Artsakh in the news
guardian.co.uk,
Nagorno-Karabakh's fragile stalemate
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are rising over the Karabakh
backwater amid fears that a 'great war' may be close
Anna Matveeva
Monday 17 May 2010 14.00 BST
Last week, 12 May, marked 16 years since Russia mediated a ceasefire
agreement that ended the Armenian-Azerbaijani war over
Nagorno-Karabakh and started a long period of "no war, no peace"
stagnation. Presently, there is a sense that things might be changing.
The territory of Karabakh is essentially a backwater for both
countries. It had certain significance for Soviet military planners
because of its proximity to Turkey, but otherwise has no prize assets.
It is agricultural land, now sparsely populated because of the exodus
of ethnic Azerbaijanis who fled the war, with roads leading to closed
borders. Remote from Armenia's better-off areas around Yerevan,
development in Nagorno-Karabakh is being propped up by the Armenian
diaspora. It remains an isolated place that, unlike Abkhazia, has
received little assistance from the international community.
Many Armenians who are currently in Karabakh fled from inter-ethnic
violence in Azerbaijani cities, losing their good jobs and nice
apartments, and continue to feel embittered. On the opposite side of
the border, Azerbaijani farmers, displaced from the lands currently
occupied by the Armenian forces, look up towards their former homes
and think that they see the lights in them at night. If so, this must
be the army using their houses as barracks.
Would the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, go to war for Karabakh?
It is a big question. The defence minister, Safar Abiyev, spoke in
February of the growing likelihood of a "great war" with Armenia.
Azerbaijan has a lot to lose if it does so. It has got rich quick due
to its energy resource development and is the only CIS country that
sustained positive economic growth during the financial crisis.
The state started to build roads, rehabilitate schools and resettle
its displaced people. The newly found prosperity conveyed a
"feel-good" atmosphere, but it also brought a new confidence that
finally "the game is ours". It cannot let 15% of its territory be lost
for ever without making an earnest effort to win something back. Any
leader with a sense of history would be mindful that future
generations would not forgive him this.
So Azerbaijan builds up its military capabilities, procures modern
weaponry and trains troops. It also unleashes bellicose rhetoric on
Azerbaijani TV channels, both in the Azeri language and in Russian.
Whether this propaganda is aimed at preparing society for war is
unclear, but it certainly instils trepidation in the Armenian public
of a threat of an imminent attack.
The military build-up and aggressive rhetoric is a pressure tactic of
presenting a credible threat, if Armenia does not move. It is
effective in projecting a fear that the war, fresh in the memory, can
restart, but ineffective in forcing a will for concessions. The public
attitude is that because so much has been sacrificed to gain these
lands, giving them back would be a betrayal of the memory of heroes
who died for them. Following this line of reasoning, the destiny is to
continue to sacrifice development for the sake of defence, even if the
price could be economic stagnation and social depression.
Encouragingly, Azerbaijan's leadership is risk-averse and not prone
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia are rising over the Karabakh
backwater amid fears that a 'great war' may be close
Anna Matveeva
Monday 17 May 2010 14.00 BST
Last week, 12 May, marked 16 years since Russia mediated a ceasefire
agreement that ended the Armenian-Azerbaijani war over
Nagorno-Karabakh and started a long period of "no war, no peace"
stagnation. Presently, there is a sense that things might be changing.
The territory of Karabakh is essentially a backwater for both
countries. It had certain significance for Soviet military planners
because of its proximity to Turkey, but otherwise has no prize assets.
It is agricultural land, now sparsely populated because of the exodus
of ethnic Azerbaijanis who fled the war, with roads leading to closed
borders. Remote from Armenia's better-off areas around Yerevan,
development in Nagorno-Karabakh is being propped up by the Armenian
diaspora. It remains an isolated place that, unlike Abkhazia, has
received little assistance from the international community.
Many Armenians who are currently in Karabakh fled from inter-ethnic
violence in Azerbaijani cities, losing their good jobs and nice
apartments, and continue to feel embittered. On the opposite side of
the border, Azerbaijani farmers, displaced from the lands currently
occupied by the Armenian forces, look up towards their former homes
and think that they see the lights in them at night. If so, this must
be the army using their houses as barracks.
Would the Azerbaijani president, Ilham Aliyev, go to war for Karabakh?
It is a big question. The defence minister, Safar Abiyev, spoke in
February of the growing likelihood of a "great war" with Armenia.
Azerbaijan has a lot to lose if it does so. It has got rich quick due
to its energy resource development and is the only CIS country that
sustained positive economic growth during the financial crisis.
The state started to build roads, rehabilitate schools and resettle
its displaced people. The newly found prosperity conveyed a
"feel-good" atmosphere, but it also brought a new confidence that
finally "the game is ours". It cannot let 15% of its territory be lost
for ever without making an earnest effort to win something back. Any
leader with a sense of history would be mindful that future
generations would not forgive him this.
So Azerbaijan builds up its military capabilities, procures modern
weaponry and trains troops. It also unleashes bellicose rhetoric on
Azerbaijani TV channels, both in the Azeri language and in Russian.
Whether this propaganda is aimed at preparing society for war is
unclear, but it certainly instils trepidation in the Armenian public
of a threat of an imminent attack.
The military build-up and aggressive rhetoric is a pressure tactic of
presenting a credible threat, if Armenia does not move. It is
effective in projecting a fear that the war, fresh in the memory, can
restart, but ineffective in forcing a will for concessions. The public
attitude is that because so much has been sacrificed to gain these
lands, giving them back would be a betrayal of the memory of heroes
who died for them. Following this line of reasoning, the destiny is to
continue to sacrifice development for the sake of defence, even if the
price could be economic stagnation and social depression.
Encouragingly, Azerbaijan's leadership is risk-averse and not prone
toimpulsive moves to suit a nationalist agenda. It does not need a war
to boost its popularity, because it is already popular. Rationally
speaking, the war is unlikely. But military games and sabre-rattling
have a tendency to get out of hand. Armenia's internal political
problems can give rise to a "now or never" attitude: since the
adversary appears weak, the time for a decisive push has arrived.
If it comes to it, the crucial issue is what Russia would do. There is
a fashionable belief that Moscow holds the key to a Karabakh
settlement, but a scenario in which Vladimir Putin calls the Armenian
president, Serzh Sargsyan, and orders him to withdraw from Karabakh
seems truly fantastic. In the current stalemate, Russia cannot do more
than the US and France, the other Minsk group co-chairs. However, if
fighting were to start, Moscow would be presented with an awkward
choice as to whether it defends Armenia militarily.
On the one hand, Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation, which, like Nato, operates on the collective defence
principle: an attack against one member is regarded as an attack on
all members. On the other hand, Moscow does not have the same problems
with Baku as it has with Tbilisi: the political relationship is good,
trade is rampant, Azerbaijan benefits from Russian investment and the
two states co-operate in combating terrorism. In the case of
deterioration, diplomatic rather than military pressure would be
Moscow's most likely option.
In the meantime, people on both sides vote with their feet. Rural
areas of Armenia, Karabakh and Azerbaijan are getting depopulated and
aged, while younger men, and increasingly women, solve the poverty
problem by labour migration to Russia. There are few signs that a
political culture of compromise is emerging.
Voices of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia standing against the war are
unpopular, as peacebuilding is equated in public wisdom with
surrendering Karabakh to the Armenians. Those who advocate peace need
to see a readiness from the Armenian side to make steps towards
compromise – otherwise "peacebuilding" amounts to an acceptance of
defeat. Such signs of compromise are yet to emerge. The danger is that
it might be getting too late for them to be
to boost its popularity, because it is already popular. Rationally
speaking, the war is unlikely. But military games and sabre-rattling
have a tendency to get out of hand. Armenia's internal political
problems can give rise to a "now or never" attitude: since the
adversary appears weak, the time for a decisive push has arrived.
If it comes to it, the crucial issue is what Russia would do. There is
a fashionable belief that Moscow holds the key to a Karabakh
settlement, but a scenario in which Vladimir Putin calls the Armenian
president, Serzh Sargsyan, and orders him to withdraw from Karabakh
seems truly fantastic. In the current stalemate, Russia cannot do more
than the US and France, the other Minsk group co-chairs. However, if
fighting were to start, Moscow would be presented with an awkward
choice as to whether it defends Armenia militarily.
On the one hand, Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Organisation, which, like Nato, operates on the collective defence
principle: an attack against one member is regarded as an attack on
all members. On the other hand, Moscow does not have the same problems
with Baku as it has with Tbilisi: the political relationship is good,
trade is rampant, Azerbaijan benefits from Russian investment and the
two states co-operate in combating terrorism. In the case of
deterioration, diplomatic rather than military pressure would be
Moscow's most likely option.
In the meantime, people on both sides vote with their feet. Rural
areas of Armenia, Karabakh and Azerbaijan are getting depopulated and
aged, while younger men, and increasingly women, solve the poverty
problem by labour migration to Russia. There are few signs that a
political culture of compromise is emerging.
Voices of the Azerbaijani intelligentsia standing against the war are
unpopular, as peacebuilding is equated in public wisdom with
surrendering Karabakh to the Armenians. Those who advocate peace need
to see a readiness from the Armenian side to make steps towards
compromise – otherwise "peacebuilding" amounts to an acceptance of
defeat. Such signs of compromise are yet to emerge. The danger is that
it might be getting too late for them to be
Hurriyet:
Erdogan to raise withdrawal of the Armenian forces from 2 of
the 7 territories in Baku
12:52 17/05/2010 » Region
Turkey’s PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan is due to leave Tehran for
Azerbaijan. The highlights of the visit are the gas price deal with
Baku and Ankara’s new proposal over the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement
process, Hurriyet writes. According to the source, Erdogan will
suggest Baku to make the Armenian military forces withdraw from
the 7 territories in Baku
12:52 17/05/2010 » Region
Turkey’s PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan is due to leave Tehran for
Azerbaijan. The highlights of the visit are the gas price deal with
Baku and Ankara’s new proposal over the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement
process, Hurriyet writes. According to the source, Erdogan will
suggest Baku to make the Armenian military forces withdraw from
two of the 7 territories adjacent to Karabakh and open the Armenian
-Azerbaijani border.
“Baku is persistent over the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from 5
territories in the upcoming future, though, the Armenian side refuses
to and this has brought the talks to a deadlock,” the paper says,
adding that even if Baku states it will not take a step back from 5+2
format, the talks on the proposal over handing the two territories
continue behind the close doors.
According to the Turkish paper, the two regions are Kelbajar and
Fizouli. Ankara closed the border with Armenia in 1993 when the
Armenians liberated Kelbajar. That’s why the withdrawal from Kelbajar
is so important for Ankara. It is signified in terms of Armenia-Turkey
normalization.
Hurriyet highlights that the cut of Azerbaijan’s expectations by
withdrawal of the forces from two territories has another point of
significance: Ankara is trying to ensure any signals form Armenia over
withdrawal. This will form beneficial grounds for the ratification of
the protocols in the Turkish parliament and resuming the process
Armenia suspended. Citing government’s sources, the paper says that
providing Armenia does not compromise over the new proposal, Ankara
will freeze the normalization process on long-term basis.
The Nagorno-Karabakh (armed) conflict broke out back in 1991, when,
subsequent to the demand for self-determination of the
Nagorno-Karabakh people, Azerbaijani authorities attempted to resolve
the issue through ethnic cleansings, carried out by Soviet security
forces (KGB special units) under the pretext of the implementation of
the passport regime and by launching of large-scale military
operations, which left thousands dead and caused considerable material
damage. A cease-fire agreement was established in 1994. Negotiations
on the settlement of the conflict are being conducted under the
mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen (Russia, USA, France)
and on the basis of their Madrid proposals, presented in November,
2007.
Azerbaijan has not yet implemented the 4 resolutions of the UN
Security Council adopted in 1993, by continuing to provoke arms race
in the region and openly violating on of the basic principles of the
international law non-use of force or threat of force.
-Azerbaijani border.
“Baku is persistent over the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from 5
territories in the upcoming future, though, the Armenian side refuses
to and this has brought the talks to a deadlock,” the paper says,
adding that even if Baku states it will not take a step back from 5+2
format, the talks on the proposal over handing the two territories
continue behind the close doors.
According to the Turkish paper, the two regions are Kelbajar and
Fizouli. Ankara closed the border with Armenia in 1993 when the
Armenians liberated Kelbajar. That’s why the withdrawal from Kelbajar
is so important for Ankara. It is signified in terms of Armenia-Turkey
normalization.
Hurriyet highlights that the cut of Azerbaijan’s expectations by
withdrawal of the forces from two territories has another point of
significance: Ankara is trying to ensure any signals form Armenia over
withdrawal. This will form beneficial grounds for the ratification of
the protocols in the Turkish parliament and resuming the process
Armenia suspended. Citing government’s sources, the paper says that
providing Armenia does not compromise over the new proposal, Ankara
will freeze the normalization process on long-term basis.
The Nagorno-Karabakh (armed) conflict broke out back in 1991, when,
subsequent to the demand for self-determination of the
Nagorno-Karabakh people, Azerbaijani authorities attempted to resolve
the issue through ethnic cleansings, carried out by Soviet security
forces (KGB special units) under the pretext of the implementation of
the passport regime and by launching of large-scale military
operations, which left thousands dead and caused considerable material
damage. A cease-fire agreement was established in 1994. Negotiations
on the settlement of the conflict are being conducted under the
mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairmen (Russia, USA, France)
and on the basis of their Madrid proposals, presented in November,
2007.
Azerbaijan has not yet implemented the 4 resolutions of the UN
Security Council adopted in 1993, by continuing to provoke arms race
in the region and openly violating on of the basic principles of the
international law non-use of force or threat of force.
Tert.am
Erdogan Will Convince Aliyev to Be Satisfied with only Kelbajar and
Fizuli: Hurriyet
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to visit Baku later
today to discuss with the Azerbaijani administration the long-awaited
gas deal.
According to the Turkish Daily Hurriyet also on the agenda will be the
issue of the Karabakh settlement with Erdogan to propose that Armenia
return only 2 regions instead of 7 as Azerbaijan insists.
"Prime Minister Erdogan's visit is essential both in terms of the
agreement reached over the gas price and the Karabakh conflict. The
agenda of Erdogan's visit includes the latest proposal over the
Karabakh conflict according to which Azerbaijan will open the border
gate with Armenia, if the Armenians pull out of the 2 regions out of
the 7 adjacent to Karabakh," writes Hurriyet.
"Even if the Baku administration stresses in its statement addressed
to the international community that it will not step back from the
'5+2' resolution, however, the discussions over the 2 regions
continue. It is being mentioned that those 2 regions are Kelbajar and
Fizuli. Ankara closed the border [with Armenia] in 1993 when Armenia
took over Kelbajar. For that reason the issue of [Armenia's
withdrawal] from Kelbajar is essential for Ankara-Yerevan relations.
Should that proposal be accepted, Turkey's expectation over Kelbajar
will fulfill, and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border will open which, in
turn, will facilitate the opening of the [Armenia-Turkey] border by
Ankara," writes the newspaper.
Panorama.am
Fizuli: Hurriyet
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is set to visit Baku later
today to discuss with the Azerbaijani administration the long-awaited
gas deal.
According to the Turkish Daily Hurriyet also on the agenda will be the
issue of the Karabakh settlement with Erdogan to propose that Armenia
return only 2 regions instead of 7 as Azerbaijan insists.
"Prime Minister Erdogan's visit is essential both in terms of the
agreement reached over the gas price and the Karabakh conflict. The
agenda of Erdogan's visit includes the latest proposal over the
Karabakh conflict according to which Azerbaijan will open the border
gate with Armenia, if the Armenians pull out of the 2 regions out of
the 7 adjacent to Karabakh," writes Hurriyet.
"Even if the Baku administration stresses in its statement addressed
to the international community that it will not step back from the
'5+2' resolution, however, the discussions over the 2 regions
continue. It is being mentioned that those 2 regions are Kelbajar and
Fizuli. Ankara closed the border [with Armenia] in 1993 when Armenia
took over Kelbajar. For that reason the issue of [Armenia's
withdrawal] from Kelbajar is essential for Ankara-Yerevan relations.
Should that proposal be accepted, Turkey's expectation over Kelbajar
will fulfill, and the Armenian-Azerbaijani border will open which, in
turn, will facilitate the opening of the [Armenia-Turkey] border by
Ankara," writes the newspaper.
Panorama.am
Only Artsakh has the right to decide on liberated territories
May 17, 2010 - 16:28 AMT 11:28 GMT
PanARMENIAN.Net -
Chairman of Heritage party board, RA National Aseembly member Armen
Martirosyan said that if Turkey manages to become a regional power, it
will affect Armenia’s national security.
“Despite frantic efforts, Turkey will hardly succeed in achieving its
goal, as there are numerous problems inside the country. Besides, in
my opinion, superpowers will prevent Ankara from spreading influence
over the region,” Martirosyan stressed.
Commenting on Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to
Baku and his intention to discuss the Karabakh conflict there, he
said: “I am against any territorial concessions, as the liberated
territories are fixed in the NKR Constitution and only Karabakh has
the right to decide on them. Surrender of even one village will have
grave consequences.”
Besides, he emphasized the necessity of recognition of the NKR
independence by Armenia
May 17, 2010 - 16:28 AMT 11:28 GMT
PanARMENIAN.Net -
Chairman of Heritage party board, RA National Aseembly member Armen
Martirosyan said that if Turkey manages to become a regional power, it
will affect Armenia’s national security.
“Despite frantic efforts, Turkey will hardly succeed in achieving its
goal, as there are numerous problems inside the country. Besides, in
my opinion, superpowers will prevent Ankara from spreading influence
over the region,” Martirosyan stressed.
Commenting on Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to
Baku and his intention to discuss the Karabakh conflict there, he
said: “I am against any territorial concessions, as the liberated
territories are fixed in the NKR Constitution and only Karabakh has
the right to decide on them. Surrender of even one village will have
grave consequences.”
Besides, he emphasized the necessity of recognition of the NKR
independence by Armenia
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