathetic.

Second, the U.S. has increased its criticism of Azerbaijan's democracy
and human rights record, but has failed to apply a similar approach to
Armenia, especially given the protests and deaths in the wake of the
Feb. 18, 2008 Armenian presidential elections.

Third, since Anne Derse left Baku for Vilnius, the U.S. kept the post
of its ambassador to Azerbaijan vacant for nearly a year, something
many in Baku have assessed as a sign of the U.S. indifference toward
Azerbaijan. It took Washington over 10 months to finally name its new
ambassador to Azerbaijan.

Fourth, the U.S. failed to invite Azerbaijan to the nuclear security
summit Washington hosted on 12-13 April, the biggest international
meeting hosted by the U.S. since 1945. This was also viewed in Baku as
a reflection of Washington's growing neglect toward Baku, especially
given Azerbaijan's potential role in non-proliferation efforts. This
sense of disappointment was even deeper given the fact that
Azerbaijan's two regional neighbours, Armenia and Georgia, did receive
invitations to attend the summit.

Finally, the largest source of disappointment came as a result of the
Obama administration's efforts in 2009 to push hard for the Armenian `
Turkish rapprochement. From Baku's perspective, the resolution of the
Nagorno - Karabakh conflict should be linked to this rapprochement
lest the Armenian's feel no pressure to settle the matter. The
Armenian - Turkish engagement deprives Azerbaijan of the little
leverage it possesses to encourage Armenia to withdraw from the
Azerbaijani territories it occupies. The U.S. has seemingly penalized
Baku's growing constructiveness in the Nagorno - Karabakh negotiations
and rewarded Armenia's obstructionist approach. Unlike Baku, Armenia
has so far failed to approve the renewed version of the Madrid
principles regarding settlement of this conflict. In Baku, this last
policy shift is viewed as a victory for the Armenian lobby and narrow
domestic political considerations in the U.S.

It is thus U.S. reluctance to become more constructively involved with
Baku's outstanding security problems, especially the Nagorno `
Karabakh conflict and its ignorance regarding the rationale driving
Azerbaijan's quest to integrate with the West that have been key in
alienating Baku in recent months. To make sure that these tactical
shifts do not translate into a strategic transformation of Baku's
foreign policy as well as into a deeply embedded mistrust of the U.S.
amongst the society at large, the U.S. should reassess its policy
toward a valuable partner on a key international fault line. The
recent nomination of Matthew Bryza as Washington's new ambassador to
Azerbaijan is a first move in the right direction, but much more
remains to be done to salvage this important relationship.

* Michael Tkacik, J.D., Ph.D. is the Professor of Government, Director
of the School of Honors at the Stephen F. Austin State University.


The Moscow Times
July 5 2010
A Forever Smoldering Conflict in the Caucasus
05 July 2010
By Thomas de Waal


As U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton travels to Baku and Yerevan
on July 4-5, an old issue will again dominate her discussions: the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev will have a wry smile if he
watches the media reports. He was the first leader to fail to solve
this conflict in 1988. Since his day, the dispute has escalated into
full-scale war and then degraded into a miserable deadlock, but its
fundamentals have not changed. For years, the broad international
consensus is that the competing Armenian and Azeri claims over
Nagorno-Karabakh are still so extreme and contradictory that it did
not merit a high-level peace initiative. The perception has been that
the conflict - halted by a cease-fire but not resolved - is at least
being managed and that the risks of a new war are negligible.

But recent developments are pushing Nagorno-Karabakh up the agenda
again. First the good news. Since the end of 2008, President Dmitry
Medvedev has surprised skeptics by personally working on a peace
agreement. It is gruelling work. In Sochi this past January, Medvedev
spent most of a day with Azeri President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan and got absolutely nowhere. In St. Petersburg
last month, he spent more than two hours with them and made a little
more progress. This top-level Russian initiative has not received much
attention outside Russia.

The default position of many in Washington, for example, is that
Moscow wants to `keep the conflict smoldering.' But that does not jibe
with the facts. No sane senior politician of Medvedev's rank would
work so hard on this if he did not want genuinely to see success. The
Russians have also been scrupulous in involving their co-mediators,
inviting the U.S. and French Nagorno-Karabakh envoys to St. Petersburg
to join in the discussions with the two presidents. It looks as though
Medvedev has made peace in Nagorno-Karabakh a personal project, and
his government sees a peaceful initiative with Armenia and Azerbaijan
as a good PR response to the damage Russia suffered internationally in
Georgia in 2008. This is one area where, at the moment at least,
Medvedev and Clinton are pushing in the same direction.

The bad news is that this latest push for peace comes at a time when
more and more people are talking war. On June 18, only a few hours
after the St. Petersburg meeting, one of the worst incidents in years
occurred on the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire line. Four Armenian
soldiers and one Azeri were killed. The circumstantial evidence points
more to this having been an Azeri attack than an Armenian one - the
bodies were on the Armenian side of the line - but the true picture
will probably never be known. Clashes like this threaten the
equilibrium that has held since 1994, when the ceasefire deal ended
fighting. They reflect an overall hardening of positions on both
sides. Many Armenians talk more openly about history ratifying the
victory they won in 1994 in the hope that Nagorno-Karabakh will follow
Kosovo down the path of international legitimacy. For its part,
oil-rich Azerbaijan now spends more than $2 billion a year on its
military and many Azeris adopt a more belligerent tone, calling for a
war to recapture Nagorno-Karabakh from the Armenians.

The international mechanism designed to deal with the conflict, the
Minsk Process of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe, is still extremely modest. There are just six European
monitors in charge of observing the ceasefire - basically a token
presence given that there are more than 20,000 soldiers on each side
facing each other along more than 175 kilometers of trenches. The
chief work of mediation falls on three Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe ambassadors representing France, Russia and the
United States, who keep up the tortuous negotiations over a compromise
document in a climate of almost total distrust in Armenia and
Azerbaijan.

Naturally suspicious, neither government offers the offer anything
constructive. To be precise, the Armenians offer constructive
engagement on small issues such as sharing water over the ceasefire
line, but the Azeris reject these gestures, worrying that this is
`doing business with the enemy.' The Armenian side rejects all
proposals to give up even an inch of Armenian-held land, before
pledges on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh are made up front. The
Azeris, saying that they are in a state of war, even reject the
proposal made by the French, Russia and U.S foreign ministers in
Helsinki in 2008 to remove snipers from the front line.

The result is that, even when Medvedev is pushing them, the two
presidents lack the will to put their signatures on a piece of paper
that will set their countries down a path of historic compromise with
each other. To do so would unleash a storm of domestic criticism,
while the international reward for taking this step is much less
certain. So the leaders calculate that they will not pay a high price
for doing nothing - and that other bilateral issues, such as Armenian
diaspora concerns, gas pipelines and Afghanistan-bound flights over
Azerbaijan will keep their relations with Moscow, Washington and
Brussels on an even footing.

The bloodshed on the ceasefire line should focus minds and be a
reminder that a new conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh would be
catastrophic for everyone, not just Armenians and Azeris. More
positive relationships between Moscow, Washington, Paris and Brussels
makes this a good moment to have a conversation about what each of
these capitals can offer to underpin a post-conflict settlement in
terms of funding and peacekeepers. If the world's top leaders send a
signal to the Armenians and Azeris that they are more serious about a
lasting peace, then the local actors may finally have to accept that
the day of peaceful reckoning has come.

Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Washington, specializing on the Caucasus.

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