News about Karabagh
ICJ Kosovo ruling – unprecedented politically and a precedent legally
Sunday, August 1, 2010
HOVHANNES NIKOGHOSYAN
These days, after the International Court of Justice, or ICJ – the
highest court of U.N.-led world order with universal jurisdiction –
issued its advisory opinion on the lawfulness of unilateral
declaration of independence with regards to the one-time Yugoslav
Albanian enclave of Kosovo, tensions and discussions over its
character swept the media outlets. This is especially relevant to the
regions where similar conflicts exist.
Whether the ICJ decision would be referred to as a precedent legally
or not, in fact it would encourage other secessionist entities around
the globe to act and hope for international recognition. Naturally,
whether Kosovo will be set as a precedent or not, strongly depends on
the stance of the leading countries supporting Kosovo's bid to become
a full member to international community. Currently those powers say
all conflicts should be dealt with individually.
When it comes to the issue of Nagorno Karabakh, it's tremendously
important to pay attention to the details and the background more than
to the present-time speculations around it.
Quite possibly, for some authors involved in Caucasus/Caspian regional
security debates, it was predictable that the ICJ ruling of June 22
would become a cold shower to Azeri propaganda, which had developed a
good tradition of making one-sided allegations toward the Nagorno
Karabakh process, for instance, by prioritizing the norm of
territorial integrity over the other jus cogens norms of modern
international law. Ironically, some unbiased experts, including those
in Armenia, blindly have been following this debate and driving
themselves to a standstill in that one-way traffic.
I would join my good friend, Dr. Tigran Nahapetyan – an expert of
international law at Yerevan-based Public Policy Institute, saying
that perhaps not the ruling itself, but the proceedings and the
statements made by different countries at ICJ make the real atmosphere
of change in the international relations when it comes to the issues
of territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and
self-determination. Surely, the change is of legal nature, not
political. Of course, politically, the ICJ ruling over Kosovo will
stay meaningless until the states sponsoring it change their minds.
However, legally this is yet the first ever prestigious ruling in
favor of unilateral declaration of independence of a secessionist
entity to become a de jure statehood.
Today no one denies that the authorities in the Nagorno Karabakh de
facto Republic, or NKR, have their sovereignty over certain
territories, where some people live on and those people do recognize
the legitimacy of the central authorities. Another yet important
element to be labeled as a functioning statehood, according to the
Montevideo Convention, is the permanently functioning government,
which is successfully configured at general elections. Perhaps the
fact, or the privilege if you want, for the people of Nagorno Karabakh
has been recognized by the CSCE/OSCE decision in Helsinki in 1992
where the states decided to establish and invite the "elected and
other representatives" of NKR to the future Minsk Conference.
Obviously, the conduct of general elections thus comes to be
implicitly encouraged by the OSCE itself, making it silly and unlawful
to declare those elections as illegal each time. The only reason for
doing that is the fact of OSCE existing on political grounds, not
legal.
To put the discussion of this contribution into a wider canvas, we
should acknowledge that a conflict resolution process in any pattern
of international disagreements receives its solution in specific
frameworks of international mediation, which is explicit only towards
a particular situation, considering the politics, political economy
and geopolitics surrounding the conflict. In order to find and employ
that specific mediation format the consent from all relevant parties
is required. And, it's notable that the usage of the wording "all
relevant parties" means not only the ones directly involved in the
hostilities but also all the stakeholders that have a share in those
geopolitics.
Not to make this entry a lecture on conflict resolution, the snapshot
of the issue of mediation is an utmost important component of the
conflict itself since a short while later it becomes actively playing
a role of a determinant to the future solution. For instance, though
"impartiality" is a vital component of any mediation efforts, over
time the peacekeepers side with either of the parties. Again, the
example of KFOR in Kosovo is a good example how the impartiality turns
into siding. The same pattern goes legitimately true with regards to
Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Thus, the format of mediation
is a vital issue to secure a lasting settlement.
This is essentially true with regards to Nagorno Karabakh peace
process, which traversed a tremendously hard path to finding the
current negotiations frameworks. While countries such as Finland,
Italy, Russia, Iran tried to have their own input in the pursuit of a
lasting solution, since the 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit the institute of
triple co-chairmanship has been established. Though continuous efforts
of Azerbaijan to jeopardize the Minsk Group contribution and take the
NK issue to another institutions such as PACE or U.N. – the
co-chairmanship proved to be mostly effective.
Perhaps since 2005, when the Karabakh peace process entered a decisive
phase – Azerbaijani leadership had done their best to push the process
in wider perspective, involving other regional arrangements and UN
podium for that. An inter-parliamentarian commission on Nagorno
Karabakh within PACE (now suspended) and continuous attempts to adopt
a resolution at UN General Assembly (passed March 2008) are sound
facts for this. Within this course, both the leaderships of Armenia
and Nagorno Karabakh, and the mediators have repeatedly warned
Azerbaijan that taking the issue out of the mandate of OSCE Minsk
Group could affect the whole process completely destructively. The
best example of this negative approach of Co-Chair countries has been
the NO-vote to the 2008 UN resolution. However, recently the Azeri
news services announced that a new draft resolution on Nagorno
Karabakh had been put into circulation for the upcoming UN 65th
General Assembly. This endeavors would continue further had the ICJ
not issued a positive opinion on the Kosovo independence.
A long silence over landmark statements, to pay a tribute to the media
talents in Azerbaijan, is foreign to this Caspian oil-rich country.
Any comment and/or resolution from any party, directly or indirectly
linked with Azerbaijan-related topic, is being fiercely refuted and
then circulated in the media. Exceptions are quite rare to this. But
sometimes even exceptions happen.
After years of tireless efforts at the U.N. General Assembly to
condemn Armenians for winning the imposed war, now the official
representative of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, Elhan Poluhov,
says Nagorno Karabakh issue is the monopoly of OSCE Minsk Group to
deal with. Thus, a paradox pops-up. Does it mean the oil-pumped
foreign currency has been wasted for nothing?
Cutting a long story short, the ICJ ruling can potentially have the
power of change on the Karabakh front. Some reports and rumors have
spread these days that Armenian authorities, co-signed and co-authored
with NKR authorities are about to circulate a draft resolution in the
U.N. General Assembly, asking the advisory opinion by ICJ over the
legality of the Constitutional referendum in Nagorno Karabakh, which
took place in December 2006. The only obstacle for this to happen is
the reservation made by the National Assembly of Armenia (decision
N-131-1, Oct. 23, 1996) with regards to Article 66 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which requires the mandatory consent
of all parties to any particular case before applying to an
international court or arbitration. This might be a completely
fascinating development in the peace process, which, by the "stupidity
factor" may also become a long-awaited pretext for a new war on the
other side of the barricade.
* Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a research fellow at Yerevan-based Public
Policy Institute
Sunday, August 1, 2010
HOVHANNES NIKOGHOSYAN
These days, after the International Court of Justice, or ICJ – the
highest court of U.N.-led world order with universal jurisdiction –
issued its advisory opinion on the lawfulness of unilateral
declaration of independence with regards to the one-time Yugoslav
Albanian enclave of Kosovo, tensions and discussions over its
character swept the media outlets. This is especially relevant to the
regions where similar conflicts exist.
Whether the ICJ decision would be referred to as a precedent legally
or not, in fact it would encourage other secessionist entities around
the globe to act and hope for international recognition. Naturally,
whether Kosovo will be set as a precedent or not, strongly depends on
the stance of the leading countries supporting Kosovo's bid to become
a full member to international community. Currently those powers say
all conflicts should be dealt with individually.
When it comes to the issue of Nagorno Karabakh, it's tremendously
important to pay attention to the details and the background more than
to the present-time speculations around it.
Quite possibly, for some authors involved in Caucasus/Caspian regional
security debates, it was predictable that the ICJ ruling of June 22
would become a cold shower to Azeri propaganda, which had developed a
good tradition of making one-sided allegations toward the Nagorno
Karabakh process, for instance, by prioritizing the norm of
territorial integrity over the other jus cogens norms of modern
international law. Ironically, some unbiased experts, including those
in Armenia, blindly have been following this debate and driving
themselves to a standstill in that one-way traffic.
I would join my good friend, Dr. Tigran Nahapetyan – an expert of
international law at Yerevan-based Public Policy Institute, saying
that perhaps not the ruling itself, but the proceedings and the
statements made by different countries at ICJ make the real atmosphere
of change in the international relations when it comes to the issues
of territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and
self-determination. Surely, the change is of legal nature, not
political. Of course, politically, the ICJ ruling over Kosovo will
stay meaningless until the states sponsoring it change their minds.
However, legally this is yet the first ever prestigious ruling in
favor of unilateral declaration of independence of a secessionist
entity to become a de jure statehood.
Today no one denies that the authorities in the Nagorno Karabakh de
facto Republic, or NKR, have their sovereignty over certain
territories, where some people live on and those people do recognize
the legitimacy of the central authorities. Another yet important
element to be labeled as a functioning statehood, according to the
Montevideo Convention, is the permanently functioning government,
which is successfully configured at general elections. Perhaps the
fact, or the privilege if you want, for the people of Nagorno Karabakh
has been recognized by the CSCE/OSCE decision in Helsinki in 1992
where the states decided to establish and invite the "elected and
other representatives" of NKR to the future Minsk Conference.
Obviously, the conduct of general elections thus comes to be
implicitly encouraged by the OSCE itself, making it silly and unlawful
to declare those elections as illegal each time. The only reason for
doing that is the fact of OSCE existing on political grounds, not
legal.
To put the discussion of this contribution into a wider canvas, we
should acknowledge that a conflict resolution process in any pattern
of international disagreements receives its solution in specific
frameworks of international mediation, which is explicit only towards
a particular situation, considering the politics, political economy
and geopolitics surrounding the conflict. In order to find and employ
that specific mediation format the consent from all relevant parties
is required. And, it's notable that the usage of the wording "all
relevant parties" means not only the ones directly involved in the
hostilities but also all the stakeholders that have a share in those
geopolitics.
Not to make this entry a lecture on conflict resolution, the snapshot
of the issue of mediation is an utmost important component of the
conflict itself since a short while later it becomes actively playing
a role of a determinant to the future solution. For instance, though
"impartiality" is a vital component of any mediation efforts, over
time the peacekeepers side with either of the parties. Again, the
example of KFOR in Kosovo is a good example how the impartiality turns
into siding. The same pattern goes legitimately true with regards to
Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Thus, the format of mediation
is a vital issue to secure a lasting settlement.
This is essentially true with regards to Nagorno Karabakh peace
process, which traversed a tremendously hard path to finding the
current negotiations frameworks. While countries such as Finland,
Italy, Russia, Iran tried to have their own input in the pursuit of a
lasting solution, since the 1994 OSCE Budapest Summit the institute of
triple co-chairmanship has been established. Though continuous efforts
of Azerbaijan to jeopardize the Minsk Group contribution and take the
NK issue to another institutions such as PACE or U.N. – the
co-chairmanship proved to be mostly effective.
Perhaps since 2005, when the Karabakh peace process entered a decisive
phase – Azerbaijani leadership had done their best to push the process
in wider perspective, involving other regional arrangements and UN
podium for that. An inter-parliamentarian commission on Nagorno
Karabakh within PACE (now suspended) and continuous attempts to adopt
a resolution at UN General Assembly (passed March 2008) are sound
facts for this. Within this course, both the leaderships of Armenia
and Nagorno Karabakh, and the mediators have repeatedly warned
Azerbaijan that taking the issue out of the mandate of OSCE Minsk
Group could affect the whole process completely destructively. The
best example of this negative approach of Co-Chair countries has been
the NO-vote to the 2008 UN resolution. However, recently the Azeri
news services announced that a new draft resolution on Nagorno
Karabakh had been put into circulation for the upcoming UN 65th
General Assembly. This endeavors would continue further had the ICJ
not issued a positive opinion on the Kosovo independence.
A long silence over landmark statements, to pay a tribute to the media
talents in Azerbaijan, is foreign to this Caspian oil-rich country.
Any comment and/or resolution from any party, directly or indirectly
linked with Azerbaijan-related topic, is being fiercely refuted and
then circulated in the media. Exceptions are quite rare to this. But
sometimes even exceptions happen.
After years of tireless efforts at the U.N. General Assembly to
condemn Armenians for winning the imposed war, now the official
representative of the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, Elhan Poluhov,
says Nagorno Karabakh issue is the monopoly of OSCE Minsk Group to
deal with. Thus, a paradox pops-up. Does it mean the oil-pumped
foreign currency has been wasted for nothing?
Cutting a long story short, the ICJ ruling can potentially have the
power of change on the Karabakh front. Some reports and rumors have
spread these days that Armenian authorities, co-signed and co-authored
with NKR authorities are about to circulate a draft resolution in the
U.N. General Assembly, asking the advisory opinion by ICJ over the
legality of the Constitutional referendum in Nagorno Karabakh, which
took place in December 2006. The only obstacle for this to happen is
the reservation made by the National Assembly of Armenia (decision
N-131-1, Oct. 23, 1996) with regards to Article 66 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties which requires the mandatory consent
of all parties to any particular case before applying to an
international court or arbitration. This might be a completely
fascinating development in the peace process, which, by the "stupidity
factor" may also become a long-awaited pretext for a new war on the
other side of the barricade.
* Hovhannes Nikoghosyan is a research fellow at Yerevan-based Public
Policy Institute
ANALYSIS: BRYZA AS AMBASSADOR TO AZERBAIJAN BODES
ILL FOR NKR SELF-DETERMINATION
Aris Ghazinyan
ArmeniaNow reporter
29.07.10
Aris Ghazinyan
ArmeniaNow reporter
29.07.10
Matthew Bryza, an Obama pick for a diplomatic posting in Baku, was
put on the defensive during recent Senate hearings.
The prospect of former OSCE Minsk Group mediator on the Karabakh issue
settlement Matthew Bryza's possible appointment as the US Ambassador
to Azerbaijan has become one of the most discussed subjects in Armenia.
The main issue in this connection is: how can Ambassador Bryza impact
the negotiation process considering his close relations with Turkey's
and Azerbaijan's political circles and his kindred relations with a
famous Turkish family?
The recent hearings at the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs
during which Bryza, as the nominee for US Ambassador in Azerbaijan,
was asked impartial questions related to his partial position on the
Karabakh issue settlement, have made this issue more urgent.
On June 20 the Washington Times published an article citing the
concerns voiced by the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA)
over Bryza's close relations with Azerbaijani and Turkish political
circles and fuel-communication companies.
Bryza has many levers of influence on the region, and regardless of his
mission - Minsk Group (MG) mediator or US Ambassador to Azerbaijan -
he is a constant presence in the South Caucasus, and has been for
many years.
As deputy head of the US State Department's office of Europe and
Eurasia and deputy assistant to the Secretary of State he has
constantly worked with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
During the Senate hearings, Senator Robert Menendez reminded him
that the US Ambassador to Armenia John Evans was released of his
duties after using the phrase "Armenian Genocide". "What was your
role in firing Evans" he asked Bryza, who, in response, said he had
no involvement in that issue.
Bryza was also asked the reasons for his firm conviction that
Nagorno-Karabakh has to be part of Azerbaijan.
Right from the moment of his appointment as MG mediator Bryza lobbied
this option, and in his interview to the BBC he candidly said
the principle of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity was dominant
over all other principles, including that of nations' right to
self-determination.
Senator Menendez asked Bryza: "Isn't the principle of national
self-determination among the most important principles in America's
policy?"
Bryza did not give a direct answer to that question, and made a
reference to the position of the then Vice-President Dick Cheney
saying that earlier, even before his interview to the BBC, Cheney
said in Baku that the settlement of this conflict had to meet the
principles of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.
Bryza marked his joining the OCSE MG in 2005 by presenting the
so-called Framework Agreement, which, as he said, "calls for the
withdrawal of the Armenian troops from those territories of Azerbaijan
where they are currently quartered".
It was during the time period of Bryza's mission as a mediator that
the Madrid Principles came up, providing for a new status to Nagorno
Karabakh, but only under the condition of being an indispensable part
of Azerbaijan. That was in November, 2007.
"If we recognize the independence of this or that territorial unit
every time the issue of self-determination is raised, the other norm
of the Helsinki Act will be violated - the principle of territorial
integrity," stated Bryza back then.
Bryza's appearance at OSCE MG activated the operation of the
International Crisis Group (ICG): the recommendations of this group
often influence the final decisions on this or that issue.
"As Deputy Secretary of State I often used the ICG products. Reports
compiled by this group and their analytical researches, as a rule,
had the kind of information that was impossible to receive from other
sources. So, no wonder their recommendations played their part in
the process of making final political decisions," said Strobe Talbott.
With Bryza's appointment as the American co-chair of Minsk Group the
ICG reports grew more and more rigorous and unambiguous.
In September, 2005, ICG made public the report text on Nagorno
Karabakh, which said in part: "Nagorno Karabakh wants independence
and grounds its capacity to build a sovereign state by having a
democratically elected government in accordance to the terms and
standards of statehood. However, from the international perspective
Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan... Nagorno Karabakh is one of the most
militarized communities on earth."
It was this report that prompted the Azeri authorities to start making
more radical appeals, and, what's important is that Bryza never once
criticized Azerbaijan's bellicose rhetoric.
Bryza's constant presence in the region (now as the US Ambassador to
Azerbaijan) will result in an even more active work of the Crisis
Group, the position of which is based on the condition of Nagorno
Karabakh being part of Azerbaijan.
RFE/RL Report
Karabakh Leader Says Another War Unlikely
0.07.2010
Ruben Meloyan
Nagorno-Karabakh President Bako Sahakian on Friday said the war with
Azerbaijan is unlikely to resume soon and again ruled out any peaceful
settlement that would place his disputed territory back under
Azerbaijani control.
`The likelihood of large-scale hostilities is small,' Sahakian told
the Russian Interfax news agency in an interview. `First of all, there
is a very effective balance of forces existing between the conflicting
parties.'
`Secondly, war is fraught with unpredictable consequences, and the
international community and, in particular, the mediating countries
are hardly interested in instability in a strategically important
region like the South Caucasus,' he said.
Tensions along the main Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact have
risen since a June 18-19 firefight in northeastern Karabakh that left
one Azerbaijani and four Armenian soldiers dead. The incident was
followed by fresh Azerbaijani threats to resolve the conflict by
force.
`Such [ceasefire] violations can not change the existing balance of
forces or undermine the spirit of our people and its army,' said
Sahakian. Karabakh Armenian forces are capable of not only repelling
an Azerbaijani offensive but also `taking hostilities deep into the
enemy's territory,' he added.
In a joint statement issued on Wednesday, the U.S., Russian and French
mediators co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group urged the conflicting
parties to `reinforce the ceasefire and demonstrate a spirit of
compromise.' They also confirmed that the parties failed to overcome
their differences over the conflict's resolution during recent
negotiations.
Sahakian scoffed at Azerbaijani statements that Baku is only prepared
to give Karabakh a high degree of autonomy. `We already had that
autonomy during 70 years of Soviet rule and we all know how it ended,'
he said. `A broad or any other autonomy within Azerbaijan is out of
the question. The conflict with Azerbaijan can only be resolved
through a formal international recognition of the independent
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.'
The Karabakh leader also insisted that the recent ruling by the
International Court of Justice upholding the legality of Kosovo's
secession from Serbia is also applicable to the Armenian-Azerbaijani
dispute.
0.07.2010
Ruben Meloyan
Nagorno-Karabakh President Bako Sahakian on Friday said the war with
Azerbaijan is unlikely to resume soon and again ruled out any peaceful
settlement that would place his disputed territory back under
Azerbaijani control.
`The likelihood of large-scale hostilities is small,' Sahakian told
the Russian Interfax news agency in an interview. `First of all, there
is a very effective balance of forces existing between the conflicting
parties.'
`Secondly, war is fraught with unpredictable consequences, and the
international community and, in particular, the mediating countries
are hardly interested in instability in a strategically important
region like the South Caucasus,' he said.
Tensions along the main Armenian-Azerbaijani line of contact have
risen since a June 18-19 firefight in northeastern Karabakh that left
one Azerbaijani and four Armenian soldiers dead. The incident was
followed by fresh Azerbaijani threats to resolve the conflict by
force.
`Such [ceasefire] violations can not change the existing balance of
forces or undermine the spirit of our people and its army,' said
Sahakian. Karabakh Armenian forces are capable of not only repelling
an Azerbaijani offensive but also `taking hostilities deep into the
enemy's territory,' he added.
In a joint statement issued on Wednesday, the U.S., Russian and French
mediators co-chairing the OSCE Minsk Group urged the conflicting
parties to `reinforce the ceasefire and demonstrate a spirit of
compromise.' They also confirmed that the parties failed to overcome
their differences over the conflict's resolution during recent
negotiations.
Sahakian scoffed at Azerbaijani statements that Baku is only prepared
to give Karabakh a high degree of autonomy. `We already had that
autonomy during 70 years of Soviet rule and we all know how it ended,'
he said. `A broad or any other autonomy within Azerbaijan is out of
the question. The conflict with Azerbaijan can only be resolved
through a formal international recognition of the independent
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.'
The Karabakh leader also insisted that the recent ruling by the
International Court of Justice upholding the legality of Kosovo's
secession from Serbia is also applicable to the Armenian-Azerbaijani
dispute.
Russian Defense Ministry representative confirms Moscow's intention to
sell two divisions of S-300 PMU-2 Favorite Russian anti-aircraft
missile to Baku
2010-08-02 12:14:00
ArmInfo. The Russian Defense Ministry representative confirmed
Moscow's intention to sell two divisions of S-300 PMU-2 Favorite
Russian anti-aircraft missile to Baku in an interview with
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. The contact amount is at least US$300 million.
The possibility of transaction and other facts have
been also confirmed.
The newspaper reported that Azerbaijani military students have been
studying at the Academy of Air and Space Defense, the Russian Defense
Ministry, for already several years. The students also study S-300
anti- aircraft missile system. The source believes that
Rosoboronexport was actually right when it refuted the recent mass
media reports on sale of the Favorites to Baku. "This deal is just
discussed, but the government has already adopted the final decision,"
he said. For his part Ambassador of Russia to Azerbaijan Vladimir
Dorokhin did not refute the possible purchase of S-300 missile system
by Baku either. "In virtue of our functions, we inform the UN and
other international organizations about sale of weapons. If such thing
takes place, we will inform them,' the Ambassador said diplomatically.
The newspaper also reported that Head of the Russian President's
Administration Sergey Narishkin has arrived in Baku.
Azerbaijani sources report that S. Narishkin will discuss preparations
for the official visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to Azerbaijan in
September. However, there are no reports about discussion of S-300
PMU-2 acquisition.
sell two divisions of S-300 PMU-2 Favorite Russian anti-aircraft
missile to Baku
2010-08-02 12:14:00
ArmInfo. The Russian Defense Ministry representative confirmed
Moscow's intention to sell two divisions of S-300 PMU-2 Favorite
Russian anti-aircraft missile to Baku in an interview with
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. The contact amount is at least US$300 million.
The possibility of transaction and other facts have
been also confirmed.
The newspaper reported that Azerbaijani military students have been
studying at the Academy of Air and Space Defense, the Russian Defense
Ministry, for already several years. The students also study S-300
anti- aircraft missile system. The source believes that
Rosoboronexport was actually right when it refuted the recent mass
media reports on sale of the Favorites to Baku. "This deal is just
discussed, but the government has already adopted the final decision,"
he said. For his part Ambassador of Russia to Azerbaijan Vladimir
Dorokhin did not refute the possible purchase of S-300 missile system
by Baku either. "In virtue of our functions, we inform the UN and
other international organizations about sale of weapons. If such thing
takes place, we will inform them,' the Ambassador said diplomatically.
The newspaper also reported that Head of the Russian President's
Administration Sergey Narishkin has arrived in Baku.
Azerbaijani sources report that S. Narishkin will discuss preparations
for the official visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to Azerbaijan in
September. However, there are no reports about discussion of S-300
PMU-2 acquisition.
Russian Troops In Armenia Set For Mission Upgrade
Russia -- President Dmitry Medvedev meets with his Armenian
counterpart Serzh Sarkisian in Rostov-on-Don, 1 June 2010.
30.07.2010
Moscow and Yerevan are planning to sign a new military agreement that
would assign Russia and its troops a greater role in ensuring
Armenia's security, official sources in both countries said on Friday.
The Interfax news agency reported that the two governments will soon
amend a 1995 treaty regulating the presence of a Russian military base
in Armenia. It said the Russian government has already submitted a
relevant `protocol' to President Dmitry Medvedev, who is scheduled to
visit Yerevan in mid-August.
It said one of the amendments proposed by the protocol makes clear
that the Russian base will not only protect Russia's interests but
also contribute to Armenia's national security.
Under another change cited by Interfax, Moscow will explicitly commit
itself to providing its main South Caucasus ally with `modern and
compatible weaponry and (special) military hardware.'
Speaking to RFE/RL's Armenian service, a senior official at the
Armenian Defense Ministry essentially confirmed the information. The
official noted, though, that the Russian troops headquartered in the
northern Armenian city of Gyumri are already tasked with defending
Armenia. The planned changes in the Russian-Armenian treaty would
simply underline that mission in more explicit terms, he explained.
The treaty went into effect in 1997 and is valid for 25
years. Interfax said its amended version would prolong the Russian
military presence in Armenia by another 24 years and provide for its
further automatic extension in the future.
The Russian base, which numbers some 4,000 personnel, and the broader
military alliance with Russia has been a key element of Armenia's
national security ever since the Soviet collapse. Armenian leaders
have repeatedly stated that despite forging closer security links with
the West in recent years, they will not seek NATO membership in the
foreseeable future.
Just last week, Yerevan and Moscow announced plans to significantly
boost cooperation between their defense industries within the
framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a
Russian-led military alliance of seven ex-Soviet states. Top Russian
and Armenian security officials said after talks in Yerevan that they
have reached agreements envisaging the establishment of defense joint
ventures.
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