Sabre rattling in the Caucusus?

TURKEY'S GUL VISITS AZERBAIJAN: A CASE OF SOUND AND FURY?
EurasiaNet
Aug 17 2010
NY

Turkish President Abdullah Gul ended a two-day official visit to Baku
on August 17 with the signing of a strategic partnership agreement,
but the details remain a guessing game. Local analysts say that they
are left to conclude that the trip, coming a few days before Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Armenia, was meant mostly for
consultations.

At a post-meeting press conference, Gul and Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev only broached the new Agreement on Strategic Partnership and
Mutual Support in general terms. Calling the deal "historic," Aliyev
declared that the agreement defines "the future of [our] bilateral
relations of brotherhood for decades." Gul added that the Agreement
will let the two countries reinforce and develop "our solidarity."

Despite those descriptions, the text of the agreement has not yet
been published - for reasons that remain unclear.

The possibility of joint foreign investments in third countries was
one form of partnership Aliyev identified, but Azerbaijan's ongoing
conflict with Armenia over the breakaway region of Nagorno Karabakh
is an area where some observers looked more sharply for cooperation.

Neither leader, however, had anything new to state on the topic
to reporters.

Gul repeated earlier statements about the need to liberate Azerbaijan's
occupied territories; Aliyev, once again, predicted that the talks
with Yerevan over Karabakh could end soon if "Armenia will take a
constructive position and would respect international law."

Baku political analyst Elhan Shahinoglu, head of the Atlas think-tank,
believes that Gul's visit served more for consultations on regional
problems than for hammering out detailed plans of action on Karabakh
or other issues. "And, of course, it served to show that earlier
serious problems between Ankara and Baku are completely overcame,"
Shahinoglu commented in reference to past differences with Turkey
over Turkish reconciliation with Armenia and gas delivery to Europe.

Making that show might appear to come at a critical time for Baku.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev is scheduled to travel to Yerevan
on August 19 and to sign a 49-year lease agreement on a Russian base
in Armenia. [For details, see the EurasiaNet.org archive.]

Neither Shahinoglu nor other Azerbaijani analysts interviewed by
EurasiaNet.org believed, however, that any link exists between
Medvedev's upcoming visit and Gul's appearance in Baku. The Russian
leader is also expected to travel to Azerbaijan sometime in September.

Nonetheless, Gul and Aliyev most likely discussed what "adequate
steps" Baku could take in response to Moscow's proposed base deal
with Armenia, Shahinoglu said.

"The deepening of military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey
is now especially important for Baku. It does not mean that Turkey
will deploy a military base in Azerbaijan soon. But some steps could
be taken . . ." he elaborated.

Analyst Zardusht Alizade contends that Gul most likely pushed Aliyev
for some form of agreement with Armenia as a means for moving ahead
toward a resolution of the 22-year conflict.

But Rasim Musabekov, another Baku-based political analyst, believes
that Baku maintained its objections to any reopening of Turkey's border
with Armenia as a way to advance such an agreement. While Aliyev may
have expected some firm statement of support for Azerbaijan from
Gul during the visit, "I did not hear anything new in the Turkish
president's public statements," Musabekov said.

Aside from "long-term peace in the Caucasus," the Turkish presidency's
website named energy as another topic for discussion with Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev, but the issue vanished from public view during
Gul's trip.

Eliminating Azerbaijan's visa requirements for Turkish citizens was
another topic earlier named by Ankara. Turkey unilaterally scrapped
its visa requirement for Azerbaijan in 2009 and expects a similar
step from Baku. The issue received only a sliver more of attention
at the press conference, however.

Responding to a Turkish reporter, Aliyev said that "this issue has
to be resolved via internal technical procedures in Azerbaijan."

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov named a similar problem
in December 2009.

"It's difficult to believe that Baku was not able to solve it during
eight months," Shahinoglu commented about the red-tape snags.

Rather, Shahinoglu believes that Iran is the reason for Baku's
hesitation. Earlier this year, Iran unilaterally eliminated its visa
requirements for Azerbaijan. [For details, see the EurasiaNet.org
archive.]

"If Baku does it with Turkey, then Iran will expect similar steps,"
Shahinoglu noted. "But the Azerbaijani government does not want to
have a visa-free regime with the Iranians."

Does that mean a fresh tussle to come between the South Caucasus'
regional players? Don't look for it in the near future. "Generally
I do not think that this visit has seriously changed anything in
current regional geopolitics," Musabekov said.

Editor's note: Shahin Abbasov is a freelance correspondent
based in Baku. He is also a board member of the Open Society
Institute-Azerbaijan.

RUSSIAN-ARMENIAN DEFENSE PACT 'WILL AVERT NEW WAR

IN KARABAKH'
Ruzanna Stepanian
Armenialiberty.org
Aug 17 2010

Armenia's deepening military cooperation with Russia will cement the
balance of forces in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and discourage
Azerbaijan from attempting to resolve it by force, President Serzh
Sarkisian's Republican Party (HHK) said on Tuesday.

Sarkisian and his Russian counterpart, Dmitry Medvedev, are expected to
sign significant amendments to a 1995 treaty regulating the presence
of a Russian military base in Armenia after talks in Yerevan later
this week.

The amendments will extend Russia's basing rights by 24 years, to 2044,
and upgrade the mission of its troops headquartered in Gyumri.

They stipulate that the troops will be supposed to not only protect
"interests of the Russian Federation" but also "ensure the security
of the Republic of Armenia" jointly with the Armenian army. They
also commit Russia to supplying its regional ally with "modern and
compatible weaponry and special military hardware."

Eduard Sharmazanov, the spokesman for the ruling HHK, confirmed that
Armenia is reinforcing its military alliance with Russia in response
to Azerbaijan's ongoing military build-up and regular war threats.

"If we want to have adequate national security, especially considering
statements made by our eastern and western neighbors, we need to
be able to develop counterbalancing mechanisms," he told a news
conference. "And I think that the agreement to extend the deployment
of that base is also aimed at ensuring the balance of forces."

Sharmazanov claimed that the new defense pact will "practically rule
out a military solution to the Karabakh problem." "That is important
not only for the Republic of Armenia but also long-term peace and
stability in the region," he said.

Speaking to RFE/RL's Armenian service on Friday, Razmik Zohrabian,
an HHK deputy chairman, said that the amended treat will oblige Moscow
to support the Armenian side in case of renewed fighting in Karabakh.

Armenian critics of the deal, among them some opposition politicians,
dismiss such claims, arguing that a new Armenian-Azerbaijani war
would unfold in Karabakh and surrounding territories that are not
an internationally recognized part of Armenia. They are worried that
Armenia would only become even more dependent on Russia.

Sharmazanov rejected the criticism as "inappropriate and populist."

He insisted that the treaty amendments will be good for Armenia.

AZERBAIJAN 500 TIMES FIRED AT KARABAKH POSITIONS

WITHIN TWO DAYS
news.am
Aug 17 2010
Armenia

On August 14-16, 32 ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani side
were registered in the contact line between the Azerbaijani and NKR
armed forces.

The Azerbaijani units over 500 times sniped at the Karabakh positions
in the Hadrut, Martuni, Askeran and Martakert regions, NKR Ministry
of Defense press service informed NEWS.am. With retaliatory fire the
NKR Defense Army neutralized the enemy.

RASIM MUSABAYOV: TURKEY CAN DEPLOY MILITARY BASE IN

GANJA AND NAKHCHIVAN
AzeriReport
Aug 17 2010
Azerbaijan

BAKU. August 17, 2010: Strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and
Turkey exists since Azerbaijan has gained its independence in 1991,
said Rasim Musabayov, political expert and former foreign policy
adviser to the Azerbaijani president, commenting on the Azeri-Turkish
agreement on strategic partnership and mutual understanding which
was signed yesterday.

Musabayov does not rule out the inclusion of the new provisions on
military and military-technical cooperation to the existing agreement.

Musabayov said it may be an Azeri response to the new Russian-Armenian
Military agreement.

In reality, the presence of the Russian militaryin Armenia will not
increase. "The term of the presence of the Russian military base in
Armenia is 25 years. And the prolongation of the agreement was anyhow
intended by the agreement.

"It was noted that the base serves the Russian interests and the new
provision in the agreement says the military base in that area will
serve the Armenian national interests, as well. However, the base has
already been involved in protecting the Armenian national interests
and half of its personnel are local Armenians," Musabayov said.

Russia cannot threaten Azerbaijan with its base consisting of 5,000
people, and Russia is quite restricted in supplying that military
base. If Armenia and Russia revise their military agreements, then
Turkey and Azerbaijan can do the same. For example, the two countries
have agreement on providing for the security of the pipelines and
this cooperation can be deepened, said Musabayov.

Iran and Armenia already threatened pipelines, and the Russian invasion
to Georgia in 2008 was a real threat for the pipelines.

Turkey can provide the anti-air defense for the pipelines and deploy
its mobile forces in Ganja, Musabayov thinks.

Musabayov thinks that the establishment of the Turkish Military base
in Nakhchivan can be real. "Let Armenia think that its frontiers are
protected, and it can easily send its troops to Garabagh to fight
at Azerbaijan's territory. The establishment of the Turkish base
in Nakhchivan will make Armenians think about protection against
the threats from the Azerbaijani military forces in Nakhchivan,"
Musabayov said.

Speaking about the Garabagh negotiations, the expert said the Russian
attempts to distance from previously agreed Madrid Principles during
the St. Petersburg meetings showed that it was impossible to pressure
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan reacted immediately, and it was expressed in
issuing a short-term credit to Alexander Lukashenko, Ilham Aliyev's
visit to Georgia and discussing the question on trans-Caspian gas
deliveries without Russia.

Musabayov considers if Russia has interests in Azerbaijan, then
president Dmitry Medvedev in September must have new ideas for
resolving Garabagh conflict. He has to let Azerbaijan know about
those ideas during his visit in September to Baku.

Moreover, in the end of this year a summit of the OSCE will take place
for the first time since 1999, and the work of Minsk Group will be
assessed. In case of progress, this cooperation could be replaced by
other initiatives.

Responding the question on the reasons of absence progress in the
question on eliminating of visa between Azerbaijan and Turkey,
Musabayov said there were certain moments which must be settled.

"Visa regime with Turkey and Iran is connected with the possibility
of having unwanted people entering Azerbaijan from third countries,"
he said. Musabayov said he hoped that a mechanism for preventing such
threats would be found, and visa regime with Turkey would be eased up
(Turan).

RUSSIAN MP SEES NO MISSILE SALE TO AZERBAIJAN
Sargis Harutyunyan
Armenialiberty.org
Aug 17 2010

A senior Russian parliamentarian on Tuesday expressed skepticism over
reports that Russia plans to sell sophisticated air-defense systems
to Azerbaijan despite serious concerns in Armenia.

Citing Russian arms industry sources, Russia's "Vedomosti" business
daily reported late last month that Azerbaijan last year signed a
deal with the Rosoboronexport arms exporter to purchase two batteries
of S-300 anti-aircraft systems worth $300 million. A Rosoboronexport
spokesman denied the report, saying that the state-run company "has
no contractual obligations whatsoever on this matter."

The Russian Defense Ministry has declined to confirm or refute it.

Unnamed ministry officials have been quoted by Russian media as making
conflicting statements about the veracity of the information.

In a phone interview with RFE/RL's Armenian service, Konstantin
Zatulin, the deputy chairman of a Russian State Duma committee on
former Soviet republics, claimed to be unaware of any missile deals
struck by Moscow and Baku.

"I don't think that such developments will occur anytime soon,
especially given that Azerbaijan .... is stepping up its militaristic
rhetoric," he said. "It's a bad moment for supplying weaponry to a
country that's making such statements."

Zatulin argued that although Russian-Azerbaijani relations are
presently "good," Moscow is "categorically against the resumption of
hostilities and attempts to solve the Karabakh conflict by military
means." "I am convinced that the Russian Federation will use all
possible methods of preventing an escalation or resumption of
hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh," he said.

Originally designed in the late 1970s and repeatedly upgraded since
then, the S-300 system is widely regarded as one of the world's
most potent anti-aircraft weapons. Its surface-to-air missiles have a
firing range of up to 200 kilometers, and its radars can simultaneously
track up to 100 targets, including both aircraft and cruise missiles.

Russia deployed at least one battery of S-300s at its military base
in Armenia in the late 1990s, significantly reinforcing the country's
air defenses. The two countries have since been jointly protecting
Armenia's airspace.

Zatulin, who also runs a Kremlin-linked think-tank in Moscow and
specializes in the South Caucasus, underlined the importance of
an upcoming agreement that will deepen Russian-Armenian military
cooperation. "In all likelihood, there is a need to both underline
the enduring value of Russian-Armenian relations and complement this
document with new content," he said, commenting on Moscow's motives.

"In the existing situation in the South Caucasus, it is
extremely important that there be no doubts about the strength of
Russian-Armenian ties, since there are quite a lot of insinuations on
this score and the development of Armenia's relations with Azerbaijan
and Turkey leaves much to be de desired," added the lawmaker.

The deal, which will take the form of amendments to a 1995
Russian-Armenian defense treaty, will commit the Russians' to supplying
more modern weaponry to the Armenian military.

Asked just how significant fresh Russian arms supplies are likely to
be, Zatulin replied, "In my view, one should get the answer [to this
question] from the Armenian side in the first instance, one should
hear the opinion of Armenian military officials. Do they think they
are satisfied with cooperation with Russia?"

Zatulin asserted in that context that Russian military assistance
to Armenia helped to stop the war in Karabakh in 1994 and prevented
its resumption. "I think that our cooperation is developing very
positively, and, as a rule, Armenian military officials are welcome
guests in Russia, both at military academies and those enterprises
that produce military hardware," he said.

What Game Theory Can Tell Us About a Possible Armenian

-Azerbaijani Conflict
August 18, 2010
Nicholas Clayton

Nicholas Clayton lives in Tbilisi, Georgia and works as a professor of
journalism and a freelance reporter covering the Caucasus. Having
studied NATO-Russian relations at Hertzen University in St.
Petersburg, Russia in 2007, Clayton began blogging about the
geo-politics ...
Read more about Nicholas Clayton ->

The four-year-old International School of Economics at Tbilisi State
University (ISET) in Tbilisi, Georgia was founded to unite students
and faculty from all three South Caucasus countries for a
Western-style education in economics. And, as if undergoing a rite of
passage in its growth as an institution, it underwent its first major
academic controversy this year.


Students were agitated, donors threatened to withdraw funding and an
ambassador warned of unilateral sanctions.

What caused all the fuss? — A master’s thesis that used game theory to
create a model for the probability of war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.

Ani Harutyunyan, 23, originally of Vanadzor, Armenia, set out last
November to create a model that could determine the probability of
all-out war breaking out between the two countries over the disputed
territory of Nagorno-Karabakh based on a variety of factors.

Now, mind you, creating a game theory model is not the same as
predicting whether war will happen or not – it’s not a magic eight
ball.

Basically it works like this: say you are hungry and the two main
factors governing your action are price of the food and deliciousness
of the food. You have three options to choose from:

1.) Don’t eat. You save your money, but you don’t resolve the problem.

2.) Throw something together at home. You expend very little money,
but, although your bachelor-pad-borne concoction is filling, it’s
hardly gourmet.

3.) Go out to eat. You’ll have to pony up some dough, but you’ll get
some good food out of it.

And so, if you make a formula out of those choices and input
subjective number values for your culinary pickiness and current level
of poverty, one can compute which action you are most likely to take.

Harutyunyan’s thesis created the formula for the major factors that
would play into what Azerbaijan would demand as a settlement in the
peace negotiations and what Armenia would be willing to accept, with
renewed war being the probable result of a total deadlock; but she did
not input her own subjective numbers to find a result. As Harutyunyan
put it, “unlike journalists, scientists never make conclusions
explicitly” (like I did earlier this month).

Nonetheless, her model and the thesis’ conclusions are quite interesting.

The basis of the model puts the Defender (Armenia) at the negotiating
table with the Challenger (Azerbaijan). Because Armenia currently
holds the territory that Azerbaijan wants, it is more or less
satisfied with the status quo and is less likely to make a deal in
which it sacrifices territory unless it is facing a war it thinks it
will lose.

Azerbaijan wants the territory, but in assessing the war option it
must decide if the costs of fighting the war are worth the benefits of
potentially regaining control of Nagorno-Karabakh and other
territories currently held by Armenia. The more Armenia believes
Azerbaijan, which is more powerful militarily, is willing to go to
war, the more amenable it will be towards cutting a deal.

The X-factor is the potential for third-party intervention as both
Armenia and Azerbaijan have much larger allies in the region – Russia
and Turkey respectively. The mood of each nation towards intervention
on a scale of “reluctant” to “motivated” then factors into each side’s
stance.

However, the most important factor in the formula — as in most wars —
is information. The study found that “there is no risk of war when
disputants are perfectly informed about each other’s costs, the
distribution of power, utilities for different outcomes.”

“However,” the paper continues, “states are rarely informed about each
other completely.”

The paper also presupposes logical thinking on both sides, as well as
the audience, which may have been a stretch.

As Harutyunyan presented her thesis this May to a mixed audience of
Georgians, Armenians and Azeris in Tbilisi, she got heckles and
interruptions – mostly from Azeri students objecting to a map used in
the presentation which showed Nagorno-Karabakh and other Armenian-held
territories shaded a different color from Azerbaijan. Some students
shot video with their cell phones, although the university was filming
the presentation as well.

When it came time for group discussion the room was silent. The
shouting would start a few days later.

Karine Torosyan, a professor of economics at ISET, said that some
students complained to school advisors and within days the university
received a letter from the embassy of Azerbaijan in Georgia demanding
Harutyunyan rewrite her thesis on a different topic or Azerbaijan
would take steps to prevent Azeri students from attending ISET and
would impede the school’s activities in the country.

Furthermore, the school, which is supported by British Petroleum, the
World Bank and various other organizations and governments, began
receiving calls from donors expressing concern over the thesis,
intimating that future grants and donations hung in the balance.

Torosyan said the university held a series of meetings with concerned
embassy officials, who said they believed in freedom of speech, but
wanted the university to guard against “uncivilized discourse.”

ISET didn’t budge.

In the end, the university agreed to set up a faculty academic
integrity committee to deal with future controversies but accepted the
thesis and awarded Harutyunyan her master’s degree.

Torosyan said the university has not faced any consequences thus far
from the Azerbaijani government or independent donors, but the fact
that such a risk remained was “very embarrassing” for academia in the
region.

In some ways, the reaction to Harutyunyan’s thesis tells nearly as
much about the potential for resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict as the thesis itself. The issue is so sensitive that the
roles could have easily been switched. Had the paper been written by
an Azeri student and presented with a map that showed Karabakh and the
other territories shaded the same color as Azerbaijan, it’s likely it
would have received a similarly dismissive and off-put reaction from
Armenians.

But Harutyunyan, for her part, said she reflects unfazed by the
controversy that could have cost her her MA.

“Come on, it was funny for me all that,” she said. “What can I think?
You wrote something, you are open for discussion, you want to reveal
things, but then you are told to shut up