Karabagh Controversy‏

Lost in translation: Interpretation of statement on Karabakh at G8
stirs debate in Armenia
Karabakh | 30.06.10 | 15:53
“This is an evident deceit, a real deception…,” says Vahan Hovhannisyan.
By Gayane Abrahamyan
ArmeniaNow reporter

The debate over the joint statement on Nagorno-Karabakh made at the G8
Summit in Canada on Saturday, by the presidents of Russia, the United
States and France, continue unabated in Armenia. The Armenian
authorities appear satisfied with the statement, even though they
agree, “there are some worrisome terms”, whereas the opposition and
analysts insist that it is a “crushing defeat.”


The clamor over the statement has even cast a shadow on US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton’s upcoming visit to the region: according to
preliminary information, Clinton will arrive in Yerevan on July 4,
soon after her visit to Azerbaijani capital Baku the same day. The
U.S. official will be on a five-nation tour July 1-5, which besides
Armenia and Azerbaijan will include stops in Ukraine, Poland and
Georgia.

An official in Washington said this week while in Baku and Yerevan
Clinton will “underscore” the peace message contained in the June 26
joint statement of the presidents of the U.S., France and Russia,
which jointly spearhead the international efforts on finding a
negotiated peace in the Karabakh conflict.

The controversy over the statement intensified in Armenia after debate
shifted onto the language of the statement, or more precisely the
discrepancy between the original English text and the translated
Russian version posted on the Kremlin website.

The Russian version of the statement differs from the one that carries
the presidents’ signatures on two key provisions. .

The original version says, “…return of the occupied territories
surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh”; whereas the word ‘occupied’ does not
exist in the Russian translation, in Russian it is written, “return of
the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.”

“This is an evident deceit, a real deception, and it is not quite
clear what it is done for,” says member of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (Dashnaktsutyun, ARF) Vahan Hovhannisyan.

The other discrepancy is connected with the term related to the
‘expression of will’. The English version says, “…final status of
Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in the future by a legally-binding
expression of will,” whereas in Russian it is written, “…final status
of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined in the future by a
legally-binding expression of will by its population.”

“In the original version it is not determined whose ‘expression of
will’ is meant -- the population of Nagorno-Karabakh or someone
else’s. It is not even written ‘the population of the territory of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region’. This means that the document is
drafted in a way so that the sides can interpret it the way they want
to; and Azerbaijan has already interpreted it in a way favorable to
it, saying that the referendum will be held on the whole territory of
Azerbaijan and by the whole Azeri population,” Hovhannisyan says.

The Armenian lawmaker is also infuriated by the Armenian authorities’
admitting, without any grounds, that the ‘expression of will’ merely
refers to the population of Karabakh.

“As long as it is not distinctly written in any document [who the
‘expression of will’ refers to], no one can insist that only the
population of Karabakh will participate in the ‘expression of will’
voting,” Hovhannisyan adds.

Even though Eduard Sharmazanov, the spokesman for the President Serzh
Sargsyan-led ruling Republican Party of Armenia, considers the
statement to be “a constructive statement containing positive
elements,” he still stresses: “Armenia does not embrace it with open
arms.”

“We are concerned over the sequence of [Nagorno-Karabakh issue]
normalization basic principles included in the document. First ‘the
return of occupied territories’ is mentioned, and only then - ‘the
interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh’; whereas we are interested in
their being simultaneous, or the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status
must be settled first,” Sharmazanov told ArmeniaNow.

In spite of the concerns, on June 27, Foreign Minister of Armenia
Edward Nalbandyan stated that he was pleased with the statement, and
that he “commended the desire and consistent efforts of international
mediators in supporting the sides to bring their positions closer and
move forward with the peaceful settlement of the conflict.”

Dashnaktsutyun’s Hovhannisyan is opposed to this position and urges
the authorities “not to indulge in self-deception and to admit that
the statement is a crushing defeat.”


Click here for the original (English) version of the text of the
statement of the presidents of Russia, the United States and France on
Karabakh as per the White House:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/g8-summit-joint-statement-nagorno-kar
abakh

Click here for the official Kremlin version of the same text in
Russian (translated from the original):
http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/623


hetq.am
Wishful Thinking versus Reality
[ 2010/06/28 | 10:53 ]
politics

The minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Armenia, citing the
statement made by the heads of the states of the OSCE Minsk Group,
said the following: "The final status of Karabakh must be decided by a
legally-binding expression of will by the people of Nagorno-Karabakh."
(lragir.am, 27 June, 2010)

There is no such phrase in the actual statement. The statement does
not clearly outline who is included in those expressing their will,
whether it is the population of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous
Oblast, the current Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, or the Republic of
Azerbaijan. It is not clear as such as to who is expressing any will;
perhaps those in charge in Baku, perhaps some group clumped together
in Baku today or tomorrow proclaiming itself to be the legal
representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh.

I believe that the minister has gotten confused over the (working)
Russian version: "определение будущего, окончательного правового
статуса Нагорного Карабаха путем имеющего обязательную юридическую
силу волеизъявления его населения" ("determining the future, final
legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh by having a legally-binding
expression of will of its population"). The official English text of
this phrase is as follows: "final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be
determined in the future by a legally-binding expression of will." The
expression "его населения" ("of its population") is missing in the
official English version.

There is also another important difference between this paragraph as
it appears officially and in the Russian version. The Russian refers
to the determination of a legal status ("определение... правового
статуса"), whereas the word "legal" does not appear in the official
text.

In logical terms as well as from the perspective of international law,
the fate of any territory ought to be determined by the people of that
territory. That is the real essence of self-determination. If someone
else is to determine your future, then what kind of self-determination
is that? However, are we seeing much of anything reasonable in the
leadership of Azerbaijan and, what is worse, in the steps taken by the
OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs?

Ara Papian
Head of the Modus Vivendi Centre
27 June, 2010

P.S. This analysis of details does not at all imply that I accept the
rationale presented to resolve the issue over Artsakh, when
Nagorno-Karabakh is a priori viewed as part of Azerbaijan without any
legal basis, and the attempts are being made to come up with some
solution or other given that condition.

When I was a child, in order that there be peace in our region - which
was the playground at that time - the grown-ups would tell us, "There
is blood in rocks." Now we must tell our grown-ups (we are forced to
admit today that the co-chairs are in that position), "There is blood
in what you propose."


Interfax, Russia
June 24 2010
Azerbaijan to continue to build up military might - President Aliyev
BAKU June 24

Azerbaijan's defense spending is currently $2.15 billion, said Azeri
President Ilham Aliyev, who attended the final stage of the
large-scale military exercise on Thursday.

Over the past few years Azerbaijan has increased its defense spending
13 times, which currently stands at $2.15 billion, the president told
the servicemen after the exercise ended, the AzTV state television
reported.

This means that the goal set a few years ago has been achieved, he
said. "Azerbaijan will continue to build its military might and steps
aimed at producing defense products will continue," Aliyev said.

Currently, the main goal is to free the occupied territories of
Azerbaijan, the president added. Nagorno-Karabakh is the historical
territory of Azerbaijan, he said.

According to earlier reports citing a statement of the Azerbaijan
Defense Ministry, the exercise is aimed at "planning cooperation
between various forces with a view to repel an armed aggression
against Azerbaijan; practicing a subsequent offensive operation
involving various forces and units with the use of modern weaponry and
aviation systems to destroy the enemy; and destroying the enemy's
forces so as to finally restore Azerbaijan's territorial integrity."
kk dp (Our editorial staff can be reached at eng.editors@interfax.ru)

On the Possibility of War in Karabakh
asbarez
Thursday, June 24th, 2010
BY ARA PAPIAN

I agree with the opinion expressed many times that, when it comes to
Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh), the policies which Ilham Aliyev follows
are based largely on domestic factors. Ilham, as his father, belongs
to that school of politicians for which only power is sacrosanct,
bringing about possibilities of pocketing immense sums with such
status. Accordingly, it is from this perspective that one must examine
the possibility of Aliev unleashing war on the Artsakh front.

Any war comprises of serious and unpredictable consequences for the
authorities in power. Ilham Aliyev, I believe, has not forgotten that
power has changed hands in Azerbaijan as a result of military defeat
in Artsakh. Does Aliyev currently have any guarantees of bringing the
Armenian side to its knees through a war? I am convinced that that is
not the case. What is more, the probability that Azerbaijan would have
more territorial losses in a war is much greater.

Let us also try to understand at what cost Azerbaijan would gain a
hypothetical victory over Artsakh. If we go so far as to imagine the
impossible, say, that the Azerbaijani armed forces manage to destroy
the Armenian army (something which cannot occur with regards to an
army entrenched in defensive positions) and get rid of all the
Armenians of Artsakh (it is a reality that this war is not just
between two armies, but also between two peoples), what would be the
situation in Azerbaijan then? Adding to the tens of thousands of those
killed in the war, Azerbaijan would find itself at the edge of utter
economic collapse.

As a state, Azerbaijan survives today solely due to the export of oil
and natural gas. It is through their sale that Azerbaijan arms itself
now and regu - larly swaggers against Artsakh and Armenia. That is, oil
wells, oil and gas pipelines and other such infrastruc - ture are
objects of strategic importance and consequently legitimate targets.
Is it not evident that, at the very first hours of the war, there
shall remain but smoking metal scrap where they used to be?

It is also important to emphasise that Azerbaijan cannot carry out
similar counter-measures, as the Armenian economy, even with all its
shortcomings, is incomparably less vulnerable, since we do not have
two or three structures whose destruction would result in the
cessation of our exports, and thus 90% of our actual income.

Besides which, Aliyev has to answer not just to his own people, but to
all the foreign companies that have made immense investments in this
sphere and of which many have not yet broken even. What does Aliyev
need a war for? The Emir of Baku is quite content by himself, milking
the mineral wealth of an entire country and keeping the majority of
the people of that country, the legal owners of the vast wealth of
that country, in extreme poverty. Aliyev uses fanatic anti-Armenianism
in order to sustain his stolen power and to maintain his stolen
wealth.

Aliyev is a straight-up thief - those who rob power are robbers still
- and so his heart is always in straits. Consequentially, although I
find war highly improbable, it still cannot be completely ruled out.
In tense situations, wars may also arise by themselves. However, as a
planned political move, I believe that Aliyev would go for such an
adventure (there would be no other word for it) in one case alone,
that is, when Aliyev's own standing in Azerbaijan be so weakened, that
it would be difficult to ensure the possibility for Aliyev to yet
again acquire power through cheating and falsifications. That is to
say, one must view all political developments of the Emirate of Baku
through the perspective of maintaining the Aliyevs' wealth and
position. When war remains the sole path for Ilham Aliyev to maintain
his hold on power, he will go for it.

However, as there is almost no real opposition currently in
Azerbaijan, I do not think that the Emir feels directly threatened by
anyone. Ilham Aliyev is not himself interested in either the victory
or even the defeat of the Azerbaijani army today. People are
unforgiving towards defeated emirs in the Orient; at the same time,
nothing is as dangerous for a tyrant of the Orient as the soldiers and
general of a victorious army.


Nagorno-Karabakh timeline: 2009-2010
By Karl Rahder
Sunday, June 27 3:29 pm EST

click on
(http://caucasus.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/06/27/nagorno-karabakh-timeline-2009-2010/
for the timeline)
Radio Free Europe reports that the Iranian ambassador to Armenia has
warned publicly against the insertion of US peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabakh
in the event of a comprehensive settlement of the 1992-94 war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan. In a Yerevan news conference on June 23, Seyed Ali Saghaeyan claimed that
the United States is eager to station troops in the Fizuli district, most of which was seized by
Armenian forces during the war and remains occupied. Fizuli borders Iran, and the
ambassador maintained that the presence of US forces would constitute a threat.
Armenian troops continue to occupy all or part of seven districts surrounding Nagorno
-Karabakh proper, and the fate of these districts is one of the key components in the
ongoing peace talks sponsored by the OSCE’s Minsk Group. The Minsk Group’s three
co-chair states–Russia, France, and the US–continue to attempt to broker a final
settlement.

I don’t intend to post a history of the conflict here or an analysis of the negotiations. But I do
want to comment briefly on the strange assertion by the Iranian ambassador, and then follow
with a timeline of major diplomatic events regarding Karabakh for the years 2009-10.

Briefly, it has been a given for many years that peacekeeping forces would be necessary
following the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the seven districts. I think the reasoning is
twofold: neutral military forces would act as a deterrent to war initiated by either side, and
such troops would protect Azeri refugees (”IDPs” - or internally displaced persons) who had
returned to their former homes in Karabakh itself. The presence of a peacekeeping force
as well as the return of IDPs is addressed in the so-called “Basic Principles” which were
enunciated in 2006 and updated in 2009. (See the timeline.)

But it has also been mentioned often–with no one that I am aware of objecting to this
interpretation –that peacekeeping forces would consist of personnel from nations that are
not Minsk Group co-chair states. That means no Russian, French, or American forces.

So why did the ambassador feel it necessary to make his point? Why did he go so far as to
say that Iran would ”not allow the deployment of American forces”? I doubt that he has inside
information, and I strongly doubt that the US wants suddenly to deploy troops in yet another
hot spot. Why should the US desire to get involved in potentially deadly encounters between
two of its Caucasus allies? It doesn’t make sense. Let’s just assume that the ambassador
is nervous and wanted to spell it out clearly for the Americans: keep off the grass.

At any rate, below is a timeline of Karabakh-related diplomacy for 2009-2010 (or at least
late June 2010). I don’t claim that it’s complete - it’s something I’ve cobbled together from
the major and minor developments in the recent past. But it’s utterly fascinating for several
reasons. Most importantly, I think, are the apparent significant concessions made by both
sides in the late spring and early summer of last year, more or less corresponding to the
Prague summit between President Aliyev and President Sargsyan, and then more than six
months later during and after talks in Munich.

The most interesting development, it seems to me, was an apparently major
concession from President Aliyev, who told Russian TV in July of 2009 that the final
status of Karabakh ”will be solved only when the parties agree on that. This could
happen in one year, in ten years, in 100 years, or this could never happen. Time will
tell.”

I may be wrong (an Azeri friend of mine, the analyst Leila Aliyeva, says I am, yes you are
wrong! this is undeterminate language), but that sounds like a huge concession.
Did Aliyev tell his Russian interviewer that he could live in a world where Karabakh proper
would not be absorbed into Azerbaijan?
Would he give up that dream in order to get the seven districts returned?
That’s what I think he said. If the Armenians ever agree to this, there would have to be a
concomitant agreement from Azerbaijan forswearing the use of force to re-take Karabakh.

But the idea never got any traction in public, and the Azeri press didn’t comment on the
President’s statement.