Articles from the Turkish Press‏

TURKEY: DAVUTOGLU'S TO-DO LIST
www.stratfor.com
26 April 2010

Following his trip to the United States, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu traveled to Azerbaijan April 19, after which he will travel
to Iran. Though Ankara and Washington are pursuing a fresh diplomatic
attempt to simultaneously restore Turkish-Armenian ties and resolve
territorial differences between Azerbaijan and Armenia, they will
continue to face heavy resistance from both Baku and Moscow in their
efforts. Meanwhile, Turkey will use the Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute
to involve Iran in another regional affair, thereby showing Ankara's
capacity as a potential mediator between the United States and Iran.

Analysis Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu traveled to
Azerbaijan April 19 after departing from Washington, where he and
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with U.S. officials
to discuss the contentious issues of Turkish-Armenian diplomatic
normalization and a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

During Erdogan's stay, U.S. President Barack Obama was firm with
Erdogan in expressing Washington's desire for Turkey to move forward
in signing the parliamentary protocols to reopen Turkey's border
with Armenia. A stronger Turkish presence in the Caucasus would,
in the United States' view, pose a counter to Russian influence in
the region and potentially expands trade and transit from the Middle
East to Central Asia without having to traverse Russian territory - a
growing strategic need for the United States as it seeks to militarily
extricate itself from Iraq and transfer resources to Afghanistan.

Turkey, however, has demanded in return that the United States, along
with France and Russia, first do their part within the Minsk Group
to pressure Armenia into conceding on Nagorno-Karabakh. Only then,
Turkey argues, can it effectively deal with Azerbaijan, which has been
alienated by the Turkish-Armenian negotiations and has consequently
grown closer to Russia, putting Turkey's and Western Europe's energy
diversification plans at risk. According to STRATFOR sources in
Turkey, Erdogan and Obama have come up with a preliminary proposal
that would entail Armenia publicly outlining a road map to withdraw
from a certain mountainous section of Nagorno-Karabakh. That way,
Turkey can distance itself from the Minsk Group's efforts and show
at least some progress on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue to move forward
with the Armenia protocols.

It is thus up to Turkey to convince Azerbaijan to go along with this
proposal (hence Davutoglu's trip to Baku) and up to the United States
to convince Armenia to make this public concession. Success is not
assured in either effort, particularly given the history of past road
maps that have ended in stalemate and as Russia, which has significant
influence over Armenia and growing influence over Azerbaijan, will
be expected to scuttle this latest proposal.

Indeed, Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian has been called up for a
visit to Moscow April 20 to discuss the latest U.S.-Turkish push on the
protocols. STRATFOR sources in Armenia say Russia is urging Sarkisian
to push for legislation that would allow the president to withdraw
from an agreement with Turkey at any time without parliamentary
approval. Such a move would allow Russia more freedom to hamper the
talks when the need arises.

Azerbaijan, meanwhile, is already angry at the United States for not
including it in the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April
12, where Armenian, Turkish and U.S. officials met on the sidelines
to discuss this issue. Baku's anger could be seen in Azerbaijan's
cancellation of joint military drills with the United States planned
for May.

While the United States has been firm with Turkey on the issue of
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Turkey has been just as firm with the United
States in defending Iran. Davutoglu is scheduled to leave Baku for
Tehran to inform the Iranian leadership of the results of his meetings
in Washington. In defiance of the U.S.-hosted Nuclear Security Summit,
Iran hosted its own nuclear summit in Tehran April 17-18 and is
feeling confident about its ability to deflect U.S. pressure on its
nuclear activities.

For Turkey to demonstrate that it is playing a useful mediator role in
this conflict, it needs to show it can carry some influence with Iran.

For this reason, Turkey likely will entertain Iran's efforts to get
involved in other regional disputes, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, as a way of recognizing Iran's regional clout to earn
Tehran's trust in the ongoing nuclear negotiations.

Moreover, involving Iran in the negotiations is a way to further dilute
Turkey's responsibility over the Nagorno-Karabakh affair and provide
Ankara with more room to maneuver in its negotiations with Armenia. To
this end, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki announced April
19 that Iran will host a meeting among foreign ministers from Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Iran. Iran does not carry nearly as much influence in
this dispute as Turkey and Russia, but it is another foreign policy
arena for Tehran to project its influence with Turkey's endorsement.

(the following article deminstrates Turkey's subservience to the Azeris)

Hurriyet

Armenia's failed maneuver

Thursday, April 22, 2010

YUSUF KANLI

Armenia’s three-way coalition government, which enjoys a clear majority

in the country’s parliament, has reversed its earlier decision to complete

“within days” the parliamentary ratification of the protocols on normalization

of relations with Turkey.

The government put the blame for its decision on Turkey’s acting slow in

ratifying the deal “without preconditions and in a reasonable timeframe.”

Why, all of a sudden, did Armenia decide last month to seek ratification

of the protocols normalizing relations with Turkey, and why has it now

decided to halt the ratification process? Did Turkey change its position

and promise Yerevan that it has given up its key demand of Armenia

actually withdrawing, or convincingly pledging to withdraw, from the

occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, or at least from five of the seven

Azerbaijani regions around the disputed, Armenian-populated area?

Did Armenia withdraw from those five regions, erasing Turkey’s concerns?

Or did the Minsk Group’s efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem

and bring an end to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory

produce some tangible results, satisfying both Turkey and Azerbaijan?

Has anything changed?

Armenia is claiming that Ankara is imposing “alien” preconditions on the

ratification of the protocols. Indeed, there is no reference in the protocols

to either the Nagorno-Karabakh issue or the continued occupation of

Azerbaijani territory. That was, and is, one of the leading complaints of

many Turks and Azerbaijanis regarding the protocols, even though, by and

large, a vast majority of Turkish citizens have welcomed the idea of

improved relations with Armenia and have commended the government

for making such a move.

Obviously, if the border with Armenia was closed due to the Armenian

aggression and occupation of Azerbaijan territory, opening it must only

be in the cards if and when Armenia withdraws from Azerbaijani territory

and Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is reestablished. Irrespective of whether

such a condition was in the text of the protocols, Yerevan must obviously

have been aware that improving relations with Turkey and getting the

border gates reopened required its compliance with “good neighborliness,

” not only with Ankara but with all other countries of the region, led by

Azerbaijan, where it still has occupying troops.

And, obviously, there was a reference to the need to develop good

neighborly relations in the text of the Armenia protocols and thus there

was as well a written condition in the protocols implying in all clarity that

Yerevan is expected to give up its intransigence, stop its aggression and

start withdrawing from the occupied Azerbaijani territory.

Obviously, apart from the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and the issue of

the occupied Azerbaijani regions, Armenia is required to lift the

preconditions imposed on the interpretation of the protocols by its

Constitutional Court. It must also declare its recognition of the Kars and

Gyumri accords between Turkey and the former Soviet Union (and the

then-communist Armenian republic, which was part of the Soviet empire)

and thus officially recognize the existing borders between Turkey and

Armenia and declare it has no designs on Turkish territory.

Failed political ploy

Armenia’s move to start the process of ratifying the protocols was a

cunning political move designed to corner Turkey and force it to also

act on the ratification of the protocols. The present decision of the

Armenian coalition government to halt the parliamentary ratification

process is a political decision conceding that the earlier move has

failed to achieve the designed effect in Ankara. Furthermore, two days

in advance of the anniversary of the alleged “genocide,” the decision

to halt the process of ratification is aimed at increasing the pressure

on U.S. President Barack Obama to use the “g” word in his anniversary

statement. At the very least, it aims to take away a possible pretext that

might be used by the American president to avoid the use of the

contentious word.

It will not be the end of the world for Turkey should the American

president decides to use the “g” word. Of course, such a decision will

have a cost for both the U.S. and Turkey, but Armenia will pay more

for such a development.

Yerevan should understand that Turkey has extended it a hand in

peace and good neighborliness. If it wants to turn down that hand,

it will be its own choice...

Hurriyet

Shoah is all right; Holocaust isn’t
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
BURAK BEKDİL


Once again, the usual we-must-look-it-up-in-the-Thesaurus season in
Washington is over and we all can sigh with relief. The thesaurus must
have depleted its alternative entries for the word “genocide,” as
evidenced by President Barack Obama’s repeat of the words “Meds
Yeghern” in reference to the 1915 killings of Ottoman Armenians. So,
“Great Calamity” is all right. “Genocide” is not.

The U.S. president’s selection for this year’s April 24 menu has
confused hearts and minds. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was not
offended, but his Foreign Ministry was.

Some Turks were jubilant that President Obama avoided the term pushed
by diaspora Armenians and their congressional allies. Some took to the
streets and shouted, in protest, “Allah is the greatest!” as if they
were marching for jihad.

Apparently there is something sick in the Turkish psyche. Turks are
too prickly about being called genocide committers, but wear bitter
smiles when they are called “the committers of one of the greatest
atrocities of the 20th century,” or when their ancestors are accused
of causing a “devastating chapter.” Bizarre? Just “Turkishly”
confusing…

Another bullet dodged, and many Turks breathed easily in all corners
of America. Some may have told their Turkish-American sons and
daughters that they can now take a deep breathe and relax… See, it’s
just “one of the greatest atrocities of the past century,” or merely
“Meds Yeghern,” but not “genocide.”

The Armenians, on the other hand, must have thought of Mr. Obama as a
leader who ended up just like any other human being – for the second
time now, making promises he could not keep. It should not come as a
surprise though because presidents George H. Bush and George W. Bush
broke similar pledges, and President Bill Clinton leaned on Congress
not to pass genocide commemoration measures. Hearts and minds tend to
break.

Hence the Armenian National Committee of America’s statement,
describing Mr. Obama's declaration as “yet another disgraceful
capitulation to Turkey's threats, offering euphemisms and evasive
terminology to characterize this crime against humanity.”

Mr. Obama was probably cute enough when he also mentioned how
encouraged he was about the Armenian-Turkish dialogue, and the Turkish
domestic debate about the issue. He was fair and unfair, depending on
which side of the Alican border one lives, when he mentioned the Turks
who helped the victims of other Turks’ atrocities. All in all, his
abstention from the dangerous word was sufficient for many to be
content on the western side of the border, if not all together
jubilant; and sad and disappointed on the other side, if not angered.

As always, the Turks look divided. Serious faces in the corridors of
grey buildings; prickly, less prickly and too prickly statements in
reaction to the word “atrocities;” increased security around the
Turkish embassy and consulates in the United States; but for the time
being the Turkish ambassador to Washington seems not to be packing up
once again for another lengthy stay in Ankara.

President Obama’s speech was grey. Armenians were heart-broken and
felt cheated yet again. They believed the Turkish powers on the U.S.
were deep. Turks were not happy that the issue did not disappear from
the face of the earth, along with the victims’ bones, and that Mr.
Obama’s speech was ambiguous and not supportive enough of their cause.

But there was some good coming out of this sad day. More and more
Turks are making attempts to understand the issue and the scientific
proof of atrocities, or genocide, depending on which part you belong.
Three outdoor commemorations of the “Armenian Genocide” on April 24, a
lecture by a diaspora Armenian journalist in Istanbul and a two-day
conference on the “Armenian Genocide” in Ankara took place, while
obstacles, counter-protests and fascist rhetoric tried to disrupt the
events and reminded the few hundred participants of the long way
ahead.

Is it genocide? Will the much-spoken archives help? Will there be a
film soon, an adapted version of “Schindler’s List,” which not only
shows the torment but also those on the other side who helped the
victims? If the person who had coined the term genocide, Raphael
Lemkin, declares the Armenian tragedy as “genocide,” will that
suffice?

One thing is clear though. Whether or not we like the Obama speech, it
indicates that the president still opposes the “genocide” resolution,
and its likelihood to pass is now slimmer than before.

Could human nature not help us here to provide a convincing argument?
Could we not say: “Dear Armenians; we know you expect an apology but
apologies come from nations – in majority at least – who can accept
their faults, attempt to change and take lessons from their wrongs…
Sorry, that’s not yet us. See, just a day before your ‘commemoration,’
which was our Children’s Day, our beloved prime minister told the
‘child prime minister of the day:’ ‘You can do whatever you please,
you can hang them or use your sword, the choice is yours…’ So do not
take it personally, dear Armenians, it is not personal, this is us,
your neighbors. Hello!”

But let’s try to derive some crisis resolution methodology from the
“Obama jurisprudence” on the “genocide” dispute. Because for two years
in a row, Mr. Obama’s preferred term for the tragedies of 1915-1920 is
“Meds Yeghern,” will the president agree to a Turkish apology for
“Meds Yeghern,” instead of “genocide?” Why should he not propose to
Congress a resolution recognizing “Meds Yeghern” instead of
“genocide?” Not many Turks would care if they are accused of having
ancestors who had caused “Meds Yeghern.”

“Shoah” is all right; “genocide” is not.

(more balance in this article)

Hurriyet

A requiem for Armenians—a sequel

Tuesday, April 27, 2010

Mustafa AKYOL

My latest piece in these pages, “For the fear of God: A requiem for

Armenians,” proved to be quite controversial. And I, as usual, was

blamed by some readers for being a bunch of nasty things. (A “traitor”

to my own nation who is funded by evil foreigners, a “fake” Turk who

hides his crypto-Armenianness, or a deceitful Islamist hell-bent on

destroying secular Turkey.)

I am not going to waste my time by trying to explain that I am really

not the man in these caricatures — or that I really don’t have fangs

and claws. But let me try to explain why I wrote a requiem on April 24

for the Armenians who perished in 1915. Because I hope that the

reasoning (and the sentiment) that I followed might also help other

Turks build a more righteous attitude in this poisonous controversy.

A tale of two arguments

I have been listening to both sides of this controversy, Turks and

Armenians, for years. And I have realized that we Turks often use

two major arguments.

The first one is what I call the There-Was-A-Reason argument. By

this, we are trying to tell the world that the expulsion of Armenians

from Anatolia in 1915 was forced by a troublesome political context.

The Ottoman Empire was crumbling. It had seen its Muslim

populations slaughtered in the Balkans and the Caucasus by the

Russians and their allies. The Ottoman elite had reason to suspect

that Armenian nationalists were the fifth column of Russia, with which

they were at war. The same elite also feared that an independent

Armenia in the east would be disastrous for the Turks.

Now, this is all true. And I, too, have written about these in this very

paper. (“After All, Who Remembers the Ottoman Muslims?” on

Feb. 15, 2007, and “Let's Be Honest on Genocide” on March 9,

2010) But understanding the context of something is different from

seeing it as justified.

What we should honestly ask ourselves here is whether it was

justified to expel a million people from four corners of Eastern

Anatolia to the Syrian Desert. If this was done simply to “secure

the eastern border from Armenian militias,” as we often say, then

why not only men but also women, children and the elderly were

also driven out of their homes? Was it too hard to see that most

of those innocents could not survive the hundreds of miles of

marching under the brazing sun without food, water and shelter?

Was it too hard to see that some could even be pillaged, raped

and murdered?

These questions make me suspect that the “tehcir” (expulsion)

law of the young Turkish government of the time was something

more than a security measure. It rather seems to me as an ethnic

cleansing for some political design. And I don’t know you, but I,

as a rule, am passionately against all ethnic cleansings

— whether they might be committed by the Serbs against the

Bosnians, the Israelis against the Palestinians (see episodes

such as Deir Yassin), or by my own country against the Armenians.

At this point, I am sure, some of the Turkish readers will raise

the objection that I call the second major Turkish argument:

But-We-Were-Killed-Too.

And this is true as well. Turks suffered horrible massacres at the

hands of Armenians militias, in a few incidents before 1915, but

in a much larger vengeance campaign in 1916 and 1917, when

the Russian forces invaded several cities in northeastern Anatolia.

The cruelty inflicted on the Muslim population at that time has

become notoriously famous in Turkey, and we keep remembering

that. We also rightfully condemn modern-day Armenia for

occupying a large portion of Azerbaijani land, and creating a million

refugees (“qacqins”) living in terrible conditions.

Yet still, I believe, the fact that we Turks also suffered should not

make us blind and indifferent to the suffering on the other side,

whose proportions are undoubtedly much larger. The fact that we

remember and honor our own dead, in other words, should not

prevent us from feeling mercy and remorse for the hundreds of

thousands of perished Armenians.

The beginning of wisdom

My intention to speak of a “Muslim conscious” in my previous piece,

by referring to some muftis and other devout Ottomans who tried to

save the Armenians in 1915, was to bring in some new perspective

to this moral side of the issue, which I see as the heart of the matter.

I did not say, “Muslims do not commit genocide,” as Prime Minister

Erdoğan unconvincingly said in another context. I rather implied that

Muslims should not do such horrible things if they will remain true to

the principles of their faith, as some exemplary figures saw clearly

during the Armenian exodus.

This is important because a particularly Islamic critique of the tragedy

of 1915 might be the key to Turkey’s way forward. Until recently, those

who questioned the official narrative on this matter were only a bunch

of Western-educated secular liberals, whose language looked too

alien to the majority of society. But recently some conservative Muslim

pundits have also entered debate saying that their values are

represented by not the Young Turks, who were secular nationalists,

but the muftis who opposed the killings “for the fear of God.”

So, well, perhaps the Psalmist was really on to something. “The fear

of the Lord,” might really be, at least once in a while, “the beginning of

wisdom.”