Armenian Political News

Asbarez
Nalbandian Says Karabakh Plan is Modified
July 14, 2010 @ 12:28 pm

YEREVAN (RFE/RL)—Armenia’s Foreign Minister Edward

Nalbandian insisted on Wednesday that the Armenian and

Azerbaijani presidents did receive a freshly amended international

plan to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at their most recent

meeting in Russia last month.

Official Yerevan has described it as a “new version” of the basic

principles of a Karabakh settlement which were first formally put

forward by the U.S., Russian and French mediators in Madrid in

2007.

According to Armenian officials, Russian President Dmitry

Medvedev presented the document to his Armenian and Azerbaijani

counterparts during their June 17 talks in Saint Petersburg. The

Azerbaijani side has denied this.

“During the meeting on June 17 in Saint Petersburg, a new version

of the Madrid document was presented,” said Nalbandian. “So during

the upcoming meeting in Almaty [of the Armenian and Azerbaijani

foreign ministers,] the big question will be whether Azerbaijan will

continue negotiations on the basis of the new version of the

Madrid document, as it was agreed at the June 17 meeting.”

Azerbaijani officials say the ongoing peace talks continue to

center on another version of the Madrid principles that was

submitted to the conflicting parties in December and January.

They say Baku has accepted it with a number of “exceptions” and is

still awaiting Yerevan’s positive response.

Nalbandian again dismissed these claims, saying that those

exceptions outweigh provisions acceptable to Baku. “In effect,

that means not accepting [the peace plan,]” he told a joint news

conference with Poland’s visiting Foreign Minister Radoslaw

Sikorski. Nalbandian and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Elmar

Mammadyarov, are expected to meet on the sidelines of an

OSCE ministerial conference in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city,

which begins its work on Friday. The American, Russian and French

co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group hope that the talks will enable

the parties to move further forward in their protracted search for peace.

Mammadyarov stated late last week that the Almaty meeting will

focus on time frames for Armenian withdrawal from the Azerbaijani

districts surrounding Karabakh. Yerevan swiftly denied that.

Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharian said Azerbaijan must

first “accept Karabakh’s status in accordance with the results of an

expression of the Nagorno-Karabakh people’s will.”

Armenian leaders say a key element of the Madrid principles is a

future referendum in which Karabakh’s mainly ethnic Armenian population

would decide whether to reaffirm its secession from Azerbaijan or

return under Azerbaijani rule.

Mammadyarov insisted on Friday, however, the proposed framework

accord contains no such provisions. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev

echoed his foreign minister on Tuesday.

“In the issues discussed during the negotiations, there is and there

can be no mechanism related to Nagorno-Karabakh’s secession from

Azerbaijan,” Aliyev reportedly told a cabinet meeting in Baku. The

Azerbaijani leadership will never agree to any settlement that would not

lead to the restoration of Azerbaijan’s control over Karabakh, he said.

Aliyev also repeated his regular threats to win back the territory by force.

“We must be prepared for the liberation of our lands from the occupiers

at any moment,” he said. “I am absolutely sure that Azerbaijan has such

capacity today.”

Tert.am

Turkey must try and buy the pipeline carrying gas to Armenia: Zaman
09:50 • 14.07.10

If Georgia eventually decides to sell the gas pipeline that links
Russia and Armenia, then Turkey should try and buy it, writes local
Turkish newspaper Today's Zaman, referring to a recent move by the
Georgian parliament to exclude that pipeline from the list of state
facilities that are not subject to sale.

"From time to time Georgian authorities refer to the selling of the
North-South gas pipeline. In an interview with the Italian daily La
Stampa in 2005 President Mikheil Saakashvili had said that Tbilisi was
conducting negotiations over selling it to the Russian Gazprom. But
later Washington said that by doing so Georgia would increase its
dependence on Russia, as well as would put the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
gas pipeline at risk. In that way the issue was put in the shelf,"
writes the newspaper, recalling that Tbilisi promised Washington not
to sell it.

Further the newspaper writes that it is Armenia which is the most
sensitive about the issue.

"Armenia is rather sensitive over this issue as it fears that
Azerbaijan who plays an important role in the sphere of energy and gas
in Georgia may pretend to that pipeline. While Russia as before will
continue being greatly interested in that pipeline," writes Today's
Zaman, adding that Turkey, who also has important investments in
Georgian, should be interested in that pipeline too.

"Should there be favorable conditions and the shares of that pipeline
be on sale, Turkey must try and buy them. And if it does so, its
influence in the region will grow."

a1plus

Will Armenia return Lachin?
06:00 pm | July 09, 2010 | Politics

Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov today announced that
Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs will focus on the withdrawal of Armenian
troops from Lachin and Kalbajar in the upcoming meeting in Almaty.

Regarding the status of the Nagorno-Karabakh, Mammadyarov noted that
the Armenian side stands for holding a referendum, but Azerbaijan's
position is that the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh must
take part in the voting together with the Armenians.

Mammadyarov said a special committee of representatives from Armenia
and Azerbaijan, as well as OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries will be
established to deal with referendum issues.

Note that Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan are scheduled to
meet in Almaty next week.


Mensoian: ‘Il Bacio della Morte’: President Sarkisian’s Reward for

Restraint and Subservience
By: Michael Mensoian

Have we given up? Or a more alarming thought is that the timidity of our

leadership is indicative of a flaw in our national character. Have we become

so accustomed to being subservient to foreign interests and alien cultural

environments that our actions are forever restrained and our legitimate

demands muted?

Whether we realize it or not, we are in a game of diplomatic hardball for the

future of Armenia. Either our leadership decides what needs to be done to

create a strong Armenia for the 21st century and makes a genuine effort to

follow through, or by default Armenia remains forever less than its Georgian

and Azerbaijani neighbors.

I am tired of hearing the constant lament that Armenia is landlocked, that we

are a few against enemies who are stronger and greater in numbers, or that

Armenia can never prosper without an open border with Turkey. If there is

anything to lament, it is the lack of leadership and their inability to develop a

political and economic system based on social justice and equal opportunity.

During a one-week period from June 19-26, three events took place which

illustrate the leadership vacuum presently facing the Armenian nation. On the

19th, an Azeri reconnaissance unit (its strength was not revealed) was evidently

able to breach the perimeter of a Karabagh defensive position. (As an aside,

the ability of the Azeri unit to invade Karabagh apparently undetected is

in itself a worrisome development.) This flagrant provocation resulted in the

death of four Karabagh Defense Force personnel and the wounding of four

others.

Yerevan’s less than impressive response came from Foreign Minister Eduard

Nalbandian who denounced the incursion as a planned provocation to disrupt

the Karabagh negotiations. Was Karabagh incapable of countering with an elite

rapid response unit against predetermined objectives, or was this restraint

calculated to strengthen Armenia’s position with the Minsk Group? If the latter,

then an event days later would indicate that it completely missed its objective…

Several days later at UNESCO’s General Assembly meeting in Paris,

Azerbaijan was elected to a four-year term (2010-2014) on the 24-member

Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible

Heritage, under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific,

and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

This is a prestigious body responsible for “protecting” an ethnic group’s culturally

significant artifacts. Armenia was also a candidate. The fact that Armenia was

not able to gain sufficient votes to win a seat on this committee indicates that

something is drastically wrong either with Yerevan’s ability to protect Armenia’s

interests in the international arena or, perhaps worse, in projecting Armenia’s

image to the world. It’s a sham for a country like Azerbaijan—that has

(a) carried out the wanton and well-documented destruction of hundreds

of centuries-old khatchkars [Armenian cross-stones] in the Julfa Cemetery

in historic Armenian Nakhitchevan and (b) desecrated the final resting

place of our ancestors—to be elected to a committee whose responsibility

it is to protect cultural artifacts. Azerbaijan has admitted to lobbying intensively

and extensively for this coveted position. Is Yerevan able to make a similar claim?

This is an example of not getting our priorities right. We got our collective noses

out of joint with respect to the Woodrow Wilson Center’s decision to honor Turkish

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. However, the candidacy of a government that

only recently refused a United Nations investigative team to enter Nakhitchevan

to evaluate the destruction at Julfa raised no widespread public denunciation by

our leadership, either in or outside of government. Evidently the honor proffered

to Davutoglu rankled our leadership more than Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev’s

ability to obliterate Julfa at no cost to his corrupt regime.

Then on June 26, the “Minsk godfathers”—Presidents Barack Obama, Nicolas

Sarkozy of France, and Dmitry Medvedev of Russia—gave President Sarkisian

il bacio della morte (the kiss of death) during a break in their meetings in Canada.

Blithely ignoring the recent military transgressions of Azerbaijan, the godfathers

reaffirmed their support of the Helsinki/Madrid Principles as the basis for a

negotiated settlement of Karabagh’s status.

When is it to be realized that absolutely none of these principles speak to the

inalienable right of oppressed ethnic minorities to seek independence? In point

of fact, these principles clearly support Azerbaijan’s claim of territorial integrity.

Conveniently overlooked by the godfathers is the fact that the Karabagh War for

Independence was brought on by the intransigence of the Azerbaijani government

in refusing to accept the will of the Karabagh Armenians, who were unanimous in

their desire to be independent.

A brief analysis of the principles that the Minsk Group continues to propose as the

basis for a negotiated settlement yields one simple fact: They foreclose any

possibility for Karabagh’s ultimate de jure independence.

1) The return of the occupied territories surrounding Karabagh. These territories

are part of historic Artsakh and were liberated by some 7,000 martyred

azadamartiks (freedom fighters) who gave Karabagh its independence. These

territories are absolutely vital to the military security of Karabagh and indispensible

to the future economic and political viability of Armenia.

2) The right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their

former homes. This principle favors the Azeri population. Few if any Armenians would

opt to return to Azerbaijan. However this principle may be nuanced during negotiations,

its purpose serves to negate the value of any future plebiscite to determine the status

of Karabagh.

3) Withdrawal of the Karabagh Defense Forces from the occupied territories

with Karabagh’s security dependent on a United Nations peacekeeping force.

Wherever these peacekeeping forces have been deployed, they have never been given

either the military capability or the mission to intervene if the peace—which they are to

maintain—is threatened. At the very best, they are no better than useless observers.

They would have absolutely no value in preventing any Azeri attack on a Karabagh

that would have been required to abandon its defensive positions in the security

zone.

4) A corridor connecting Karabagh with Armenia. Without the fortified security

zone, the Lachin Corridor is militarily untenable. As an aside, who would be entrusted

to guarantee its operational status? Certainly not an international peacekeeping force.

Should Azerbaijan decide to occupy the area, which would not be difficult to

accomplish, who could force them to leave? No one.

5) Final status of Karabagh to be determined by a legally binding vote. When

will this vote take place? Once Azerbaijan has resettled a sufficient number of Azeris

—enough to out-vote the Armenian population—the vote will be taken. Whenever

the plebiscite occurs, Karabagh, having been shorn of its security zone and with

an Armenian population reduced to minority status, may be granted

semi-autonomous status within Azerbaijan.

One has to question what it will take for our leadership to lead. What is most

disquieting is the apparent lack of urgency exhibited in confronting the situation

that has been developing. Does Yerevan believe that by playing diplomatic “nicey

nicey” and by showing restraint vis-a-vis Azerbaijan’s constant military threats

and Line of Contact (LoC) incursions, that Armenia’s cause will prevail? Hasn’t the

past taught us the foolishness of this incomprehensible mindset—of entrusting

Armenia’s interests to other nations?

Between 1915 and 1918, the government of Ottoman Turkey decimated the

Armenian population of our historic western provinces. This genocide of a nation

was overlooked by the victorious western democracies when the defeated Ottoman

Turks were actually rewarded by the Treaty of Lausanne, and a free and

independent Armenia promised in the Treaty of Sevres was forgotten.

Now let’s fast forward to the present. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s

trip to Armenia (and Azerbaijan) ostensibly was to stress the importance of

U.S.-Armenia relations and to impress on Armenia the need to settle the Karabagh

issue. She emphatically stated the U.S. position against the use of force as an

alternative to negotiating (without condemning Azerbaijan for its recent incursion

or its constant threats of military action). However, her visit’s purpose was to

remind Sarkisian of il bacio della morte the godfathers had given him a few days

earlier. The subtext of her message was the United States’ expectation that

Armenia-Karabagh would evacuate the security zone and in return the Karabagh

Armenians could gain a degree of local autonomy within Azerbaijan sometime in

the future (after the Armenian population had been reduced to minority status).

Without any shame in forcing Armenia to submit to its Turkic persecutors, the

United States supports a corrupt, autocratic, anti-Armenian regime in Azerbaijan.

As if this was not a sufficient affront to Armenia, the United States anoints Georgia

as the front of democracy in the south Caucasus, knowing that Tbilisi implements

a blatant policy of political, economic, and cultural repression against its Armenian

minority in Javakhk. And presumably playing the part of an honest broker, the

United States further seeks to emasculate Armenia politically and economically

by encouraging rapprochement on Turkey’s terms. Yet we are expected to be

beholden because Washington gives Armenia a paltry few million dollars of

economic and military aid. So much for placing our trust in other nations.

Our leadership in Yerevan and in the diaspora has yet to accept the fact that

Artsakh is a significant piece of real estate not only in the struggle for control of

the south Caucasus and the energy resources of central Asia, but for the political

and economic viability of a future Armenia. The reversion of Artsakh to Azerbaijan

will have a positive impact on Turkey’s goal of expanding its influence in the south

Caucasus and across the Caspian Sea into Central Asia, and enhancing its

influence in the Middle East. Whether or not Turkey becomes a member of the

European Union is inconsequential. If Ankara is allowed by Russia and Iran to

achieve its objective in the south Caucasus and become a key player in the Middle

East and Central Asia (Turkey will not need the United States should that happen),

it will be Europe that will come calling on Turkey and it will be Europe that will rush

to build the German Kaiser’s legendary “Berlin to Baghdad Railroad” connection

rather than the Turks. Turkey would become a conduit by way of the Middle East

and Central Asia to India and China (a region with some 3 billion of the world’s

6-plus billion people). While these events are being played out, we continue to

depend on the internal problems of Turkey causing that country’s implosion for

Armenia’s benefit. Let’s concentrate on developing Armenia and properly

prioritizing our objectives in order to create a stronger country and a

stronger diasporan nation.

The relationships that exist between countries are carried at two levels: those

that are played out in the public arena and those not exposed to the light of day.

Again we have an example of more wishful thinking by hoping that the

Israeli-Turkish friction will benefit Armenia. However the breakdown might appear,

it is more cosmetic than substantive. The two countries have far too many political

and economic interests to allow the incident concerning the blockade running

vessel “Mavi Marmara” to be more than a temporary distraction. Turkish Prime

Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s denouncement of the Israeli action serves his

purpose both at home and in the wider context of his Middle East gambit. Israel

understands that. Immediately, reports began circulating that Jewish organizations

may not lobby against passage of the Armenian Genocide Resolution in the

United States Congress. It’s an idle Israeli threat to remind the prime minister to

tone down his rhetoric.

Yerevan should understand that Armenia-Karabagh occupies a key position in

the south Caucasus. Neither Russia nor Iran wants an ascendant Turkey supported

by the United States in control. The loss of Karabagh would be a singular victory

for the United States, Azerbaijan, and, above all, Turkey. The longer Yerevan waits

to effectively and repeatedly articulate its position with respect to Artsakh

(Karabagh and the liberated territories), the more the demand by the godfathers for

a negotiated settlement will force Yerevan into a losing position. The loss of Artsakh

would be a political catastrophe. How could that loss ever encourage Turkey to

engage in a meaningful dialogue on genocide recognition? If Artsakh can’t be

saved, what can be said for Hai Tahd? Sarkisian has received il bacio della morte.

Hopefully he will not wait for Armenia to receive its death blow.