Saturday 10 July 2010

Karabagh Devlopments as seen by Azeris and Russians‏

Last Chance For Armenia,’ Threatens Aliyev
Posted By Asbarez Staff On July 7, 2010 @ 3:18 pm In Azerbaijan,

Featured Story, International, Top Stories |
BAKU (Combined Sources)–”This is the last chance for Armenia to
leave the occupied lands voluntarily for the sake of its own future and
its own security,” threatened Azeri President Ilham Aliyev Tuesday
during the inauguration of a center for the so-called “Azeri Community
of Nagorno-Karabakh,” reported the Turan news agency.

The threat comes two days after Aliyev held talks with Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, who urged both sides to refrain from “use of
force or the intention of use of force” to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.

In his lengthy remarks, Aliyev said that Azerbaijan had accepted the
updated Madrid Principles drafted by the OSCE Minks Group that is
mediating the peace process.

He said the time had come for Armenia to adopt the principles,
accusing Yerevan of deliberately delaying the process.

The Azeri President said his country’s growing economic and military
potential and the strengthening of its position in the international arena
will help it restore its territorial integrity.

“Today our army is able to solve any task,” the Azerbaijani President
said. Aliyev, however, did not touch upon the mechanism of
development of the final legal status of Nagrono-Karabakh during his
speech.

In related news, Azerbaijan has denied Armenian claims that Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev presented his Armenian and Azerbaijani
counterparts with a new international plan to end the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict at their meeting in Saint Petersburg last month, reported Radio
Free Europe.

Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian referred to them as “a new version
of the Madrid principles” of a Karabakh settlement at a joint news
conference in Yerevan with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on
Sunday.

President Serzh Sarkisian likewise spoke of “the latest version” of the
proposed framework accord as he met with the visiting French, Russian
and U.S. co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group on Saturday. A statement
by his office said the document was “presented in the course of the Saint
Petersburg negotiations between the presidents of Armenia, Russia and
Azerbaijan.”

The Azei Foreign Ministry dismissed these statements late on Monday.
“Even though Russia plays a large role in this process and the Russian
president has taken part in several meetings [between Aliyev and
Sarkisian,] proposals are drawn up only by the [Minsk Group] co-chairs,”
Azerbaijani news agencies quoted the ministry spokesman, Elkhan
Polukhov, as saying.

“Updated Madrid proposals exist only in the form of a document, and they
were submitted to both parties last year,” Polukhov said. “Only various
approaches were discussed in Saint Petersburg. The statement by
Nalbandian is only aimed at distracting the Armenian and international
publics from the essence of the issue.”

The three co-chairs made no mention of the Saint Petersburg in a
statement issued after their latest tour of the conflict zone. They instead
reiterated the U.S., Russian and French presidents’ joint calls for the
parties to “take the next step and move towards completing work on the
Basic Principles to enable the drafting of a peace agreement to begin.”
They also urged the sides to “strictly observe the 1994 ceasefire and
exercise restraint along the Line of Contact.”

“During their visit, the Co-chairs also presented to the parties their plan
to undertake a mission to the occupied territories in this fall, which was
accepted in principle,” added the statement.


ArmInfo News
What was said in Petersburg was the last drop for Aliyev
2010-07-06 14:52:00
David Stepanyan

Interview of the First Deputy Chairman of the Russian State Duma
Committee for CIS Affairs and Relations with Compatriots, Director of
the Institute of CIS Countries Konstantin Zatulin with ArmInfo News
Agency

Mr Zatulin, did the Petersburg meeting and the statement by American,
Russian and French presidents during G8 summit in Canada change the
situation in the Karabakh settlement?

I think the Petersburg meeting and the statement by the presidents of
Russia, USA and France during G8 Summit in Canada promoted the change
of the situation in the Karabakh settlement, therefore the situation
is not static. I think that just the statement by the presidents of
OSCE MG cochair-countries but not the trilateral meeting in Petersburg
with all its pluses and minuses and not even the deplorable fact of
the Azerbaijani subversive action has become the primary event of
late. This statement is very important even because the presidents of
OSCE MG cochair countries have chosen just the topic of Nagorno
Karabakh for their statement, against the background of the presently
existing conflicts and wars in the world. I consider it very important
in the context of the current aggravation of the situation in the
region, as well as the propagandistic and militaristic statements by
Azerbaijan which have recently become very frequent.

Did Baku take note of it?

I think that a serious concern appeared in Baku in view of the
Armenian-Turkish relations, and, having developed a propagandistic
advance on Turkey and having achieved actual failure of the
Armenian-Turkish process, Azerbaijan had a bellbit in a sense and
decided that it can incline the world community to the good of its
version of settlement of the Karabakh conflict through development of
this topic. However, since Baku is not sure of this, the military
rhetoric is going on. In this context, the statement by the three
presidents is important as it emphasizes that their attention is
locked on the region, and Russia, the USA and France will not
encourage the attempt of military solution of the Karabakh problem.
Moreover, despite the fact that the cochair-countries' stances do not
fully coincide with the official stance of the Armenian party, they
are nevertheless much closer to the Armenian party's stance than to
Azerbaijan's one. I say so as the cochairmen very clearly separate the
issues of territories and Nagorno Karabakh, separately mention the
problem of a corridor between the NKR and Armenia and, finally, they
mention holding of a referendum with participation of refugees not in
whole Azerbaijan but specifically in Nagorno Karabakh.

Does this statement stem from the Armenian party’s interests?

The statement by the presidents of Russia, USA and France on Karabakh
made within the frames of the G8 summit in Canada is really important
and favorable for Armenia. Undoubtedly it makes Azerbaijan nervous
even if to suppose that the scenario offered by the co-chairs
automatically supposes ceding of territories and giving status to
Karabakh. If the co-chair states take guarantees and say strictly that
the referendum will be held in the fixed terms, but not delayed to
endless, it would almost meet the interests of the Armenian party. As
in fact it would mean the bargain - status for territories, which is
rather realistic, although emotional and other narrow-mindedness of
the Armenian as well as the Azerbaijani party are on its way. I think
that the option when the NKR gets independence and Armenia a corridor
which connects it to Karabakh, giving in exchange the territories
around Karabakh is rather acceptable for Armenia and Nagornyy
Karabakh. The point is, in that case how necessary it will be to bring
the peace-keeping contingent in the region. I think it will depend on
the level of trust between the parties.


The last Azeri sabotage will hardly give rise to such a confidence…

Unfortunately, today I am less optimistic when viewing Azerbaijan's
stance. I see that they in Baku are not ready for a dialogue and there
are several proofs of this: the last military incident, the nervous
response to the involvement of observers in the last elections in
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. I have observed lots of elections but it
was for the first time I saw such a reaction. Thereby, Azerbaijan is
escalating the tensions. For example, in Northern Cyprus the Turkish
and Greek communities have no communication problems with one another.
Aliyev's escape from St.Petersburg received a negative response.


What horrible could be said to Aliyev in Petersburg?

Much was said about Aliyev's escape from Petersburg, but I think that
over the trilateral talks they already touched on Kelbajar, which was
the last drop for Aliyev which he could not bear. That is to say, they
touched not only on the NKR status but also on the necessity of the
corridor between Armenia and the NKR. By the way, it was repeated by
the presidents of the USA, Russia and France in Canada already after
the Petersburg meeting. That is to say, despite all its demarches and
diversion Azerbaijan should take this point of view into account.

What part in uncompromising attitude of Azerbaijan is played by Turkey
which found itself far from the Karabakh settlement after suspension
of the Armenian-Turkish process?

Undoubtedly Azerbaijan hopes that Turkey will support it in everything
regarding Karabakh, especially that Turkey occupied such position
having sacrificed its image in Europe, its European plans and its good
relations with all the sponsors of the Armenian-Turkish settlement.
For this reason, Azerbaijani hopes are not groundless though many
people do not imagine how Turkey despite the above mentioned plans and
interests may help Azerbaijan in this matter.

Robert Gates has recently visited Baku, and Hillary Clinton will visit
the region in early July.What is the reason of such an increasing
interest in us?

I think the outcome of the Armenian-Turkish normalization process has
made an extremely unfavorable impression on all the participants in
the Minsk Group. Moreover, it is extremely important that Turkey has
disrupted the talks, having actually done Azerbaijan's bidding. It is
simply inadmissible to put aside what seemed so important for both
Americans and Europeans. In addition, I think that for the United
States the Armenian-Turkish normalization was also extremely
significant in the context that it gave Barack Obama an opportunity to
evade his pre-electoral promises and recognition of the Armenian
genocide. He could keep on saying without any remorse that in
conditions of establishment of a dialogue between Armenia and Turkey,
it is simply inexpedient to recognize the Armenian Genocide. And now,
having blocked the Armenian-Turkish process, Turkey took away such a
trump card from his hands.

Does it mean that Obama will be unable to speak Armenian next April 24?

Sure it does. Therefore, I think that the West is objectively
irritated with Turkey's stance and strives to undo the
Nagorno-Karabakh knot. There is some irritation in Russia as well,
since to develop relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan peace is needed
between your countries, because development of Russia's relations with
Armenia is quite jealously perceived in Azerbaijan.


I think this is quite a pragmatic expression which is called to chill
some emotions in Azerbaijan. By the way, Azerbaijan is important for
the USA not only as a transport corridor, as a way to the resources of
Central Asia, but like a resource base. Central Asia and Azerbaijan
are watched by the West in one package like an opportunity to revise
the situation in EurAsia. For this reason, Azerbaijan continues
remaining necessary to the West.

Does the visit by Hillary Clinton to the region have other reasons?

Hillary Clinton is one of those politicians which are the authors of
the Armenian-Turkish process and placed stake on it and commented on
it many times. At present after the statement by the presidents of the
co-chair states on Karabakh such a trip to the region is quite logical
although it was planned before the statement. Moreover, Clinton is
striving to feel how much the Armenian-Turkish and the Karabakh issues
may be resolved. How much acceptable are Washington's positions on
Karabakh settlement for Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the problem
of relations of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan with Iran will be also
discussed, as American administration is still concerned about the
Iranian issue. By the way, Azerbaijan is also important for the USA
like a corridor in case of worsening of relations with Iran especially
in the context of availability of the many-million Azerbaijani
community in Iran.


azerireport.com
What Causes Armenian Opposition to Madrid Principles?
By Murad Gassanly


The short answer to that question is the Armenian political elite is
against the Madrid Principles because for Armenia and the Armenian
Diaspora the issue is not Karabakh independence, neither it is simply
about Karabakh unification with Armenia. Instead it is about the
events in Ottoman Eastern Anatolia in 1915. Negative Armenian reaction
to Madrid Principles and to rapprochement with Turkey begins to make
sense in that context.

Let’s leave aside the irrationality and absurdity of Armenia applying
the implications of events in another region, at another time in
history to present-day relations with Azerbaijan and the Karabakh
dispute. It is a fact and one Azerbaijan should not ignore. For
Armenians victory in Karabakh and conquest of additional territories
served as a means to a perverse sense of vengeance against a proxy
enemy. As tragic and tragically pathetic as that may be and whatever
the rights and wrongs of Armenia’s conflict with Turkey are, it is us,
Azerbaijanis, who have to deal with this fall out.

Karabakh, however, was never the main objective, merely a step along
the way. The entire Armenian national ideology is predicated on
acquisition of territories deemed as “historically Armenian”, in
effect a Greater Armenia. This process began long before the events of
1915, so it would be pointless trying to “understand” and “feel the
pain” – a natural aggressor will always find an excuse for his
predatory instincts. In fact a historic sense of grievance informed
most of the modern military aggressions.

Much of the debate in Armenian academic and social circles centres on
the territorial issue. This is as true of the international “genocide”
recognition campaign, as of Armenian strategy on Karabakh. The
conquest of Karabakh and other regions, as well as the recognition
campaign are simply stages in a long term vision.

In a debate on the pages of a respected quarterly journal Armenian
Forum as long as ten years ago, various authors discussed the purposes
of international “genocide” recognition and the consensus on the
territorial compensation issue was concrete. The disagreement was on
the means to achieve the end of getting Turkey to relinquish its
“Armenian” territories. Khatchik Der Ghougassian, a moderate, argued
that Armenia should normalise relations with Turkey as part of the
recognition process and that doing so “would not mean ignoring other
expectations associated with recognition”. Instead, it would merely be
the beginning of a long process of negotiations.

More excitable author, Simon Payaslian, was a proponent of a more
radical solution:

“Scenarios other than recognition would perhaps prove more realistic
for Armenians to effectuate the objective of regaining their homeland.
This would involve, for example, an opportunity provided by a regional
war, whereby regional powers (Russia, Syria, Iraq, Iran, or a
combination thereof) would be engaged in one major war or a series of
military conflicts with Turkey and its allies.”

These are not ravings of a lunatic but are published comments of a
respected author. And they do not sound too farfetched given recent
history of the region and current situation with Iran’s nuclear
programme. Payaslian’s views and mindset remain indicative of the
nature of the debate in a country, whose president notoriously speaks
in terms of “ethnic incompatibility” between Armenians and Azeris. He
was not even aware of the implications of his words on a European
audience – this is normal talk in Yerevan. Ten years after the
Payaslian Exchange in the Armenian Forum we know whose side is winning
in Armenia.

An agreement on the basis of Madrid Principles would provide Armenia
with a kind of security guarantees only few states enjoy. An
international peace-keeping force, almost certain to contain
considerable Russian contingent, would replace Armenian occupying
forces in all of the seven regions around Karabakh. These areas would
remain demilitarised and free of Azerbaijani troops for decades.
Armenia would keep its forces in Karabakh indefinitely – there are no
demands for Armenian-Karabakh forces disarmament.

Azerbaijan, having signed the agreement, would never get away with
military action and would never be able to pose any threat to Armenia.
The risk and costs of doing so make it unthinkable. As I discussed in
a previous article (link here) the legal framework of Madrid
Principles would ensure that whilst Armenia could not make any
territorial claims against Azerbaijan, Karabakh Armenians could
proceed with their own independence through a democratic referendum.
Even if all Azerbaijanis return to Karabakh (highly unlikely),
Armenians would still constitute a majority in the province and would
reasonably expect to win.

Moreover, if before 1988 Karabakh Armenians constituted part of the
general Armenian ethnic minority in Azerbaijan, after Madrid
Principles-based deal they would, under international law,
indisputably constitute a national minority in Azerbaijan – situated
as they would be in a territorially defined administrative unit under
international jurisdiction. Their claim to independence would be
legally waterproof – a situation that is not even near the reality
today.

With such serious international security guarantees on offer Armenia
should be in favour of Madrid principles. Instead it stalls the
process and seeks to undermine it through military adventures on the
line of contact in Karabakh – the most serious and recent one resulted
in four Armenian and one Azeri soldier being killed.

The answer to this apparent paradox lies in the fact that Karabakh
independence was never the objective – the purpose had always been
unification with Armenia, which in turn is part of the larger plan
that includes territorial claims against Georgia as well as Turkey.

The right of Armenian self-determination in Karabakh was raised only
after the collapse of Soviet Union. It was a political move designed
to legitimise the aggression perpetrated by Armenia against
Azerbaijan. The issue between 1988 and 1991 was not Karabakh
independence, but unification with Armenia – Miatzum was the slogan.
It was irredentism, not separatism. Today independence is the only
option for formalising Armenian control over Karabakh. Nothing short
of that would be acceptable to Armenia.

To return seven regions captured in battle, major territories with
resources and arable land that cumulatively comprise a buffer zone
against the “Turkic enemy” - seems too costly. For Armenia, a nation
that prides itself on its racial purity and boasts highest ethnic
homogeneity rate in Europe (achieved through centuries of ethnic
cleansing of minority populations) it is unthinkable that a single
Azerbaijani should return to Karabakh. One Azeri in Shusha means
failure of their entire endeavour. Ethnic cleansing in Khojaly and
across Karabakh was as much of an aim behind Armenian actions in 1992,
as it was in Armenian rebellion in Van in 1914 when most of the city’s
Turkish and Kurdish inhabitants were slaughtered. If we are not
careful there would be another date, few decades from now, perhaps in
Nakchivan or Ganja. Aggressors cannot and should never be appeased.

Presence of foreign troops (especially non-Russian) in the adjacent to
Karabakh territories is also unacceptable to Armenia as this precludes
future territorial expansion against Azerbaijan and perhaps Georgian
regions where Armenians make up ethnic majority. Any presence of
Western troops in the region can threaten Armenian interests.

Status quo is the ideal scenario for Armenia. As time goes by and more
colonists and settlers establish themselves not just in Karabakh but
in Lachin and Kelbajar, and “NKR” gains more and more international
recognition, pressure for independence would become immense. By that
stage two generations of Armenians will have been born in “NKR” and
two generations of Karabakh Azerbaijani will have been born in exile.
This is a process that began with deportations of Azerbaijanis from
present day Armenia and Karabakh in 1830s, continued through 1940s and
1960s and culminated in the final mass expulsion in 1988-1992. One
hundred and sixty odd years and there is no trace of Azeri presence
south of the ceasefire line, save for a few ruined mosques.

That is why Armenia will not agree to a peace treaty based on Madrid
Principles, or to any other agreement. Peace is not the objective
here. Territorial expansion and Armenian ethnic purity are the real

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